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This thesis examines the counterfactuals, both syntactic and structural, of Virgil's Aeneid. These 
are alternative stories presented by speakers (primary narrator and characters) as conceivable 
but only partly or not at all materialized; they clash with the more visible story of the fated 
advent of Rome and Augustus. The purpose of the study is to envisage some alternatives to the 
Aeneid as readable from the actualization, in some cases already under way, of the 
counterfactuals scrutinized; these include the universe and the text not starting or collapsing, 
Troy surviving, the Greeks losing the Trojan war, Aeneas repeatedly failing to carry out his 
mission, and Turnus defeating him. Virgil's counterfactual language and images are examined in 
relation to a number of obvious sources as well as developments contemporary to Virgil, as 
relevant to the individual case: Homer (particularly if not constructions in the Iliad: A would 
have happened, if not B), pre-Stoic and Stoic studies of conditionals, linguistic changes in Latin 
(uses of the indicative / subjunctive and coordination / subordination), the practice of 
comparison between pairs of differently actualized entities in Livy and earlier historians 
(synkrisis) and political language in Horace. The main strands of modern thought on 
counterfactuality from logical, linguistic, narratological and psychological viewpoints are also 
taken into consideration. An attempt has been made to examine all syntactic counterfactuals 
spoken in the Aeneid, including some but not all cases of possible counterfactuals, such as 
wishes, and two types of structural counterfactuals: those which become such when characters 
are saved through the diversion of weapons, and those which depict partial Troys. The different 
types of analyses have been as far as possible integrated. My conclusion is that Virgil was 
revealing but also deflecting alternative stories to that of the destiny of Rome and Augustus as 
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Counterfactuals are particularly salient in the Aeneid because of the concept of fate that runs 
through it, which emphasizes the inevitability of the current regime. They present alternatives to 
that narrative, relegated to syntactic or structural non-actuality. How each operates, particularly 
in relation to the principal themes of the poem, to my knowledge has never been analyzed. 
Nesselrath (1992) on "Beinahe Episoden" in ancient epic has done useful work in bringing 
together syntactic and structural patterns of counterfactuality on the model "A, if not B". This 
thesis is inspired by that work, and by Hornblower's related analyses of Thucydides. 
Counterfactuals are divided into groups according to grammatical features and theme, starting 
from the most momentous. The alternative Aeneid that emerges is examined in chapter eight. 
In order to understand how the counterfactuals function in the text, an integrated view 
has to be taken of how counterfactuals work both generally and specifically in Latin. This 
requires a survey of how counterfactuals as a linguistic phenomenon encode philosophical, 
cognitive and narratological concepts that have a role to play in historical and epic narrative. I 
am aiming to take a unified view of all the different areas of theory where counterfactuals are 
thought about, and to use this to look at how Virgil problematizes Roman destiny.     
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Chapter One: Views on Counterfactuals 
1. Philosophical views of counterfactuals
1.1. Counterfactuals as Conditionals 
Counterfactuals are types of conditionals. Philosophers look at conditionals as consisting of 
antecedent (the linguists’ protasis; if-clause) and consequent (the linguists’ apodosis; main 
clause). Examples of conditionals in English are: (1) “If there was a run on sterling, interest 
rates rose”; (2) “If there had been a run on sterling, interest rates would have risen”; (3) “If there 
is a run on sterling, interest rates will rise”. (1) and (3) are classed as indicative conditionals, 
and (2) as subjunctive or counterfactual (conditional, Cohen 1995: 147). Broadly speaking, a 
subjunctive or counterfactual conditional contains an antecedent believed by the speaker to be 
contrary to fact and unchangeable; the precise difference between the two is a matter of some 
debate. Antecedent and consequent are generally considered propositions (conditional, Cohen 
1995: 147). “It is raining”, “Il pleut” and “Es regnet” are three separate sentences, but they 
express the same proposition (Harrison-Barbet 2001: 12). The term statement is sometimes used 
interchangeably with proposition, but the distinction is not settled (Harrison-Barbet 2001: 13).
The two propositions antecedent and consequent form a compound proposition 
(Harrison-Barbet 2001: 19). In traditional logic a proposition can be true or false, as established 
by Aristotle: "... while every sentence has meaning, ... not all can be called propositions. We call 
propositions those only that have truth or falsity in them. A prayer is, for instance, a sentence 
but neither has truth nor has falsity" (Arist. Int. 17a,1). 
In truth-functional logic, associated with the mathematician Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), 
compound propositions are linked by operators (also called connectives and constants). These 
are: negation (¬p, contradictory of p; if one is true, the other is false), conjunction (p&q, “p and 
q”; also p˄q ), disjunction (p∨q, “p or q”), implication (as in conditionals: p→q, “if p, then q”; 
also p⊃q; but see below) and material equivalence (as in biconditionals,  p↔ q “p materially 
implies q and q materially implies p”) (Harrison-Barbet 2001: 19-20); propositional forms can 
be constructed on the basis of these compounds, with propositions expressed symbolically by 
the variables p and q. The relation of material implication,  p→q is true if and only if (iff) it is 
not the case that p is true and q is false; (Cohen 1995: 147; Wolfram 1995: 530); the relation of 
material equivalence, p↔q is true iff p and q have the same truth-value (Wolfram 1995: 248).
The way the truth of propositions can be tested is through the mechanical use of the 
truth table. Ascribed to Wittgenstein, it establishes the overall truth-value of a compound 
proposition, based on every possible combination of truth-values attributed to the components 
(Hoyningen-Huene 2004: 27; 3; 75). The following is a truth-functional truth table:
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p q p &  q p ∨ q p  →   q p ↔ q
T T T T T T
T F F T F F
F T F T T F
F F F F T T
The truth table as represented here contains three principal sources of problems for conditionals 
(truth table Harrison-Barbet 2001: 19-20). Column five, highlighted, shows some problematic 
evaluations. Rows one and three concern the viability of the concept of truth for p→q when the 
consequent  is true. If all is needed for truth is lack of contradiction between the antecedent and 
the consequent (column five, row one), conditionals such as the following will be considered 
true: (4) “If Oxford is a city, then Italy is sunny” (material implication, Wolfram 1995: 530); 
there is clearly no necessary logical relation between Oxford being a city and Italy being sunny. 
A false antecedent (column five, row three), similarly does not invalidate the overall truth of the 
conditional: the conditional statement p&¬p→q, derived from a sentence such as (5) “The 
forest is green and the forest is not green; therefore tomorrow is Christmas”, is accordingly true 
(Hoyningen-Huene 2004: 88). That anything follows from a contradiction was the medieval ex 
falso quodlibet (Hoyningen-Huene 2004: 89). On the truth table, even a false antecedent and a 
false consequent will produce a true conditional (column five, row four). The attribution of truth 
to conditionals which appear absurd because they show no relationship between the antecedent 
and the consequent constitutes the paradox of material implication; and the way the truth-value 
of the compound proposition is evaluated in these cases is said to be extensional, i.e. based on 
the truth relations of the constituents with minimum regard for meaning (Harrison-Barbet 2001: 
22; Hoyningen-Huene 2004: 87).
One solution is to tighten the logical link required between antecedent and consequent. 
This has been done in various ways. One kind of conditional which is always true is a strong 
form of material implication, entailment. (6) “If all cats are black and Tibby is a cat, then Tibby 
is black” and (7) “If a man is a bachelor, then he is unmarried” are necessarily true propositions 
regardless of facts; this is because the first statement is a valid deductive argument, with true 
premisses and a true conclusion, and the second contains the consequent in the meaning of the 
antecedent. (8) “If the animal is a unicorn, it has only one horn” well illustrates this principle: 
the conditional is necessarily true, although unicorns do not exist (Harrison-Barbet 2001: 22; 
Hoyningen-Huene 2004: 3; 75). In examples (7) and (8), the meaning of the constituent 
propositions matters, and the interpretation in this case is said to be intensional (Harrison-
Barbet 2001: 22-23). 
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But entailment itself remains controversial. An impossibility entails everything and a 
necessary truth is entailed by everything in truth-functional logic (entailment, Kirwan 1995: 
237; Read 1988: 20). There are also statements which appear to be strictly truthful because 
obviously unfalsifiable, such as this example of logical truth, a subgroup of analytic proposition 
(Wolfram 1989: 90): (9) “If the rooster crows on the manure pile, either the weather will change 
or it will stay as it is”, (p→q∨¬q). This conditional is true, but only because it is vacuous. Its 
form, tautology, makes it true, regardless of meaning; no eventuality is left out (Hoyningen-
Huene 2004: 57-58).
Further problems with apparently inescapable truths are circularity and (more) 
vacuousness. The way a valid inference (example 6) is spotted is ultimately circular. 
Philosophers start from examples which seem acceptable, and give an explication of what they 
observe. That becomes a definition of a valid inference (Hoyningen-Huene 2004: 81; 118). John 
Rawls invented the concept of “reflective equilibrium” for this process of constructing theories: 
our opinions on particular examples have to come to an agreement with the general definition 
(Hoyningen-Huene 2004: 119-20). A related case is (7), “If a man is a bachelor, then he is 
unmarried”. Here the consequent is a restatement of the antecedent. This is a tautology, a self-
evident and analytic proposition (Wolfram 1989: 89). Since it is synonymy that makes it true, it 
is vacuous. Being “uninformative” is indeed one of the charges levelled at analytic propositions. 
Even the whole of mathematics and formal logic have been considered uninformative by some 
(conventionalism, Wolfram 1989: 89). Locke, who distinguished between analytic and 
necessarily true propositions on the one hand, and synthetic, contingent and empirical ones on 
the other,1 also separates the informative ((10) “The external angle of all triangles is bigger than 
either of the opposite internal angles”. 4.8.8) and the trifling ((11) “A triangle has three sides”. 
4.8.7). But the two only differ in degree of complexity (Wolfram 1989: 89; 124n7).
Quine (1943) attacked the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions on 
grounds of circularity. Any statement is liable to revision in the light of experience (analytic and 
synthetic statements, Lowe 1995: 28). While the number 9 and the number of planets may seem 
interchangeable, for instance, “Necessarily 9 is greater than 7” is true, but “Necessarily the 
number of the planets is greater than 7” is false (Quine 1943: 119-21; Wolfram 1989: 96-97). 
On the opposite side, Kripke defended the concept of necessary truth, from the very minimum 
statement of the form “x is x”, to “x is y” based on the “essential properties” of the objects under 
discussion. A lectern, for instance, will be made of wood and not of ice (Kripke 1971: 86-87; 
Wolfram 1989: 110-11). Kripke also developed the concept of a weaker logical truth. In relation 
to conditionals, these are steps towards an understanding of the logical link that can be expected 
to connect antecedent and consequent for the conditional to be true.
As a consequence of the problems connected with truth-functionality, many 
1  An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690. Terms coined by Kant.
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philosophers have abandoned the concept of truth in relation to conditionals. In relevance or 
relevant  logic, there must be sharing of content between premisses and conclusion, and 
dependency between the two (Read 1995: 758). 
1.2. Relevant Logic 
1.2.1. Relevant Logic in Antiquity
Sextus Empiricus reported the opinions of earlier Greek philosophers on conditionals (Read 
1988: 119-20). Material implication and the logic of conditionals were discussed by the Stoics 
according to Sextus, who wrote a history of Scepticism around 200 AD (Bailey 2002: 17). 
Sextus cites the Stoics as saying that of the four combinations of truth-values attributed to 
antecedent and consequent, “only that which begins with truth and ends in falsehood is invalid, 
and the rest valid. ‘Antecedent,’ they say, is ‘the precedent clause in a hypothetical syllogism 
which begins in truth and ends in truth.’ And it ‘serves to reveal the consequent,’ since in the 
syllogism ‘If this woman has milk, she has conceived,’ the clause ‘If this woman has milk’ 
seems to be evidential of the clause ‘she has conceived’” (Sext. Emp. Pyr. 2.105-06). The 
Stoics’ identification of the combination of true antecedent and false consequent as invalid 
appears to match that of the truth-table. 
Sextus does not specify who “those who introduce ‘connection’ or ‘coherence’” in their 
analysis of hypothetical syllogisms are. Such people reject the truth of “If atomic elements of 
things do not exist, atomic elements exist” because validity occurs “whenever the opposite of its 
consequent contradicts its antecedent clause”; and they accept the truth of  “If day exists, day 
exists” (Pyr. 2.111). Sextus quotes more unidentified philosophers: those who “judge by 
implication” and consider true a conditional “when its consequent is potentially included in its 
antecedent”; they nonetheless judge “If day exists, day exists” as “probably” false, “for it is not 
feasible that any object should itself be included in itself’” (Pyr. 2.112). Elsewhere, Sextus gives 
more examples of inconsistency between premisses and conclusions in a conditional: “‘If it is 
day, it is light; but in fact wheat is being sold in the market; therefore it is light.’ For we see that 
in this instance neither the clause ‘if it is day’ has any relevance and connection with the clause 
‘wheat is being sold in the market,’ nor either of these with the clause ‘therefore it is light,’ but 
each of them is inconsistent with the others” (Against the Logicians 2.430).
Sextus also explicitly refers to the debate between the pre-Stoic philosophers Philo and 
Diodorus Cronus (Long & Sedley 1987(1): 504). Philo, of around 300 BC (Philo the 
Dialectician, Denyer 1995: 660), like the Stoics later, in Sextus says that a valid hypothetical 
syllogism is “‘that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood,’ as for instance 
the syllogism ‘If it is day, I converse,’ when in fact it is day and I am conversing”. Diodorus 
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defines it “as ‘that which neither was nor is capable of beginning with a truth and ending with a 
falsehood’” (Pyr. 2.110; Against the Logicians 113-15). A truth for Diodorus has to be such over 
time, a related concept to that of the “Master Argument”, which sees identity between what is 
possible and what is real (Brisson 1997: 154-55; Cic. Fat. 7.13; 9.17). The contrast between the 
two positions is most noticeable in the following: according to Philo, “If it is day, it is night” is 
false during the day, because it begins with a truth and ends with a falsehood; and “If it is night, 
it is day” is true, because it begins with a falsehood, and ends with a truth (Against the  
Logicians 2.114; 2.117); but according to Diodorus, “If it is night, it is day” is false, because “it 
admits of beginning, when night comes on, with the truth ‘It is night’ and ending in the 
falsehood ‘It is day’” (Against the Logicians 2.117).    
These philosophers judge propositions in relation to the time and place of assertion 
(Long & Sedley 1987(1): 205). Sextus concludes that “it is to be feared that the task of 
distinguishing the valid hypothetical is impracticable” (Against the Logicians 2.118). 
Chrysippus, considered the principal Stoic (ca. 280-206 BC), in Cicero’s De Fato (44 
BC) questions the observations by astrologers of apparently related events: “If (for instance) a 
man was born at the rising of the dog-star, he will not die at sea” (Cic. Fat. 6.12; Ierodiakonou 
2006: 512-13). The existence of signs of this kind was a fact of life for the Stoics. Cicero states: 
“Their view is that the world was from its beginning set up in such a way that certain things 
should be preceded by certain signs, some in entrails, others in birds, others in lightning ...” 
(Cic. Div. 1.117-8; Long & Sedley 1987(1): 261; 264; Sharples 1991: 8). Sextus says that they 
made a parallel with a conditional sentence: the Stoics “state that ‘A sign is an antecedent 
judgment in a valid hypothetical syllogism, which serves to reveal the consequent’” (Pyr. 2.104; 
Long & Sedley 1987(1): 264).
The Cicero of De Fato (44 BC), who thinks that events are often accidental (Cic. Fat. 
3.5), outlines one main difference between Diodorus and the apostrophized Chrysippus: "he 
says that only what either is true or will be true can happen, ....You say that things that will not 
happen, too, can happen (Cic. Fat. 7.13). Chrysippus "hopes that the astrologers ... will not 
make use of conditionals, but rather of conjunctions", and suggests the reformulation of the 
conditional as a negated conjunction: non et ... quis ...  et is ..., “not both p and not-q” is 
preferable to si quis ... is ..., “not possibly both  p and not-q” (Non et <cui> venae sic moventur  
et is febrim non habet rather than Si cui venae sic moventur, is habet febrim. Cic. Fat. 8.15) 
(Sharples 1991). The difference between the two seems to be that what is observed not to 
happen (conjunction) is not the same as what necessarily cannot happen (conditional) (Sharples 
1991: 169n15). In relation to Virgil, the date of these debates, as reported in Rome, is important: 
this is the time he was beginning to write. 
The Aristotelian philosophers too, it is interesting to observe in view of the assumed 
difference between the two branches of logic, were involved in discussions of the hypothetical 
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syllogism as a conditional, conjunction and disjunction. The ancients treated the Aristotelian 
philosophers as rivals of the Stoics; their inferences were based on the relations between terms, 
with predication as the fundamental relation (S is P), whereas the Stoics worked with inferences 
based on the relations between sentences, including hypothetical syllogism (Barnes 1984: 282; 
279-80). But Alexander's commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics says that Theophrastus, 
successor of Aristotle as head of the Lyceum, "mentions [hypothetical syllogisms] in his own 
Analytics, and so do Eudemus and certain others of Aristotle's associates" (Alex. A.Pr. 390.2-3). 
Philoponus and Boethius repeat this, attributing "lengthy treatises" and "elements" on the 
subject to Theophrastus (Philoponus, in Alex. A.Pr. 242.18-21; Boeth. Hyp. syll. 1.1.3; Barnes 
1984: 285; 1999: 78). 
Barnes says: "First, Theophrastus developed a reasonably detailed theory of wholly 
hypothetical syllogisms. Secondly, he denied that they constituted an independent body of 
logical science - rather, they are in some sense reducible to categorical syllogisms" (Barnes 
1999: 80). Alexander and Theophrastus wanted to "reduce" ( and al) "wholly 
hypothetical syllogisms" to categorical syllogisms, by the so-called "method of selection" 
(). What is meant by "reduction" is not clear. Of Alexander's possible meaning Barnes 
(1984), counterfactually, says "I suspect that, if pressed, he would acknowledge that he is really 
after a genuine sense (I) derivation." Barnes' "sense (I) " consists in reducing a syllogism to 
another, and has Alexander think, "mistakenly", that the procedure reduces modus ponens (if P, 
then Q; and P, therefore Q) to a categorical syllogism. "Alexander is in a muddle" (Barnes 1984: 
286-87n3).
 The point is that Theophrastrus found an analogy between the two kinds of logic which 
over the centuries became predicate and propositional logic: "For being a consequent or 
apodosis is analogous to being predicated, and being antecedent to being subject - for in a way it 
is subject for what is inferred from it" (Alex. A. Pr. 326.31-2). Aristotle's  (Arist. A. Pr.  
43b3, 44a14, 56a21) and ἀn (Arist. A. Pr. 43b4) confirms Theophrastus' point that the 
consequent "follows" the antecedent (Barnes 1984: 309n4).
1.2.2. Relevant Logic and Modal Logic in the Twentieth and Twenty-first Centuries
In the twentieth century, among key figures are C.I. Lewis, W. Ackermann, and A. Anderson and 
N. Belnap. C.I. Lewis is credited with starting modern interest in modal logic (Kneale & Kneale 
1962: 549-50). His and Langford’s Symbolic Logic (1932) uses P Θ Q as an abbreviation for 
~◊(P~Q), “it is not possible that P and not-Q”; PΘ Q also codifies the link of necessity as PΘ Q 
= □(P⊃Q), “it is necessary that if P then Q” (Kneale & Kneale 1962: 549-50, 555; my English). 
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But C.I. Lewis, whose Survey of Symbolic Logic was published in 1918, when arguing after 
MacColl (1906) that one proposition strictly implies another iff it is impossible for the first to be 
true and the second false, is not far off the truth-functional system (Kneale & Kneale 1962: 549; 
Mares 2004: 9). This is the case although he uses the modal notions of possibility and necessity. 
One important move away from that was Ackermann (1956). He objected to much of C.I. 
Lewis’s work, and especially to ex falso quodlibet: if A is to entail B, there must be a logical 
connection between the two; and this is not the case when A∧~A→B, “if A and not-A, then B” is 
accepted (Ackermann 1956: 113; Read 1988: 125-26; Mares 2004: 96). Ackermann insisted that 
there should be a logical relationship between the content of statements. He did not, however, 
formulate a theory about content (Read 1988: 126; Mares 2004: 96-97). 
Anderson and Belnap devised a system for tracking down the relevance of premisses to 
the conclusion and of antecedents to consequents. A simplified version of their technique for so-
called “relevant logic R” is illustrated in Mares’ “Relevance Logic” (2012):
1. A {1} Hyp
2. (A → B){2} Hyp 
3. B{1,2} 1,2, → E
This is a case of modus ponens, “If p then q and p, therefore q” (modus ponens, Williamson 
1995: 583). "The numbers in set brackets indicate the hypotheses used to prove the formula. We 
will call them ‘indices’. The indices in the conclusion indicate which hypotheses are really used 
in the derivation of the conclusion" (Mares 2012). “E” means “entailment”. At the very least, for 
antecedent and consequent to be related, it is necessary that propositions “share a variable” 
(Anderson & Belnap 1975: 33).
Making truth relative to an index was a step towards world semantics for modal logic. 
Kripke, amongst others, expanded Leibniz’s seventeenth-eighteenth century idea of possible 
worlds in the 1950s and 60s (Mares 2004: 23). A possible world is a universe connected to 
another through a binary (two-place) relation called an “accessibility relation”. Read outlined 
the “Australian plan”, based on the dialetheist ideas that propositions can be both true and false 
at the same time: A can be true at a situation x, and untrue at a situation x* (Read 1988: 138-
140); the “American plan” has four truth-values: true, false, both, neither (Read 1988: 143); and 
Read’s own “Scottish plan” argued that A and ~A can be true “fuse” (non-truth-functional “and”) 
B false, because fusion “expresses a logical connection between propositions, that the truth of 
one does not preclude that of the other” (Read 1988: 147; 191; 81). Richard Routley and Bob 
Meyer in 1973 introduced worlds which relate to one another in a ternary relation (R; a relation 
in which the places are three); the Routley and Meyer truth condition for implication is: “‘A→B’ 
is true at a situation s iff for all situations x and y if Rsxy and ‘A’ is true at x, then ‘B’ is true at y” 
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(Mares 2004: 27-28). Mares translates: “A→B is true in a situation s iff, when we postulate the 
existence of any situation in the same world in which A holds, we can infer that there is a 
situation in that world in which B holds” (Mares 2004: 51). 
In the 1920s, Frank Ramsey suggested that in order to evaluate indicative conditionals, 
such as “If A will C?”, people add A to their stock of knowledge and then argue about C. “We 
can say that they are fixing their belief in C given A” (Ramsey 1929: 143; Bennett 2003: 28). 
This is the Ramsey test, hugely exploited by philosophers. Not all indicative conditionals, 
however, can accommodate that procedure: in “If my business partner is cheating me, I will 
never realize that he is”, the consequent becomes unacceptable when I pretend to believe the 
antecedent (Bennett 2003: 28-29). Bennett suggests a version of the test with a different use of 
probability: after adding a probability of 1 for A to the set of probabilities which constitute my 
belief system, it needs to be evaluated whether the conservatively obtained result includes a 
high probability for C (Bennett 2003: 29). There is here no pretence to believe the antecedent. 
Bennett’s “Ratio Formula”, π(C/A), also builds on Ramsey: the probability of C given A is the 
probability of A&C divided by that of A (Bennett 2003: 51-52).
Ernest Adams is one of the principal philosophers to exploit Ramsey, with the notion of 
probabilistic validity (Bennett 2003: 28). An indicative conditional can be truth-functionally 
invalid, but probabilistically valid (Bennett 2003: 131). The higher the probability of A, the 
nearer the indicative (non-truth-functional) conditional and the material (truth-functional) 
conditional are to being equal. This is captured by: U(A→C) = U(A⊃C) + P(A); the uncertainty 
of an indicative conditional equals the uncertainty of the corresponding material conditional 
divided by the probability of its antecedent (Adams 1975: 2-3; Bennett 2003: 133-34). Adams 
uses Venn’s diagrams, too. Ovals, which represent propositions, overlap, or do not, and are sized 
differently to indicate degrees of probability in a person’s belief. The value of someone’s 
probability for A→C equals the proportion of the A oval lying within the C oval (Adams 1975: 
9-10; Bennett 2003: 134-35).
Frank Jackson argued that A→C is assertible by me to the extent that I consider C robust 
in relation to A (Jackson 1987: 22-32; Bennett 2003: 34). The meaning of the “if” of indicatives 
for Jackson contains something stronger than the implicature that Grice calls “conversational”. 
According to Grice (1967a; 1967b), hearers draw inferences because they assume speakers are 
being helpful. Grice’s horseshoe analysis of the 1960s, according to which the material 
implication A⊃ B  means the indicative conditional A→B, equates disjunctive syllogism to an 
indicative conditional: “If Booth did not shoot Lincoln, someone else did” means “Either Booth 
shot Lincoln or someone else did” (Bennett 2003: 20). This has been criticized for allowing the 
antecedent and the consequent to be unconnected; it also relies on the speaker not being 
dishonest or teasing when presenting alternatives. Bennett claims he knows, for instance, that 
one of the two options is wrong in “Either my father was F.O. Bennett or my father was Stafford 
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Cripps” (Bennett 2003: 20-22; 24). Jackson accepts that A⊃ B is A→B (Jackson 1987: 5) but 
sees the latter as stronger; the “conventional”, rather than “conversational” implicature of A→B 
is that its speaker implies his perceived robustness of B with respect to A (Jackson 1987: 28-29; 
31; Bennett 2003: 38). A parallel relationship Jackson envisages between sentences joined by 
“and”, “but” and other conjunctions: “If I say 'Hugo is bad at mathematics; nevertheless, he is a 
fine chess player', what I want you to believe is that Hugo is a fine chess player, not something 
else” (Jackson 1987: 94; Bennett 2003: 37). 
Jackson himself acknowledges that the parallel between conjunctions such as “but”, 
“however” etc. and “if” is not watertight. Two sentences linked by a conjunction can be 
assertible but improbable, whereas an indicative conditional requires that the consequent should 
be highly probable for the conditional to be assertible (Jackson 1987: 39; Bennett 2003: 39). 
Also, “if” cannot easily be replaced by “and” or omitted as other conjunctions can with no 
change to truth conditions (Bennett 2003: 41). Bennett claims that Jackson by letter added 
“unless” to “if” as structurally different from “and” (Bennett 2003: 41).
 
1.3. Counterfactuals, or Subjunctive Conditionals: Are They Different from Indicative 
Conditionals?
No philosopher has yet incontrovertibly identified the difference between subjunctive and 
indicative conditionals. Bennett held his nose, but kept the opposition (Bennett 2003: 12). 
Edgington's “One Theory or Two?” opts for “one”, the difference being “mainly” one of tense 
(Edgington 1995: 314-15; 2007: 206-07). Yet spotting counterfactuals  does not seem difficult: a 
counterfactual in English is a conditional built on the pattern given in example (2): “If there had 
been a run on sterling, interest rates would have risen”. Since this implies that there was not a 
run on sterling, the common view is that the falsity of the antecedent is what gives a 
counterfactual its name. But that falsity is only the case in the mind of the speaker (Bennett 
2003: 11-12).
For Dudman, the dividing line groups together “Does-will” with “Would” conditionals 
against the rest. This is the Relocation Thesis, based on the rationale that a counterfactual 
expresses a Does-will conditional at a later time: “If you had swum in the sea yesterday, your 
cold would have got worse” seems to derive from the earlier “If you swim in the sea today, your 
cold will get worse” (Bennett 2003: 13). Gibbard called the Does-will conditionals 
“grammatically subjunctive”, and those without time shift (Does, with future consequent) 
“grammatically indicative” (Gibbard 1981: 222-26; Bennett 2003:14- 15). But Bennett, a former 
relocator, finds that counterfactuals do not stand or fall with their corresponding Does-will 
conditionals when the acceptability of the Does-will depends on a kind of evidence which does 
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not apply at a future time. “If I touch that stove, I shall be burned” does not generate a valid 
counterfactual if its speaker has a vague memory of being hypnotized to think that the stove was 
hot but not believing it (Bennett 2003: 13; 343; 348; 351).
Further problems include Dudman's opposition between “conditionals” (Does-wills and 
subjunctives), and “hypotheticals” (the rest). The distinction is partly based on the argument that 
“conditionals” are reached by reasoning from proposition to proposition, and “hypotheticals” by 
developing a sequence of events (Dudman 1984: 153; Bennett 2003: 351). Moving from 
proposition to proposition is how sequences of events are imagined (Bennett 2003: 351). 
Edgington offers many objections to Dudman. We accept (from Jackson 1987: 74) “If Oswald 
hadn't killed Kennedy, things would have been different from the way they actually are (were / 
will be)”, but neither “If it rains, things will be different from the way they actually will be” nor 
“If Oswald didn't kill Kennedy, things were different from the way they actually were”; this is 
because the Had-would conditional expresses our thought conditionally on an antecedent we 
think did not happen, whereas the other two represent our belief about the actual world. The 
speaker's epistemic state, again, makes a difference to the viability of the two respective cases. 
While the Relocation Thesis, which groups together Wills and Woulds, earns some 
sympathy from Edgington and once persuaded Bennett (Edgington 2007: 213; Bennett 2003: 
13), the speakers' epistemic conditions in the two respective cases are clearly not the same.
1.3.1. Counterfactuals as Propositions and Counterfactuals as Worlds
Amongst the philosophers who support separating subjunctive from indicative conditionals, 
some face the question in terms of propositions, and some in terms of worlds. The first group 
stems from Nelson Goodman's 1947 “Support” theory, and the second from Robert Stalnaker's 
and David Lewis' 1960s-70s concept of worlds (Bennett 2003: 302).
According to Goodman, A>C is true if C is entailed by a combination of the following: 
a true proposition Support, the antecedent A and the causal laws of the actual world. What is the 
true proposition Support? “If I had taken aspirin my headache would have gone by now” does 
not tell us what makes it true. Support brings in contingent facts which help confer truth to the 
counterfactual (Bennett 2003: 302-03). It must be compatible with A & laws of nature. But other 
conjuncts of it are more difficult to pin down. Chisholm emphasized the speaker's intentions: 
“we can usually tell, from the context of a man's utterance, what the supposition is and what the 
other statements are with which he is concerned” (Chisholm 1955: 101; Bennett 2003: 305). But 
in most cases, speakers cannot know what those statements are (Bennett 2003: 305-06). 
A related problem is that of irrelevant particular facts. Goodman says that Support must 
be “cotenable” with A (Goodman 1947: 120-21; Bennett 2003: 308). That condition, however, 
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does not exclude undue influence on the evaluation of a counterfactual by extraneous facts. 
Philosophers are divided, for instance, on assessing the following: a coin tossed by an 
objectively random coin-tossing machine has come down heads when triggered by Joe; we say: 
“If Susan had pressed the button at TA [time of the antecedent], the coin would have come down 
heads.” Consideration of post-antecedent particular facts makes that counterfactual true, 
because the coin coming down heads occurs both in the counterfactual and in the actual world. 
Stalnaker's theory makes it indeterminate, because there is no single closest antecedent world. 
David Lewis' similarity of worlds theory as tightened in 1979 to state the unimportance of post-
antecedent particular facts would consider it false: the closest A-worlds contain both outcomes 
(Bennett 2003: 234; 309; Lewis 1979: 472; Stalnaker 1981: 87; Edgington 1995: 256; 259; 
2007: 147; 150). Edgington summarizes the pitfalls inherent in paying attention to particular 
facts: if Hitler had died in infancy and we evaluated a counterfactual which said that in that case 
the 1930s and 40s would have been different, emphasis on the similarity between the overall 
state of the actual world and that of the consequent in the counterfactual would rule that “then 
the 1930s and 40s would have been different” is false, because a world which contained a figure 
similar to Hitler would be nearer to the actual one than one without it. “The difficulty is 
general” says Edgington (1995: 255; 2007: 146). Bennett discusses Pollock's 1976 objection to 
Goodman's concept of cotenability between Support and A: just arguing that ¬(A>¬Support) 
should have been formulated as the stronger A>Support; the only problem this retains is that of 
infinite regress in the definition of Support (Pollock 1976: 11; Bennett 2003: 308-09).
Edgington comments: “we need cotenability to define counterfactuals and 
counterfactuals to define cotenability” (Edgington 2007: 139).
Thinking of ways things could have been has suggested the concept of worlds. Bennett 
describes the shared kernel of world theories as: the conditional A > C is true just in case C 
obtains at all the closest A-worlds (Bennett 2003: 165). Possible worlds are alternative realities, 
and facts about the actual world decide what possible worlds are to be considered when 
evaluating counterfactuals. Stalnaker talks of a “function” which selects the A-world closest to 
the actual world (Stalnaker 1981: 103). This follows from modal logic, especially Kripke's work 
of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Modal logic uses the concepts of necessity (□) and possibility 
(◊), and involves worlds which hold a relation of accessibility to each other. Stalnaker proposes: 
“Consider a possible world in which A is true, and which otherwise differs minimally from the 
actual world. 'If A, then B' is true just in case B is true in that possible world (Stalnaker 1968: 
102). Todd had talked of similarity between worlds in 1964: “It has to be supposed that this 
hypothetical world is as much like the actual one as possible” (Todd 1964: 107; Bennett 2003: 
166). 
Lewis (1972, 1973), writing exclusively on counterfactuals, reached similar views to 
Stalnaker (Bennett 2003: 152). But he conceived differently of closeness between worlds: 
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“Stalnaker's theory depends for its success not only on the Limit Assumption that there never 
are closer and closer φ-worlds to i [real world] without end, but also on a stronger assumption: 
that there never are two equally close closest φ-worlds to i, but rather (if φ is true at any world 
accessible from i) there is exactly one closest φ-world” (Lewis 1973: 77). A formulation of his 
truth conditions for counterfactuals includes: "a counterfactual is non-vacuously true iff it takes 
less of a departure from actuality to make the consequent true along with the antecedent than it 
does to make the antecedent true without the consequent" (Lewis 1973b: 560; Edgington 2007: 
143).
Stalnaker's logical truth is the Law of Conditional Excluded Middle:╟─(A C˃ )˅(A ~C˃ ) 
(Stalnaker 1981: 89); “(if A, B), or (if A, ¬ B)” (Edgington 2007: 172). A complex sentence may 
be neither true nor false if it includes component sentences which have (permissible) truth-
values which clash (Stalnaker 1981: 87-104; Bennett 2003: 184). When the selection function 
does not select one closest A-world because there is a tie, the conditional of which it is part is 
neither true nor false (Bennett 2003: 183-84). The pair of examples attributed to Quine by 
Stalnaker, are: "If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have been Italian" and "If 
Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Verdi would have been French"; these are false according 
to Lewis and indeterminate according to Stalnaker (Stalnaker 1981: 91-92; Lewis 1981: 60-61). 
One consequence of the Conditional Excluded Middle according to Lewis (1973), is the 
loss of the difference between would and might counterfactuals (Lewis 1973: 80). Stalnaker 
argues that Lewis treats "If ... might ... " as an idiom, rather than keeping the meanings of if and 
of might apart, and of recognizing that the expression normally indicates the speaker's 
knowledge. He also attacks Lewis' s definition of would and might in terms of each other, 
emphasizing rather the epistemic sense of might (Stalnaker 1981: 98-101]. Lewis defends a 
different position: "If I had looked, I might have found a penny" is false, because the penny was 
not there, and I did not look; but Stalnaker considers it true, because he judges the conditional 
on the basis of "for all I know". He talks of a "quasi-epistemic" possibility "relative to an 
idealized state of knowledge" (Lewis 1973: 80; Stalnaker 1981: 100-01).
1.3.2. Counterfactuals involve forks
Followers of Stalnaker-Lewis largely agree on the following: "the truth value of A C˃  depend[s] 
on whether C is true at the A-worlds that are (1) like the actual world in matters of particular fact 
up to the antecedent time and (2) perfectly like the actual world in respect of causal laws" 
(Bennett 2003: 198). Bennett conceives of a "ramp" that goes from the actual world (α) to the 
antecedent (TA). At world w events take a different course at the time of the antecedent, as 
illustrated in the following representations of three major theories:
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(a)
                                                                      TA
α ___________________________________________________________
                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                         Jackson
w____________________________     
(b)
                                                                      TA
α ___________________________________________________________
                                                                                                                      
                                                                     
w    Simple 
                                                     
(c)
                                                                      TA
α ___________________________________________________________
w ________________________                 Lewis 
(Bennett 2003: 215). Bennett's own "Simple" theory (1984), is meant to avoid the bump 
Jackson's suffers from, since Jackson considers the pre-antecedent time as being exactly like 
actuality; Jackson would have "If there had been no cars on the road just then [when the dam 
burst], no lives would have been lost" imply that the cars were there until the time of the 
20
antecedent, and then suddenly disappeared (Jackson 1977: 9; Bennett 2003: 208-10). Bennett's 
Simple Theory says that a counterfactual is true iff "C obtains at the legal A-worlds that most 
resemble α in respect of their state at TA". There is here no sudden departure from reality, as 
indicated in (b) by the two diverging lines (which are not meant to intersect). But Bennett finds 
the Simple Theory faulty too (Bennett 2003: 209; 216; 213). Consider: "If the German army had 
reached Moscow in August 1941, it would have captured the city"; that may seem true if we 
think the hypothetical Soviet troops in August 1941 would be the same as at α. But that would 
not have been the case. The Simple Theory avoids Jackson's bump, but also lacks the correct 
kind of run-up away from actuality to the antecedent (Bennett 2003: 213). 
How, then, do we theorize a departure from our world? Lewis, whose 1979 "Time's 
Arrow" description of overall closeness is largely behind these concepts, talks of "small 
miracles", and Bennett of "exploding differences". A small miracle is an illegal event which 
occurs just before the time of the antecedent, as shown in (c), and does not obtrude on the 
thoughts of people who evaluate the counterfactual; an exploding difference is the final result of 
tiny, legal differences that have been accumulating for a long time (Bennett 2003: 217).
1.4. Independent and Biscuit Conditionals
These may be either indicative or subjunctive and are not very interesting. Logically necessary 
independent conditionals are “If the closing date is Tuesday the 14th, then the closing date is a 
Tuesday”; and “If the river were to rise another two feet, it would be two feet higher than it is 
now”. No matters of particular fact intervene here between antecedent and consequent. A causal 
independent conditional is “If that particle had been two light years from here a month ago, it 
would not have been here now”. This is a matter of physics. A simpler form than the conditional 
would make the same point: “no particle can travel faster than the speed of light” (Bennett 
2003: 16-18).       
Biscuit conditionals are named after J. L.Austin's “There are biscuits on the sideboard if 
you want some” (Austin 1970: 212). This could be interpreted as an ordinary conditional, but in 
most cases is not: the question “And if I don't want them?” shows that. DeRose and Grandy 
(1999: 412) argue that saying A → C is asserting C conditionally on A being true in both 
indicative and biscuit conditionals; in the latter, however, the speaker's uncertainty concerns not 
the truth of C, but the relevance of C to the hearer's interest.2
Biscuit and “nonconditional conditionals” are discussed by Geis and Lycan (1993). A 
nonconditional conditional is: “If I may remind you, I have been working here for seventeen 
2  Wakker (1994) calls these "illocutionary", and Martín Puente (2009) "conditionals of the 
enunciation".
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years” (Geis & Lycan 1993: 39).3 Lycan later decided that these are conditionals after all 
comparable to non-interference ones (Lycan 2001: 206-10; Bennett 2003: 125-26). A non-
interference indicative conditional is one which after the Ramsey test has a high probability for 
C because the speaker has already given it one; you may want to reassure me that the 
refrigerator will not explode if you open its door as I fear; you cast that in a conditional, but 
there is no link between the antecedent and the consequent (Lycan 2001: 89-90; Bennett 2003: 
122-24). 
2. Cognitive studies of counterfactuals 
Psychologists test conditionals empirically (Evans & Over 2004: 33). Two major contemporary 
figures in this field are Jonathan Evans and David Over, the former supervised for his PhD by 
the founder of those experiments, Peter Wason, and the latter by the philosopher Edgington. 
Their 2004 book If was intended to bring the philosophy and psychology of conditionals 
together (Evans & Over 2004: vi); and the periodical Thinking & Reasoning, started in 1995 and 
edited by Evans, dedicates around 50% of its space to the empirical study of conditionals. What 
follows is largely based on the former publication.
2.1. The suppositional three-way and the mental models two-way
Evans and Over consider themselves the opponents of Johnson-Laird and Byrne, whose theory 
they consider more popular (EO 2004: 59). The difference concerns the mental representation of 
conditionals, and both start from the truth table task.
The suppositional (three-way) theorists, such as Evans and Over, claim that people 
reason with representations which resemble three-valued truth tables, and draw support 
principally from testing participants by the "truth task": people are asked to decide whether the 
combination of antecedent and consequent makes a given rule true, false or irrelevant. Wason 
introduced the notion of "defective truth table", which contains the judgment "irrelevant". From 
the results of one version of the "selection task", he hypothesized that people assume that a 
conditional has three values; "If it rains, I shall go to the cinema" becomes irrelevant when the 
weather is good (Wason 1966: 146-47). Johnson-Laird and Tagart (1969) are attributed the first 
truth table experiment which confirmed the judgment "irrelevant" for false antecedent cases. 
People were asked to evaluate the rule: "If there is an A on the left then there is a 7 on the right"; 
3  Wakker (1994) calls these "propositional" and Martín Puente (2009) "conditionals of the 
proposition".
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many put cards without an A on the left (false antecedent) into the group "irrelevant" (EO 2004: 
34-36). This kind of test has been replicated many times since; De Finetti (1967; 2008) used 
"null" as the third value (Sevenants et. al 2011: 214-15). 
The "confirmation bias", later "matching bias", was identified from the "selection task". 
Participants were asked to choose which cards needed to be turned over in order to confirm or 
falsify the statement: "If there is an A on one side of the card, then there is a 3 on the other"; the 
four cards showed A, D, 3,7 (true antecedent, false antecedent, true consequent, false 
consequent). Most people chose A and 3, trying to prove the conditional true. The intended 
solution was A and 7 (Wason 1966). People tend "to see cases whose lexical content matches the 
explicit values in the conditional statement as relevant and conversely to fail to see the 
relevance of the mismatching cases" (EO 2004: 41; 74-75; Evans 1972). By "bias", 
psychologists mean systematic non-logical influence on behaviour (EO 2004: 41). That was 
then counteracted by the use of explicit negations, harder to process (Oaksford and Chater 
1994).
Processing difficulties were also considered the reason for discarding false antecedents 
as irrelevant at a preconscious stage. This was disproved: experiments involving participants 
talking aloud (Evans 1995), computerized inspections of decision times (Evans 1996), eye 
movement (Ball et al. 2003) and the presentation of two identical consequents with different 
antecedents (Handley et al. 2002) showed that people think before replying, and do not just 
eliminate problems without reasoning.(EO 2004: 77-78). Evans and Ball (2010) reconsidered 
the eye movement study, and confirmed that a two-stage process of evaluation which involves 
conscious analysis takes place. 
Another non-logical response to conditionals which was observed is the unjustified 
reading of biconditionality (Braine 1978; EO 2004: 95). Evans and Newstead's large data sets 
(1977) show large percentages of "irrelevant" responses for false antecedent and true 
consequent cases, FT, and for FF, but also a large number of "false" for FT. This means that 
many accept the denial of the antecedent, the fallacy if p then q; not-p therefore not-q (EO 2004: 
42-43). The trend, however, is for people to endorse  the denial of the antecedent less than the 
affirmation of the consequent, the fallacy if p then q; q therefore p; and modus ponens (if p then 
q; p, therefore q) more than modus tollens (if p then q; not-q, therefore not-p); this partly 
excludes older children, strangely, who correctly endorse modus tollens more than adults and 
younger children do (Barrouillet et al. 2000; EO 2004: 47; 50; 51). Stanovich (1999) found that 
brighter participants are better at suppressing prior belief which leads to biases (EO 2004: 79). 
For a while psychologists thought that realistic rather than abstract material would 
produce more logically correct results. That worked with "Every time I go to Manchester I 
travel by train" (Wason & Shapiro 1971) but not, later, with "If I eat haddock, then I drink gin" 
and other food and drink conditionals (Manktelow & Evans 1979) and the idea lost support (EO 
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2004: 80). In the first deontic selection task, however (response to a conditional aimed at 
regulating behaviour), the people who made the right choice were those who had experienced 
the rule: presented with "If a letter is sealed, then it must have a 50 lire stamp on it", participants 
who were familiar with that postal arrangement checked the correct envelopes (Johnson-Laird et 
al. 1972); the others did not (Griggs & Cox 1982). It was concluded that familiarity makes the 
difference. Under those circumstances, or when the rule is well explained, most people will 
choose the p and not-q cards, and that regardless of intelligence. Griggs and Cox (1982) called 
this familiarity effect the "memory-cue hyphothesis", and Cosmides (1989) "availability" 
theory. Cheng and Holyoak (1985) proposed  "pragmatic reasoning schemas": people would 
learn sets of rules for reasoning about certain situations, grouped in an abstract structure. But 
since this structure is expressed by the authors as sets of conditionals that contain deontic 
modals ("If the action is to be taken, then the precondition must be satisfied"), circularity has 
been found in that argument (EO 2004: 83-84). Cosmides (1989) has also argued that detecting 
cheaters, as in the Drinking Age Rule ("If people are drinking beer, then they must be over 21 / 
18 years of age"), has evolutionary advantages, and later that hazard management is innate in 
people (Cosmides & Tooby 1992). EO asked whether that relates specifically to "if" (EO 2004: 
82-86). 
Abstract conditionals are not processed deeply. When communicating, people juggle 
effort and cognitive effect; the latter is "a worthwhile difference to the individual's 
representation of the world" (Sperber & Wilson 2002). A deontic context can stimulate a deeper 
reading when people are instructed to seek cheaters: "If a person is drinking beer then that 
person is over 18 years of age" induces the representation of an underage drinker, if p then not-
q. People then have no problem understanding and following the instructions. Conversely, there 
is no incentive in the non-deontic selection task for participants to go beyond intuition (Sperber 
& Girotto 2002: 287; 280). Most conditionals equally do not require deep processing: "If you 
stay an extra hour tonight, I will pay you double time" probably does not lead to thoughts of if p 
then not-q; but "If you want to keep this job, you will wear a tie to work every day" does, 
because if p then not-q is a live issue to the listener who may lose his job (EO 2004: 88). 
Relevance, then, equates "epistemic utility" in indicative conditional reasoning, and costs and 
benefits in deontic conditional reasoning (EO 2004: 88-89).
This research points to an application of logic which is not that of the two-way truth 
table. The mental model (two-way) theorists, however, such as Johnson-Laird and Byrne, claim 
precisely that. They draw support principally from the "possibilities task": people are asked to 
evaluate whether a certain combination of antecedent and consequent is possible in relation to a 
given rule (Johnson-Laird & Byrne 1991; 2002; Sevenants et. al 2011: 214-15). This approach 
emerges from the thinking of Piaget (1960s), which trusted logic to provide the correct account 
for reasoning (EO 2004: 33).
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For Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991), "If Arthur is in Edinburgh, then Carol is in 
Glasgow" is true even when Arthur is not in Edinburgh. Conditional assertions "suggest" a 
relation of causation between antecedent and consequent, but retain the truth-table as the basis 
for evaluating conditionals; this includes: "If you are a millionaire then it will rain tomorrow". 
They comment that in this case theorists "face a choice: to abandon the truth-table analysis of 
conditionals ..., or to accept the validity of these apparently paradoxical deductions and to 
explain why they seem improper. We shall embrace the second alternative". The explanation 
given for the "improper" appearance of those conditionals is that they "throw semantic 
information away", which is one of the three things which contravene the constraints of 
deductive competence (JLB 1991: 7-8; 73-74; 20-22; EO 2004: 63-64). JLB, however, 
repeatedly distinguish between logical validity and the complexity of life (JLB 1991: 20).
JLB also depart from the standard truth table in two ways. They maintain that people 
construct mental models of what is true, but not of what is false ("principle of truth"); and that 
many people initially only have shortened representations of conditionals, the false antecedent 
cases becoming the subject of what Johnson-Laird (1995) calls "mental footnotes" (EO 2004: 
61; 101). Also, JLB's 2002 article quotes various forms of "semantic" and "pragmatic 
modulation" (context, relevant knowledge, default assumptions, attempts at consistency) as 
regulatory mechanisms in the understanding of conditionals; these include the influence of the 
order in which information is learned (JLB 2002: 658-60; 667). JLB, then, acknowledge that 
more than strict adherence to the truth table comes into play in the evaluation of conditionals.
Two interesting findings have been replicated by a study published in 2011. Participants 
who judge false antecedent cases as irrelevant and examine both true-true and true-false 
conditionals rather than just the first, score more highly on intelligence tests; but the nature of 
the experiment influences the results: the truth-task produces a larger proportion of three-way 
answers, and the possibilities-task produces a larger proportion of two-way answers (Sevenants 
et. al 2011: 214-15). 
2.2. Indicative, counterfactual and deontic conditionals; and conditionals with negations
Psychologists divide conditionals into indicative, counterfactual and deontic. Deontic 
conditionals try to influence behaviour ("If the traffic light is red then you must stop". EO 2004: 
2-3). Speech acts such as tips, warnings, promises and threats are also somewhat deontic:
"If you avoid the motorway then you will get there quicker" (tip; more indicative)
"If you clean my car then you can borrow it tonight" (promise; more deontic)
"If you smoke cigarettes then your health will suffer" (warning; more indicative)
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 "If you arrive late again, I will fire you" (threat; more deontic) (EO 2004: 3-4). 
To psychologists, the motives of the person uttering the deontic conditional matter. The speaker 
may have power over the consequent: promises and threats contrast with tips and warnings (EO 
2004: 3). Also, the probability that the antecedent is true seems to be irrelevant to the listener, 
though EO bemoaned the lack of research as yet into conditionals and decision making (EO 
2004: 4). 
Conditionals with negations are also of interest to psychologists. As Wason (1972) has 
argued, negative statements are often meant to deny presuppositions. We say that a dolphin is 
not a fish, but not normally that a horse is not a fish. When we imagine a different state of the 
world, we can think of something that is true being false, and the other way round; and we can 
envisage either positive or negative possibilities: "What if we take up salsa dancing?" and 
"What if we do not go the meeting?". In counterfactual form we can imagine: "What if we had 
gone for a long walk?" and "What if we had not had too much to drink?" (EO 2004: 4).
2.3. Pragmatics
Pragmatics goes beyond linguistics. It concerns "the way in which prior knowledge and belief 
influences communication between people". If we observe a woman rushing into her house and 
we hear her husband say "It is on the table", we cannot understand the verbal message without 
further information. She has just phoned about her passport. The verbal part is the least 
important, as the husband's pointing to the table would be just as effective. Both linguistic and 
non-linguistic means of this kind are commonly used in communication (EO 2004: 5).
Context, therefore, crucial for successful communication, matters in conditionals too. 
From the conditional promise "If you clean my car then you can borrow it tonight", we can 
make pragmatic inferences unrelated to the truth of the premises: the speaker has power over the 
listener, does not want to clean the car, and believes that the listener wants to borrow it; the 
speaker uses the conditional as a way of influencing the behaviour of the listener, but may relent 
should the listener offer to clean the car on the next day. None of this relies on strict logic (EO 
2004: 6).
The "principle of relevance" (Sperber & Wilson 1986; 1995) says that "all 
communications convey a guarantee of their own relevance". Grice's (1975) pragmatic 
implicature included not saying less than is meant. As applied to deontic conditionals, that 
means that asserting the consequent alone is often enough: "If you clean my car then you can 
borrow it tonight" is either biconditional, or the antecedent is unnecessary. If the listener knows 
that the speaker sometimes gives in, an infringement of the rules of conversation occurs. "If" 
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needs to be studied in relation to more than principles of conversation (EO 2004: 6-7).
A theory developed by Evans (1984; 1989) is the "heuristic-analytic theory". It surmises 
that we form a representation of what is relevant and act accordingly, sometimes wrongly 
because of a biased selection of information. EO conceived of two cognitive systems: 1 is 
unconscious, or pragmatic, and evolved earlier; 2 is conscious, or analytic, and relates to 
language and general intelligence. The suppression of pragmatic influences and the ability to 
reason slowly and abstractly are heritable features of System 2. This is what is involved in 
hypothetical thinking: while both humans and animals make decisions based on past experience, 
only humans can imagine the possible results of actions, and make decisions on a balance of 
probability and utility; though evidence exists of biased decisions (Shafir et al. 1993; Baron 
1994) and logical flaws. Humans act according to past experience, too: "If I go to a 
departmental meeting, I get a headache"; but, differently from animals, they can tell someone 
why they avoid the meeting, and to reason about causes (EO 2004: 6-9). Evans, Over and 
Handley (2003) formulated three principles: the singularity principle (we only consider one 
hypothesis at a time); the relevance principle (the possibility considered is the most relevant and 
plausible in the given context); and the "satisficing" principle (we keep the current model if it 
satisfies our constraints and goals. EO 2004: 9-10). 
2.4. Psychologists, Ramsey, Stalnaker and Lewis
EO take the Ramsey test as expressing "the degree of confidence one should have in the 
ordinary conditional by relating it to conditional probability" (EO 2004: 21). Stalnaker (1968) 
used the Ramsey test for cases in which we must change our beliefs before applying them 
because our suppositions contrast with the antecedent. We need to reduce the conflict which 
results from our hearing "If Linda is a feminist and a banker, then she will vote for the 
Conservative Party", when we think that she is actually a non-feminist (EO 2004: 22). We will 
need to make minimal readjustments to our beliefs before considering that conditional. JLB 
(2002) objected that making that change can be a psychological problem; EO replied that 
revising beliefs in the light of experience is normal behaviour (EO 2004: 22-23). 
We evaluate conditionals by forming a representation of the antecedent and the 
consequent and by comparing it with one of the antecedent and the negation of the consequent. 
System 1 is involved if we count how often we had headaches after departmental meetings, and 
System 2 if we build causal models and make conditional probability judgments; with the 
possibility of biases, such as relying on unrepresentative but easily retrievable examples (EO 
2004: 24-26). Our mental constructs are the psychological equivalents of Stalnaker's worlds: if 
we usually carry an umbrella, and we forget it once and get wet, we will perceive a world in 
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which we take one as close, and will even feel regret; whereas if we never take an umbrella, we 
will consider a world with an umbrella in it as distant and will not feel too bad about getting 
wet. Our probability judgments are linked to closeness judgments (EO 2004: 28).
In 1976, David Lewis revealed that the probability of a conditional as meant by 
Stalnaker cannot equal the conditional probability of q if p (Lewis 1976: 297-315; 1986: 133-
156; Bennett 2003: 60). "The truthful speaker wants not to assert falsehoods, wherefore he is 
willing to assert only what he takes to be very probably true" (Lewis 1976: 297; 1986: 133). 
Consider: "If the teapot is dropped, then it will break". We think of four future possibilities. The 
teapot not being dropped and not breaking (false antecedent and false consequent, FF), which is 
what we are trying to achieve by carrying the teapot carefully, Stalnaker would judge to depend 
on whether that world is closer to "the teapot is dropped and breaks" (TT), or to "the teapot is 
dropped and does not break" (TF). Psychologists have found that people's judgments, based on 
past experience (of dropping china) or on causal models (of how china breaks), are that FF is 
closer to TT than to TF. Therefore, were we to follow Stalnaker, we would say that people 
consider true a conditional which has a false antecedent and a false consequent (EO 2004: 28-
29). As against this possibility, which results from the model Edgington calls "T2" (2003), and 
against the mechanical application of the truth table too ("T1"), EO support the non-truth-
functional "T3" model of conditionals throughout their book. T3 maintains that there is no truth 
outside of pragmatic considerations. Conditional probability depends on a subjective degree of 
conditional confidence, as argued in Adams' (1975) reworking of Ramsey; and it is different 
from the probability of the conditional actually happening (EO 2004: 29; 31). 
In tests, people mix up the probability of the conditional and the conditional probability, 
but also reject the material conditional. EO comment that empirical studies of conditional 
probability are only very recent, and that psychologists mix up the two different probabilities 
themselves (EO 2004: 133). 
Hadjichristidis et al. (2001) ran an experiment in which people evaluated couples of 
conditionals such as: "Peter said the following: If horses have steneozoidal cells, then cows will 
have steneozoidal cells. How likely do you think it is that what Peter said is true?"; and 
"Suppose you knew that horses had steneozoidal cells. How likely would you think it was that 
cows have steneozoidal cells?" The ratings between judgments of the probability of the 
conditional (first question) and those of conditional probability (second question) were highly 
correlated, 0.99 (EO 2004: 134-35). 
Evans et al. (2003) measured three probabilities: conditional, material conditional and 
conjunctive. Participants were asked how likely certain claims, cast as conditionals, were about 
objects of which they had read a description ("If the card is yellow then it has a circle printed on 
it"; if p then q). The cards were declared either red or yellow with either a circle or a diamond 
printed on and in these combinations. People overall rejected the probability of the material 
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conditional: 33 cards out of 37 do not confirm "If the card is yellow then it has a circle printed 
on it". There was high correlation between the other two probabilities and the estimated 
probability of the conditionals. Moreover, people rated the probability of conditional and 
contrapositive statements (the latter being on the pattern: "if not Q, then not P" in relation to "if 
P, then Q") independently, although they are logically equivalent; there was a small trend to 
judge the conditional as less likely when the probability of the antecedent was lower. These 
results flatly contradict the rules of the truth table (EO 2004: 136). 
Oberauer and Wilhelm (2003), also using conditionals "impoverished" of a context, 
independently replicated these findings. About half the participants matched the probability of 
the conditional to the conditional probability; the material conditional was again largely 
rejected. 
A study which remedied lack of context, by Over et al. ("in preparation"), involved 
asking people to evaluate claims such as: "If the cost of petrol increases then traffic congestion 
will improve". Knowledge of the world has a bearing on this kind of reasoning. A probabilistic 
version of the truth table task was used, with TT, TF, FT, FF having to add up to 100%: "Petrol 
cost increases and traffic congestion improves", "Petrol cost increases and traffic congestion 
does not improve" etc. The overall result was relatively clear: the association of the probability 
of the conditional with the conditional probability was stronger than in the two studies which 
involved frequency distribution and mental arithmetic, and the material conditional was again 
rejected (EO 2004: 138-40). 
2.5. Empirical testing of counterfactuals
EO and others tried to demonstrate that the same mental process is involved in the evaluation of 
both counterfactuals and indicative conditionals. When people know an event has happened, 
they are more likely to think of it as inevitable ("hindsight bias"; Baron 2000; Roese 2004); but 
that does not affect the relationship between the perceived probability of the conditional 
happening and the conditional probability. People were asked to consider the state of the world 
five years earlier, and to evaluate the probability of counterfactuals such as "If New York had 
not been attacked by terrorists in 2001, then the US would not have attacked Iraq"; and also to 
consider Does/Will conditionals ("If Queen Elizabeth dies then Prince Charles will become 
king") and Had/Would counterfactuals ("If Queen Elizabeth had died last year, then Prince 
Charles would have become king") in all their permutations (TT, TF, FT, FF). "What is very 
striking ... is that results are very similar for indicative and counterfactual conditionals and for 
ratings of probability or causal strength"; there was high correlation between the conditional 
probability and the probability of the whole conditional (EO 2004: 140-41). Real people treat 
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counterfactuals similarly to indicative conditionals, and mix up the conditional probability with 
the probability of the conditional.
There were no studies of people's probability judgments about counterfactuals before 
the early 2000s, according to EO (2004: 120). These need to be integrated with philosophical 
logic: Chisholm, Goodman, Stalnaker, Lewis, Dudman, Edgington and Ramsey are of most 
interest to EO. By making adjustments to our beliefs, we can apply Ramsey to counterfactuals 
(EO 2004: 115-17). People have been found to have intuitions about the closeness of 
possibilities (EO 2004: 117), though often biased ones, such as selecting versions of themselves 
when performing better than usual, and generally perceiving those past situations which were 
successful rather than not, the "availability heuristic" (EO 2004: 117-18). Kahneman and 
Tversky (1982) proposed the "simulation heuristic", which involves a simulation model derived 
from a possible condition, the antecedent, a process which is however fraught with biases, such 
as the rejection of relatively unlikely events when we evaluate counterfactuals (EO 2004: 118). 
EO see the simulation heuristic as akin to the Ramsey test, and both in need of further 
experimentation (EO 2004: 119). 
Thompson and Byrne's 2002 article on reasoning counterfactually EO select for 
criticism: the authors are accused of encouraging pragmatic rather than logical inferences when 
they asked people what they thought the speaker of a counterfactual meant to imply. Participants 
were presented with possibilities such as the truth or falsity of antecedent and consequent. As 
expected, subjunctive, as opposed to indicative conditionals were interpreted as more likely to 
be counterfactual, namely not to have happened; but, surprisingly, although the "nothing 
implied" response was more likely for indicative conditionals, people also read an implication 
of truth or falsity in one of the two components of indicative conditionals, especially 
consequents (Thompson & Byrne 2002: 1158-59). The idea that counterfactual and causal 
thinking are related was confirmed: more counterfactual interpretations were made of causal 
than of non-causal materials; and when the antecedent or the consequent were considered false. 
According to Thompson and Byrne, people "flesh out" the default mental model TT with the 
mood and content of the conditional, and the perceived necessity of the antecedent (Thompson 
& Byrne 2002: 1166-67). 
EO comment that what is lacking is evidence that people will not spot the falsity of: "If 
I had taken that pawn, then I would have won the game", said after I lost. They expect an 
attribution of probability: "Some of these experiments should be on counterfactuals ... and their 
relation to indicative conditionals ..., and on the relation between degrees of confidence in both 
of these conditional types and conditional probability judgments". This kind of approach is not 
strictly logical. Elsewhere, not enough emphasis on pragmatics is the accusation (to JLB; EO 
2004: 63).
One 1970s psychological account of conditionals would apply to counterfactuals (EO 
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2004: 121-25). Rips and Marcus (1977) conceived of suppositions people make when 
considering an indicative conditional, as parallel to possible worlds. They rank progressively 
less discardable sets of beliefs. The antecedent is added to the top belief; if a set of propositions 
which feels consistent is hit, and it contains the consequent, then the conditional is considered 
true. OE find this theory in advance of its time, because the possibility of having more than one 
consistent set suggested the concept of conditional probability (EO 2004: 53-55). But it had two 
shortcomings: the implication that those sets would be equally probable, and the impossibility 
for people to hold sets of possible worlds in their heads, and to recall all their beliefs about 
something when asked (EO 2004: 55-56).
2.6. Psychologists and Adams 1975
EO find that Dorothy Edgington's T3 model (2003), as opposed to the T1 (the truth-table) and 
the T2 (Stalnaker 1968), comes closer to the truth about indicative conditionals: there is no truth 
outside of pragmatic considerations. Conditional probability depends on a subjective degree of 
conditional confidence. This was Adams' 1975 interpretation of Ramsey. But there are problems 
with T3 as well as with more truth-functional theories: these involve negations, conjunction, 
disjunctions and embeddings  (Bennett 2003). T3 is dismissed by the only psychologists EO 
know to have taken it seriously, JLB (1991), who define validity in terms of truth conditions: an 
inference is valid iff its conclusion must be true given the truth of its premises (EO 2004: 29).   
2.7. Two more Experiments 
Garcia-Madruga et al. (2009) carried out experiments meant to compare inferences from 
"unless" to "if not" and from "unless" to "only if" in factual and counterfactual conditionals. The 
report declares allegiance to the mental models theory of JLB (1991, 2002); reasoners keep few 
possibilites in mind, because of limited working memory. Having discarded the epistemic 
models of EO (2004), which add knowledge and probabilities to mental models, GM 
acknowledge the importance of pragmatic knowledge (GM 2009: 222). 
Participants were given sets of problems (such as: "Sergio would have been in Granada 
only if Cristina had been in Lisboa") and three possible conclusions (such as: "1) Victor was in 
Madrid; 2) Victor was not in Madrid; 3) There is no valid conclusion"). Reasoners were able to 
understand and reason from counterfactual '"unless" assertions, thus confirming its acceptability 
as recently claimed by linguists, but denied formerly. Also, while reasoners treated factual and 
counterfactual "unless" similarly, there was a trend to increase the difference between 
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affirmative and negative inferences in counterfactual "unless" and "only if" (GM 2009: 243; 
227; 235). "Unless" still presented problems with high asymmetrical responses, for instance, 
which implies misunderstanding of "unless" (especially amongst people with low working 
memory), perhaps due to superficial bias. Counterfactual "unless" was understood better (GM 
2009: 237). 
Quelhas et al. (2008) found an identical counterfactual thinking style (upward or 
downward, for instance) amongst depressed and non-depressed participants; this contradicts 
Roese and Olson's (1995) supposition that the depressed counterfactualize downward to make 
themselves feel better. The non-depressed, however, showed a higher tendency towards 
spontaneous counterfactualizing, which counters the idea that the depressed are more inclined to 
counterfactualize (Quelhas et al. 2008: 359-62). 
3. Linguists' Views of Counterfactuals
3.1. Linguists who are Philosophers
3.1.1. Kaufmann 2006
Kaufmann (2006: 6) keeps the basic tripartite grouping of conditionals, as outlined at 1.1, 
adding that indicative conditionals may also be predictive (Does/will) and nonpredictive 
(Did/did).
An interesting view of Kaufmann's is that if A, B asserts that B follows from A "without 
asserting either A or B".That opinion probably agrees with current concepts of degrees of 
speaker's confidence in an utterance (Givón 2001; Edgington: 2007). The relation between A 
and B can be causal or inferential. But B can also be relevant if A is true, as in "If you want to 
meet, I am in my office now". Or the conditional may be a speech act, such as "If you will be 
late, give me a call" (command); or a metalinguistic comment of the consequent, such as "If you 
excuse me saying so, she is downright incompetent". An if-then sentence which is not a 
conditional is "If these problems are difficult, they are also fascinating".
Conditionality may also be expressed in other forms: "Should the sun come out, Sue 
will go on a hike"; "Buy one - get one free"; "Give me $ 10 and I will fix your bike". But if  
remains the prototypical conditional marker in English. Modality, a form of which is the use of 
the auxiliaries will and would, temporal relations and pragmatic factors all play a role in the use 
of conditionals cross-linguistically.
Kaufmann highlights four aspects of "Truth-Conditional Semantics", each constituting a 
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more advanced phase in the understanding of conditionals.
Material Conditional (or material implication) allows intuitively unacceptable 
conditionals, as we saw in the philosophical section, because it is a truth function equal to 
conjunction and disjunction. The following is acceptable as a conjunction, but unacceptable as a 
conditional: "If today is Friday, it is raining, and if today is Friday, it is not raining". Strictly 
logical truth conditions, therefore, have been altered to include pragmatic considerations. One of 
them is the "assertibility" of the conditional (Jackson 1987). Two conditions must be met for if  
A then B to be assertible: A→B must be highly probable and it must remain so in case A turns 
out true; the conditional probability of B given A has to be high. 
A different approach has used the concept of possible worlds. A cannot be true without 
B also being true: "if A then B is true at a possible world w relative to an accessibility relation R 
iff (if and only if) for all possible worlds w' such that wRw' and A is true at w', B is true at w'". 
This approach includes a relation R which decides the modal base (set of possible worlds; 
Kratzer 1981) relevant to the truth of the conditional at w. Under (variably) strict implication all 
possible worlds are relevant, and the conditional is true iff B is a logical consequence of A; at 
the other extreme, in the case of the material conditional, the only world relevant to w is w itself.
Conditionals, then, need to be evaluated by reference to speaker's beliefs, information 
available and possible future courses of events; which constitute "different choices of the 
accessibility relation". A given conditional can be true and false at the same time, depending on 
its modal base. The evaluator may lack information and judge a true conditional false, as with: 
"If this material is heated to 500°, it will burn". This approach makes truth relative to a certain 
index and escapes the shortcomings of the material conditional. But flaws remain, such as 
Strengthening of the Antecedent, which allows: "If this material is placed in a vacuum chamber 
and heated to 500°, it will burn". There is no link of necessity between the two. Kaufmann 
presents two possible solutions to this. 
"Relative Likelihood". Default assumptions about the first example include air being 
present. Such assumptions are "an ordering source", a set of propositions that are normally true 
at w (Kratzer 1981) and preorder the worlds in the modal base. Kaufmann's improved 
formulation of the possible world approach is as follows: "If A then B is true at w relative to a 
modal base MB iff for every A-world w' in MB, there is an AB-world in MB that is at least as 
normal as w' and not equalled or outranked in normalcy by an A-world in MB at which B is 
false" (Kaufmann 2006: 7). Every antecedent-world at which the material is placed in a vacuum 
chamber is outranked in normalcy by another at which it is not. The order achieved Kaufmann 
likens to that envisaged in the concept of "comparative similarity" between possible worlds used 
by Lewis and Stalnaker regarding counterfactuals (and indicative conditionals in Stalnaker 
1975).
A second solution ("Probability") consists in rejecting "the universal quantification 
33
over possible worlds". On this account (Adams' probabilistic entailment, 1975), modal bases 
and ordering sources are replaced by different probabilistic distributions over possible worlds. 
But this did not resolve all complications: Lewis (1976) showed that there is a difference 
between the conditional probability and the probability that the conditional is true. That 
conditional sentences should be propositions at all, therefore, is now in doubt, and 
philosophically-inclined linguists tend to look at how conditionals are used (Jackson 1987). 
Kaufmann's final comment is that Kratzer is the most influential theorist amongst 
linguists, and that probabilistic accounts and artificial intelligence have been studied extensively 
by philosophers. Kratzer's collected essays on conditionals, highly theoretical, was published in 
2012. Choosing between theories is difficult for linguists, because the issues involved in studies 
of conditionals are not obviously linguistic. One theory works better than another, depending on 
the purpose of the study (Kaufmann 2006: 8).   
3.1.2. Barker 2006
Barker (2006), on counterfactuals, comments that the speaker's knowledge of the falsity of the 
antecedent is not a mark of counterfactuals; mere improbability may justify the utterance, and 
some indicative conditionals may also be asserted with known false antecedents: "If Bill Clinton 
was bald, no one knew about it." Future open conditionals, in particular, appear to fall in both 
camps because of the syntactic tense shift and modal auxiliary in the consequent: "If Clinton 
goes bald, everyone will know about it." Truth conditions also constitute a problem, which 
begins with indicative conditionals; "probabilistic assertability condition semantics" has 
developed as an alternative (Adams 1975). How probabilistic semantics applies to 
counterfactuals, however, remains unresolved. Barker identifies two main approaches to truth 
conditions for counterfactuals: the metalinguistic (older) and the possible worlds (more recent), 
both based on Ramsey (1929).
Metalinguistic Approaches. These consist of the following argument: the antecedent P 
and laws of nature L plus facts cotenable with P (legitimate factual premises) entail or 
probabilize the consequent Q. As we saw in the philosophical section, this presents two 
challenges: the avoidance of circularity in the definition of the conditions for premise A to be 
cotenable with P, and the conception of law (Barker 2006: 259).
Natural laws present another problem: it is not obvious why some generalities support 
counterfactuals and others do not. My inference "all organisms living in the shade have a 
temperature of 98.6° F", based on my taking the temperature of lizards in the shade, can confirm 
"all organisms living in the sun have a temperature of 98.6°F", although I have observed that 
those lizards were in the shade rather than in the sun (Barker 2006: 260). 
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Possible Worlds Approaches. These run into even more problems with laws. The 
closest P-worlds to the actual will be worlds which diverge from it shortly before the time of the 
antecedent; there is then a small miracle of divergence, and those worlds then develop according 
to the laws (Barker 2006: 260). 
Lewis' temporal asymmetry (the dependence of the future on the past rather than the 
opposite) worries Barker. Concerning physical determination, Barker refers to Elga (2000). Elga 
asks: assuming that at 8 Gretta cracked an egg onto a frying pan, are the following true? "If 
Gretta hadn't cracked an egg, then at 8.05 there wouldn't have been a cooked egg on the pan / ... 
at 7.55 she wouldn't have taken an egg out of the refrigerator". Which possible world amongst 
the non-crack worlds is the closest to the actual world? For that to be decided, history before 8 
has to be almost like actual history, and history after 8 has to be very different from it. On those 
conditions, the second counterfactual ("at 7.55 ...") will almost never turn out true (Elga 2000: 
314). Elga's argument involves the world of thermodynamics: here, "the existence of apparent 
traces of an event ... falls far short of entailing that the event occurred" (Elga 2000: 324). Dunn 
(2011) rebuts: entropy "does not seem to refer to a perfectly natural property". "The Second 
Law [of thermodynamics] would be very complex if formulated by referring only to perfectly 
natural properties" (Dunn 2011: 83). The laws to be respected are rather "new science laws" 
(Dunn 2011:  84). Are there different kinds of natural laws, through which we can evaluate 
counterfactuals? Loewer (2012)'s view is that there are no additional, ontologically independent 
dynamical or causal special laws; there is, however, "a law that specifies an objective 
probability distribution over initial conditions compatible with the very low entropy state of the 
universe at the time immediately after the Big Bang" (Loewer 2012: 13; 18).
Lewis' insistence on temporal asymmetry fails in relation to physical indeterminism, 
too, according to Barker (2006). Consider: "If I had bet on heads I would have won", said after 
the coin lands heads. That will always be false if we adopt Lewis's rule 4 and rule out 
approximate agreement of fact after the time of the antecedent as relevant to similarity of 
worlds. Ruling it in would have the same results, since Lewis seeks global similarity between 
the counterfactual and the actual world, rather than patterns of causation (Barker 2006: 261). 
Barker concludes that the lovers of world semantics may prefer a version of it which has 
impossible rather than possible worlds (Barker 2011: 573). In a physically deterministic world, 
the divergence between the counterfactual and the real world results in inconsistency of laws, 
which possible world theories ignore. The "pragmatic or metalinguistic approach", on the other 
hand, views counterfactuals as "incomplete representations of divergence, representations that 
never register the inconsistence" (Barker 2011: 573). A game, rather, "can ensue between 
assertor and assessor depending on how much detail" they may want; an uncooperative audience 
may well ask too many questions about the precise causal path and lead to a collapse of the 
counterfactual (Barker 2011: 573). 
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3.2. Linguists who are Linguists
This section will consider linguists who take a more technical approach to the study of 
conditionals.
3.2.1. Givón
Givón considers himself a "functionalist" and declares his lineage back to Aristotle, who saw a 
correlation between bodily form and function; although he also founded the opposite approach, 
structuralism, by recognizing the arbitrariness of linguistic signs, which modern structuralists 
have "unreflectively" extended to grammar. Saussure's "fateful" opposition between langue 
(ideal system) and parole (observable linguistic behaviour), Givón argues, neglects the role of 
mental processing, which was present in Aristotle (Givón 2001(1): 3-5).
Givón asks whether thought precedes syntax and whether grammar is the manifestation 
of syntactic structures. This is self-reportedly done in the spirit of Chomsky, who after many 
changes of heart "decreed" syntactic structures to be "figments of the methodologist’s 
imagination” in 1992. Plato (for pre-existing ideals) and the Positivists (against) also "loom 
over" Givón's approach. Givón claims to seek universals while “affirming the reality of 
syntactic structures”, and admits the principles he discovers are "elusive" (Givón 2001(1): xv-
xvi). Some consider Givón an authoritative linguist and typologists, a follower neither of 
Chomsky's formalism nor of any particular version of functionalist linguistics (Kulikov 2004: 
419). Others find his analysis superficial and inconsistent (Carroll 1985: 343-47). 
For Givón (2001), counterfactuals are adverbial clauses that constitute a branch of 
conditionals, but "fall under the scope" of negation rather than that of irrealis modality. 
3.2.1.1. Modality
Counterfactuals (and conditionals) are expressions of modality. This concerns the way the 
speaker's attitude towards the proposition is coded: speakers make a judgment which can be 
epistemic (truth, probability, certainty, belief, evidence) or evaluative / deontic (desirability, 
preference, intent, ability, obligation, manipulation), and often both. A modal "shell", or 
"envelope", encases the event: 
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a) Darla shot the tiger
b) It's too bad that Darla shot the tiger
c) If Darla shoots the tiger, ...
d) Darla didn't shoot the tiger
e) He told Darla that she should shoot the tiger
f) Shoot the tiger, Darla!
g) Did Darla shoot the tiger?
The subject-agent (Darla), the object-patient (the tiger) and the transitive event (shoot) are 
relatively unaffected by the different modal encasings (Givón 2001(1): 300).
In Aristotle, emphasis is on epistemic modalities, which are kinds of truth: necessary / 
factual / possible / and non-/ truth; and their modern equivalents in communicative terms are 
assertions: presupposition and realis / irrealis / negative assertion (Givón 2001(1): 301). These 
are no longer treated as properties of propositions, but considered to be pragmatic. The 
following is a shortened version of Givón's 2001 reformulation of his own work on epistemic 
modality in communicative terms and more widely of the linguistic trends which followed from 
Austin (1962), who drew a distinction between utterances that cause something to be done and 
those that do not, Searle (1969), who elaborated the concept of speech always being a form of 
action, and Grice, whose "conversational implicature" and "reflexive intention" put meaning in 
the speaker's attitude to utterances (Grice 1975):
Presupposition. The proposition is taken for granted to be true, either by definition, prior 
agreement, generic culturally-shared convention, ... or by having been ... left unchallenged by 
the hearer.
Realis assertion. The proposition is strongly asserted to be true. But challenge from the hearer 
is deemed appropriate.
Irrealis assertion. The proposition is weakly asserted to be either possible, likely or uncertain 
(epistemic sub-modes), or necessary, desired or undesired (valuative-deontic sub-modes). But 
the speaker is not ready to back  up the assertion ... and challenge from the hearer is readily 
entertained.
Negative assertion. The proposition is strongly asserted to be false, most commonly in 
contradiction to the hearer's explicit or assumed beliefs. A challenge from the hearer is 
anticipated, and the speaker has evidence or other strong grounds for backing up their strong 
belief.
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These views reveal the shift that has occurred from logic to "matters of subjective certainty", 
and from "speaker-oriented semantics to interactive pragmatics" (Givón 2001(1): 301-02).
Givón discusses four grammatical contexts across which modality, which is universal, is 
distributed: (1) the inherent modality of lexical verbs; (2) tense-aspect and auxiliaries; (3) modal 
adverbs; and (4) clause type, subdivided into (4a) main declarative affirmative clauses, (4b) 
verb-complement clauses, (4c) relative clauses, (4d) adverbial clauses (which include 
conditionals and counterfactuals) and (4e) non-declarative speech acts. The four modalities can 
also be divided between fact (presupposition and realis assertion) and non-fact (irrealis assertion 
and negative assertion) (Givón 2001(1): 302-03; 305; 440; 442; 477n2). 
(1) Most verbs are inherently realis, unless under a non-fact operator (Givón 2001(1): 
304; 443). 
Modality is distributed in (2) tense-aspect in the following way: past and present qualify 
as fact, and future qualifies as non-fact. The future tense allows a non-referring interpretation 
along with the aspect habitual and with negation ("He will eat / always eats / did not eat a 
sandwich") (Givón 2001(1): 305; 443). 
Epistemic adverbs, (3), such as "maybe" and "probably" tend to make propositions 
irrealis and to override realis tense-aspects: "Maybe she ate a sandwich" (Givón 2001(1): 305). 
Evaluative adverbs such as "hopefully" cast realis scope, whereas "preferably" projects into the 
future and casts irrealis scope.
(4a) The declarative, affirmative clause is the default type and has a realis status which 
can be modified by the means just discussed (Givón 2001(1): 305-06).
(4b) Only modality verbs and auxiliaries concern us here. Modal verbs have high 
inherent irrealis status. In English, they form the class of modal auxiliaries: "can", "could", 
"may", "might", "will", "would", "shall", "should", "must". These started off having evaluative-
deontic senses (intent, ability, necessity, obligation, permission, preference) and acquired 
epistemic senses like lower certainty or probability; the still evolving new modals have not 
acquired any epistemic sense yet: "have-to", "got-to", "need-to", "be-able-to". Evaluative-
deontic irrealis sub-modes always involve epistemic uncertainty. The evaluative-deontic senses 
are future projecting, an obviously irrealis epistemic mode. Many English modals code more 
than one irrealis sub-mode, such as "can" and "may", which can indicate ability, probability and 
permission; "should" and "must" are more deontic and can indicate either obligation or 
probability (Givón 2001(1): 306-08).
(4d) Adverbial subordinate clauses generally come under the scope of presupposition 
("When she found a house, it was too expensive" (temporal); "Although she found a house, she 
refused to buy it" (concessive); "Because he met a new guru, he left the church" (cause); "Since  
she has a job, she can afford it" (reason)), irrealis ("When you get a loan, I'll sell you my car" 
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(future time); "If you get a loan, I'll sell you my car" (conditional); "In order for you to get a  
loan, I'll have to co-sign it" (purpose)) and negation (counterfactual: "If you had got a loan, I 
would have sold you my car") (Givón 2001(1): 311). 
Adverbial conditional clauses can be: irrealis, counterfactual, conditionals with 
intermediate truth value and concessive conditionals. 
Irrealis conditionals have a "pending truth value" which is extended to the main clause 
and applies also to the past tense ("If they arrived that late, they must be tired") and to the 
habitual aspect ("If he works that hard, he has no time for this"); they have an "implied futurity" 
("If you finish on time, you can have this") and the sub-mode of prediction ("If she was there, 
then she did see it"). Irrealis conditionals also resemble irrealis when-clauses in many 
languages, the speaker's expectation of the eventual truth of the whole sentence just being lower 
in the case of conditionals. Moreover, both irrealis if and irrealis when behave like bi-
conditional connectors: here Givón parts ways from logic, as he comments himself, since only 
modus tollens (denying the consequent) is valid in logic (Givón 2001(2): 332; 387n4). To most 
people, "If you bring it, I will pay you" implies "If you don't bring it, I won't pay you". 
Some languages have a "NEG-conditional subordinator" meaning if not. This is 
demonstrated by the "rough equivalence" of "Unless you pay up, we'll have you arrested" and 
"If you don't pay up, ...". Haiman (1978) has suggested that conditional clauses are "topics", 
therefore "pragmatically presupposed" without truth value. This probably applies only to pre-
posed adverbial clauses.
Counterfactuals stand in contrast with irrealis conditionals by falling under the 
negative, epistemic scope of non-fact. Counterfact modality is also associated with main clauses 
such as "You should have told me he was here" and complement clauses such as "I wish you 
were here" (Givón 2001(2): 332-33). Cross-linguistically, counterfactuals tend to be marked by 
semantically contradictory inflections: the realis past, perfective and perfect, and the irrealis 
future, subjunctive, conditional or modal. "I wish you were here" uses the past as a subjunctive.
Conditionals with intermediate truth value are those between conditionals (possibly 
true) and counterfactuals (not true). The same combinations of forms used in counterfactuals are 
often used to code low-probability conditionals: "If I were to do this, I would die" / "If I was to 
have done this, I would have died".
Of concessive conditionals, Givón observes that in some languages they use a special 
morpheme rather than the combination  "even if", as in English (Givón 2001(2): 330-35).
3.2.1.2. The Position of Adverbial Clauses
Adverbial clauses may precede or follow their main clause, the latter not attested in all 
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languages. The different "grounding properties" of the two cases oppose semantics to 
pragmatics: "A post-posed ADV-clause tends to have more local, semantic connections to its 
main clause ..."; "A pre-posed ADV-clause tends to have more global, diffuse pragmatic 
connections to its discourse context ...". An example from Ramsay (1987: 405) illustrates the 
difference: "If they had not seen him already, they would not see him if he remained still". The 
pre-posed clause reaches "diffusely back across several preceding chains" (rifles shooting, then 
silence  ...), whereas the post-posed clause remains fixed to the main clause, what has to happen 
for it to take place (Givón 2001(2): 345-46). Pre-posed adverbial clauses are "coherence 
bridges", which link back to the preceding discourse and forward to the main clause (Givón 
2001(2): 345-07).  
Closely related is the concept of iconicity, i.e. how grammar mirrors events. Givón 
thinks there is a "naturalness of grammar" (Givón 2001(1): 34). Chomsky's (1968) argument 
that animal communication consists of signals associated with the non-linguistic, whereas 
human language is arbitrary and symbolic, Givón sees as a good summary of the views of 
Aristotle and De Saussure, respectively, on the arbitrariness of the sign, and of those (1920s-
30s) of Leonard Bloomfield, "the father of American structuralism" (Chomsky 1968: 69-70; 
Givón 2001(1): 36; 5). On the opposite side, Peirce (1934, 1940), like Givón, found that most 
grammatical constructions contain a mixture of devices which go from the more iconic to the 
more arbitrary (Givón 2001(1): 34). Less predictable information chunks, for instance, are 
stressed. "Information chunks that belong together conceptually" are packed together spatially 
and within "a unified melodic contour". Predictable or unimportant information is left out, 
whereas important information is fronted, and "[t]he temporal order in which events occurred 
will be mirrored in the linguistic report of the events" (Givón 2001(1): 34-35).
In a language which has the subjunctive, the two semantic domains occupied by that 
category are the epistemic and the evaluative-deontic irrealis; the former indicates low certainty 
and the latter weak manipulation, and both sub-modes accommodate gradation. 
In main declarative clauses (and yes/no questions), old past forms of the modals are 
used in English as subjunctive markers: "She would / might / could / should come"; this has the 
lowest certainty, as opposed to the highest certainty of "He will come" and the lower certainty 
of "He may / can / shall come" (Givón 2001(1): 313-14). In manipulative speech acts, strength 
of manipulation is coded by a three-way opposition between imperative / simple modal and past 
modal: "Leave!" / "You may / can leave" and "You might / could leave". 
In different languages, adverbial clauses and  / or their main clauses are marked by 
combinations of subjunctive and non-subjunctive forms depending on levels of epistemic 
certainty. English uses modals and their old past forms: "When she comes, we will consider it" 
(irrealis when; high certainty); "If she comes, we will/shall consider it" (irrealis if; lower 
certainty); "If she ever came, we would/might consider it" (subjunctive if; even lower 
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certainty); "If she had come, we would have/might have considered it" (counterfactual if; 
lowest certainty) (Givón 2001(1): 317; 324).
3.2.2. Timberlake 2007
Timberlake (2007) also emphasizes modality. He even argues that realis past narrative may be a 
record of conditions and consequences that are fulfilled, without any explicit conditional 
construction (Timberlake 2007: 322). The possibility "to consider alternatives from the 
perspective of an authority", is also at work "in seemingly innocuous assertions in the indicative 
(realis) mood" (Timberlake 2007: 283; 315- 16). Darwin's report of spotting whales near the 
coast, for instance, tacitly tells the addressee that there were two alternative courses of events, 
and the less expected occurred: "On one occasion I saw two of these monsters, probably male 
and female, slowly swimming one after the other, within less than a stone's throw of the shore". 
The speaker points to the expected, that whales do not come close to the shore, and informs the 
addressee that it was the opposite that took place. The passage demonstrates that alternative 
courses of events are always present in language ("Tierra del fuego", 22 Jan. 1823; Timberlake 
2007: 321).
Timberlake identifies three forms of modality: epistemology, as instanced in questions, 
inferential constructions ("It seems that ..."), and indicative assertions; obligation, as expressed 
in commands, weaker or stronger; and contingency, as in conditionals (Timberlake 2007: 316-
19; 329-30). Authority, which resides in the speaker in various ways in all other cases, in a 
conditional is assigned to another situation. Explicit conditionals distinguish the contingency 
(protasis) and the consequence (apodosis) (Timberlake 2007: 321). "[F]olk reasoning" infers 
that if the contingency is removed, the consequence is too. The condition is in some way 
considered uncertain, and that can be in one of three time-oriented ways: in general, or iterative 
conditionals, the condition is known to occur on and off, and the consequence with it, as in 
"Whenever ..." constructions; in counterfactual conditions, the condition "is known to be not 
actual, yet it is considered worth discussing as an alternative reality"; potential conditions are 
future-oriented and have an uncertain fate. Epistemic conditions, as in "If Jack fetched the 
water, (you can be sure that) Jill was pleased", are "parasitic" on other conditional structures 
(Timberlake 2007: 322-23). 
General conditions are often treated as aspectual: aspect "is concerned with the 
relationship between situations ... and time", and general conditions are expressed similarly to 
iterative events (Timberlake 2007: 303; 325). Condition and consequence tend to be marked 
differently, the protasis receiving a mark of uncertainty. Counterfactuals are usually 
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distinguished from other conditionals and marked by the past tense, but are not always marked 
as less actual than other types (Timberlake 2007: 325-26).
Cross-linguistically, a mood other than the unmarked realis indicative and the 
imperative is often available as a general-purpose way of expressing uncertainty. Terms for this 
mood include subjunctive, which indicates its featuring in embedded clauses, conditional, which 
shows it is used to mark explicit conditional structures, potential and the general irrealis 
(Timberlake 2007: 326).
Speech inevitably contain a modal component: "at each point, the current predication is 
compared to the prior expectations, and, at each point, the current predication allows one to 
project and anticipate possible futures" (Timberlake 2007: 332). 
3.2.3. Thompson et al. 2007
Thompson et al. distinguish between reality and unreality conditionals as occurring in most 
languages. Reality conditionals refer to "real" present ("If it's raining out there, my car is getting 
wet"), "habitual/generic" ("If you step on the break, the car slows down") or past situations ("If 
you were at the party, then you know about Sue and Fred"). Unreality conditionals can be 
imaginative - either hypothetical ("If I saw David, I'd speak Barai with him"; this might happen) 
or counterfactual ("If you had been at the concert, you would have seen Ravi Shankar"; this did 
not or could not happen) - or predictive ("If he gets the job, we'll all celebrate") (Thompson et 
al. 2007: 255-56). 
Most languages use subordinating morphemes, such as if, to mark conditionals, and 
these precede the (adverbial) clause in head-initial languages (like English). Adverbial clauses 
as a whole are "less subordinate" than the other subordinate clauses, which are complements 
(clauses within noun phrases) and relative clauses (modifiers of nouns); subordination and 
coordination are generally considered to be points along a continuum (Thompson et al. 2007: 
238). Pre-posed adverbial clauses are widely acknowledged to have a cohesive function in all 
languages, and often repeating information, whereas post-posed, they tend to link  primarily to 
the main clause, and to introduce new information and to mark a turning point ("He was up in 
the tree, picking apples, when the wolf came along") (Thompson et al. 2007: 295-96). In 
conversations in English, a higher frequency of post-posed temporal, conditional and causal 
clauses has been observed (Thompson et al. 2007: 297). Pre-posed adverbial clauses have been 
considered as topic (Thompson et al. 2007: 291-92). In imaginative conditionals 
(counterfactuals and hypotheticals), a special marker is common, such as would in English; this 
marker also features in non-conditional imaginative sentences, as in "Would that he were here 
now!". In some languages, there is no distinction between if and when clauses (Thompson et al. 
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2007: 256-57). 
Are predictive clauses real or unreal? Different languages group these conditionals 
syntactically either with one group or with the other. English marks predictive clauses as real. 
Semantically speaking, the future is unreal because it has not come yet (Thompson et al. 2007: 
258-59). 
Some languages mark all imaginative conditionals with the same unreality aspect, 
whereas others differentiate between counterfactuals expressing what could not happen, and the 
rest. In English, the former group is marked by an if clause which contains had and a past 
participle, and a then clause which contains would and an uninflected verb: "If we had wanted a 
quiet evening, we would have left you at home". The other imaginative conditionals are marked 
by an if clause which has the verb in the subjunctive (identical with the past tense, except with 
be), and a then clause, which has would and uninflected verb: "If I saw Jimmy Carter, I would 
faint" (what might happen) / "If I were you, I would write a book" (what could not happen) 
(Thompson et al. 2007: 259-60). 
Two more groups of conditionals are identified: negative and concessive conditionals. 
Many languages have a morpheme to mark a negative condition, such as unless in English 
("Unless you get there by 6.00, we're leaving without you"; "We'll go to Chicago unless the 
airport is snowed in"). These conditionals signal that the proposition in the main clause depends 
on a certain condition not obtaining. The authors do not discuss clause position, but mention a 
difference in implication between the negative conditional morpheme and the conditional 
morpheme used with a negative: in "If it doesn't rain, we'll have our picnic", the implication is 
that the speaker thinks it is likely not to rain. In "Unless it rains, we'll have our picnic", the 
speaker is neutral. Negative conditionals behave syntactically and semantically like other 
conditionals in the given language (Thompson et al. 2007: 260-61). Concessive conditionals 
code "frustrated implication": "Even if it rains we'll have our picnic"; "He wouldn't have passed 
even if he had turned in his term paper" (Thompson et al. 2007: 261).
Indicative  versus subjunctive is the basic opposition of verbal moods adopted by 
Thompson et al. (2007); optative, potential and consequential they consider more specific. The 
purpose of the subjunctive in complements is to code dependency (Thompson et al. 2007: 102). 
The complements of propositions which are asserted as factual have a realis modality 
(indicative); those of propositions which express doubt have an irrealis modality (subjunctive or 
other non-indicative mood): these include negative propositional attitudes (doubt, deny), 
hypothetical propositions and commands / requests / desires (Thompson et al. 2007: 108-09).
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3.2.4. Declerck and Reed 2001
Declerck and Reed (2001), on conditionals in English, reject the labels "hypothetical" and 
"subjunctive", and two-clause structures in which the subordinate clause is introduced by as if, 
or is a subject or object clause introduced by if meaning whether. A conditional is "a two-clause 
structure in which one of the clauses is introduced by if (possibly preceded by only, even or 
except) or by a word or phrase that has a meaning similar to if (e.g. provided) or except if (viz. 
unless)". That definition follows consideration of the very wide variety of semantic dependency 
there can be between an if-clause and its head-clause, as shown in the following examples: 
the actualization of the P-situation will trigger the actualization of the Q-situation: If you hit me,  
I'll hit back
the P-clause expresses a relevance condition for uttering the Q-clause: If you're interested,  
there's someone peering at your house
both clauses express a fact; the Q-clause boosts the meaning of the P-clause: If my room is a bit  
messy, yours is a pigsty
if P is true, Q is true: If this is Brussels, it must be Tuesday
the hearer is invited to conclude from the evident falsity of Q that P must also be false: If that  
witness is speaking the truth, I'm the next President of the US (DR 2001: 8-9; 13-14).
Besides conditional sentences introduced by connectors such as if, even if, unless, in  
case, lest, whether ... or, necessity connectors providing / provided (that), on condition that, on 
the understanding that, and inversion conditionals (Had he seen this, he would have been  
curious), DR include subclauses that may have "a conditional connotation", such as relative or 
temporal clauses (Any mistake that should be made is immediately corrected by the machine  
itself = If a mistake should be made, ...; You will be paid after the job is finished, not before = 
You will [only] be paid if ...), "comparative conditionals" (The more we hurry, the sooner we'll  
get there), paratactic conditionals (Do that or I'll punish you), and until-, as soon / long as-, and 
when-clauses. DR make most conceivable sentences seem possible conditionals. 
DR (2001) present a possible-worlds-based typology in their analysis. This is mainly for 
"case-specifying" conditionals, i.e. conditionals in which P specifies cases in which Q 
"actualizes" (as opposed to "relevance conditionals", such as If you are a Catholic, there is a  
Catholic church in Broad Street; DR 2001: 262). Their classification is summarized in the 
following (page numbers in brackets): 
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Possible P-worlds:
- factual: I (always) avoided her if I could; factual performative: Excuse me, please, if I decline  
(66, 68)
- theoretical (non-factual)
- neutral theoretical: If the slugs eat more lettuce than you do, here is the solution (73)
- non-neutral theoretical 
-closed (echoic of other propositions): If it's already 8.45, I'd better hurry up 
(83)
- open: If the train is late, we will miss our connection in London (91)
- tentative: Would you mind if I used your phone? (97)
 - counterfactual: If you weren't such a blockhead you would be much easier to  
work with (99) (DR 2001: 66; 109). 
Given the magnitude of DR's 2001 work, only counterfactuals are treated next. 
3.2.4.1. Counterfactuals
DR (2001) view counterfactuality as "a special type of negation": both clauses of a 
counterfactual implicate, in Grice's sense of implying according to the principles of 
conversation, that it is not the case that either P or Q is true. I would've been happy if he'd come 
implicates "it is not the case that I am happy" and "it is not the case that he came" (the 
implicature is blocked in cases such as If I'd been there, I wouldn't have protested to what he  
said, because "I wasn't there" excludes "I protested". DR 2001: 12). A condition P is 
counterfactual if it is "assumed to be true in a possible world which is incompatible with the real 
(actual) world", as in: If he had been here, he would not have approved of this decision (DR 
2001: 13; 99). Sentences often called "hypothetical", DR call "tentative", such as If he found out  
about our plans, he could ruin everything. These are not considered counterfactuals because the 
fulfillment of the condition is considered unlikely by the speaker, but not impossible. 
Counterfactuals have an irrealis meaning, along with "imaginary-P" conditionals: In your place 
I wouldn't have helped him unless he had paid me for it; this does not say whether I helped him 
or not (DR 2001: 54-55). 
But some counterfactuals imply factuality, such as those with unless and if not, since P 
in those case has its negation reversed: Unless you'd helped me / If you hadn't helped me, I  
wouldn't have finished the job in time (DR 2001: 69; 140; 244; 246). This is also the case in ad 
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absurdum counterfactuals: If Oswald didn't kill Kennedy, I'm Shakespeare (DR 2001: 70; 100; 
140-41; 176). Other "indirect inferentials" are of the type: If (as you say) he really fought in  
Vietnam for three years, he would know / have known a lot about warfare. Here, the 
counterfactuality of Q suggests that P is false too, although there may be ambiguity (DR 2001: 
141; 153). When P identifies two incompatible entities with each other, there is inherent 
counterfactuality, as in: I would reconsider my assumptions if I were you; Goodman (1983) calls 
these  "counteridenticals". The deictic centre presents a problem here, resolved by keeping the 
referent of the subject of P as the referent of the subject of Q: I would ... if I / *you  were you  
(DR 2001: 101-02). This is DR's subdivision:
Counterfactual P and factual (in an imaginary world) Q 
If we had taken the other road, we would also have been here in time (DR 2001: 104; 258; 266). 
Tentative P and factual Q
If it were ever lost or stolen, your card can usually be replaced within 24 hours. "Ad absurdum" 
tentative conditional: Pigs will fly if she manages that (DR 2001: 175-76; 233). 
Counterfactual P and imaginary Q 
If I had your genes, I would have curly hair (DR 2001: 243).
Imaginary P and imaginary Q
These are thought experiments with no implications that the speaker considers them true or 
otherwise: Would he be talking to her if she was busy? (DR 2001: 244).
3.2.4.2. Unless
DR 2001 consider three cases of unless clauses: integrated and non-integrated non-irrealis, and 
irrealis.
Integrated non-irrealis unless clauses equate "Q except if P": Unless / except if / if  
you don't point out the consequences, people ignore the warning (DR 2001: 447-48). Unless is 
not interchangeable with if not when it means "Q results from [not P]": I will be surprised if  
that book does not sell well / *unless .... (DR 2001: 450-51). 
Non-integrated non-irrealis unless clauses typically take a postscript position. Since 
"Q unless P" entails "Q - (but) not Q if P", the following are interchangeable: She'll be here by 
nine - unless / except if / but not if the traffic is bad / but only if the traffic isn't bad (DR 2001: 
452-53). 
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An irrealis unless clause "is one which is not presented as possibly matching the 
actual world": P is either counterfactual or imaginary, in both cases existing only in the 
speaker's mind (DR 2001: 453-54). Interchangeability with except if only applies to imaginary 
conditionals, and interchangeability with if not to counterfactuals (especially in post-posed 
unless clauses) (DR 2001: 456-57). Out of context, this type could be read both ways: I couldn't  
have got to Slough in time unless (except if) I'd had a helicopter (it did not happen); I couldn't  
have got to Slough in time unless (if it hadn't been for the fact that) I'd had a helicopter (it 
happened) (DR 2001: 458). Counterfactual unless means "if it hadn't been the case that", ie. can 
be replaced by if not but not with except if, and has a factual implication: But unless I'd gone  
along with you (if it hadn't been the case that I went ...), you'd have told your husband, I bet; and 
I couldn't have finished this in time unless (if it hadn't been for the fact that) you'd helped me. 
The unless clause in a counterfactual states what happened; it is not itself counterfactual, and is 
not interchangeable with an except if clause (DR 2001: 458-59).
3.2.5. Conditionals as Mental Spaces: Dancygier and Sweetser (2005) 
Dancygier and Sweetser justify their 2005 book on four grounds: linguists' neglect of uses of 
unless and since; apparently coordinate constructions such as "Take another step and I'll shoot"; 
clause order (DS 2005: 5; 7).
"Mental Spaces Theory" frames DS's analysis (DS 2005: 11; Fauconnier 1994, 1997). 
This relates to possible worlds: saying that an if-clause "evokes a Possible World within which a 
then-clause holds", is similar to saying that "an if-clause sets up a Mental Space within which is 
the background for the construal of the then-clause." In "If we leave it open it will be so hot", 
the if-clause sets up a space in which the window is left open, and within that space the speaker 
predicts that the room will become too hot (DS 2005: 11). In the world at which the window is 
open, the speaker considers it highly likely that the room becomes too hot.
 There are different types of mental spaces: content, speech-act, epistemic and 
metalinguistic spaces. An instance of mental content is provided by the if-clause in "If I tie my 
handkerchief around it it'll stick"; the prediction only works within that if-clause. But the 
speaker sets up a discourse context, a speech-act space, in: "If I don't see you before Thursday, 
have a good Thanksgiving!". In this case, the relationship marked by if holds between "the 
possible scenario portrayed by the if-clause and the speaker's act of well-wishing" (DS 2005: 
16).
The concept of epistemic conditionals refers to the space set up by the speaker's 
conditional reasoning process. The speaker 's belief and her conclusion are set out in the two 
clauses:  "If you don't own a House, then (I guess) you (must) materialize in a Port" (from Neal 
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Stephenson's Snow Crash, 1992) (DS 2005: 17). Another type of conditional involves 
metalinguistic negotiation, as in: "The philosophy of life, if it could be defined by such a  
phrase, was beyond his grasp". Here, the narrator is commenting on his own use of words. In all 
these cases, the if-clause sets up a mental space and "request[s] construal of something", the 
then-clause, within that space (DS 2005: 18). 
3.2.5.1. "If I hadda known you were coming, I woulda stayed home"
DS's are suspicious of the label "counterfactual". The speaker of "if you got me a cup of coffee, 
I'd be very grateful", utters a counterfactual, but does not think it contrary to fact (DS 2005: 58-
59). The term "irrealis", DS consider equally unhelpful, as it applies also to predictive 
conditionals, non-conditional predictions and subjunctives, including, therefore, forms which 
mark a positive epistemic stance (DS 2005: 58-59). Similarly, all predictive conditionals, rather 
than just counterfactuals, can be said to be "hypothetical", and even with past temporal 
reference, the contrary-to-fact reading of a counterfactual depends on context (Comrie 1986). 
For instance, after "At that moment, if I'd tried to slip further into the bushes he would have 
seen me", the speaker may well go on to say that he did not know whether he had been seen or 
not (DS 2005: 59-60). 
The use of past tense meanings ("temporal distance"), moreover, has been observed 
cross-linguistically to be closely related to conditionals (James 1982), but also to perform social 
and epistemic distancing functions (Fleischman 1989). The term "distal" has been used for past 
forms of modals and other auxiliaries, to include both temporal and epistemic distance 
(Langacker 1978; Sweetser 1990). In English, one distancing layer consists in the backshifting 
of the protases of predictive conditionals, which are expressed in the present although they refer 
to the future: "If you get me a cup of coffee, I'll be grateful" (DS 2005: 60-61). The term 
"counterfactual", therefore, DS reserve "for specific interpretations involving a construed 
contradiction with 'reality'" (DS 2005: 58). 
DS note that many English speakers register a difference in the degree of speaker's 
dissociation from belief between these two examples: "If he was President, he wouldn't ..." and 
"If he were President, ..."; the latter seems more remote (DS 2005: 61). Also, the speaker of: "If 
I was running a car factory, I wouldn't let workers drive cars home or borrow tools ..." (Neal 
Stephenson, Snow Crash, 1992), goes on to say that he does precisely that, since he lets his 
workers go home with computer data in their heads (DS 2005: 62). DS, therefore, argue that 
"the only 'true' counterfactuals in modern English" are American colloquial forms which written 
may be hadda, woulda, or had've, would've or had of, would of. These show evidence that the 
speaker does not think that the described situation holds in reality. In the protasis of "If I hadda 
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known your were coming, I woulda stayed home", the auxiliary is derived from the contraction 
of the non-occurring form "had have". The speaker has transferred the negative stance observed 
in apodoses ("would have" etc.) to protases; also, "hadda" (with back-formation "had've" and 
"had of") was created by analogy with "woulda", "coulda" and "shoulda", and "hadn'ta" was 
created alongside "wouldn'ta", "couldn'ta" and "shouldn'ta" (Fillmore 1990). In British English, 
a similar phenomenon occurs in Dorothy Sayers' The Nine Tailors: the most extreme form of it 
is "If I hadn't a-been ill, I'd a-got him away all right ..." ("The Slow Work"). There is no "hadn't 
have been" as source for "hadn't a-been" (DS 2005: 63).
Only context will give some idea of whether a sentence is to be interpreted 
counterfactually or not (DS 2005: 71). The question becomes more complicated when 
counterfactuals interact with other space-building mechanisms. 
Fauconnier (1996) argues that counterfactuals often create irrealis space for the purpose 
of evaluating the actual space, as in: "Had I been he, I would have thrown me out, but he said 
no, sure he'd talk, he'd be happy to, if I didn't mind these goddamn phones going off all over the 
place" (Jonathan Raban, Old Glory. 1981). The speaker here constructs a conditional space 
which contains someone else's imagined viewpoint, and embeds that space in a past narrative. 
Because of past time embedding, there is another layer of past morphology (DS 2005: 68). Both 
the distanced space ("I" = the other character) and the reality space ("me" = the narrator), are 
described from the narrator's viewpoint. These situations have been described as blended 
spaces, or cases of blended perspectives (Fauconnier & Turner 2002; DS 2005: 69).
3.2.5.2. Clause Order 
"There is something intuitively natural about the idea that the space-builder clause should 
precede the contents which elaborate the space". This is what happens with most if-clauses (DG 
2005: 173).    
But there are many possibilities:  
(1) if P, Q "If the home computer breaks down, I'll work in my office" 
(2) Q, if P "I'll work in my office, if the home computer breaks down"
(3) Q if P "I'll work in my office if the home computer breaks down"
(4) if P Q "If the home computer breaks down I'll work in my office" (DG 2005: 174).
The if-clause can also be placed medially, and that position says that the clause is a pertinent 
comment to a part of Q ("The philosophy of life, if it could be defined by such a phrase, ...) (DG 
2005: 176). The presence or absence of commas is taken to indicate intonation: comma 
intonation has been observed to correlate with conceptual subordination (DG 2005: 174).
DG conclude that since if is not a topic marker, the if-clause can follow Q, especially 
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when Q is old information. Space-builders, whether they are building actively or evoking, 
present material relative to the contents of the new space (DG 2005: 183). 
3.2.5.3. Unless
Unless behaves in the opposite way to if. A sample from the Wall Street Journal showed twenty-
seven post-posed unless-clauses, mainly preceded by a comma, and one pre-posed unless clause 
(DG 2005: 183). If sets up a neutral space, often as background for the hearer to connect Q to 
the mental-space structure of the ongoing discourse: "If Christo hadn't been injured, he'd have 
made the swim with Karl. If he had been injured, however, Karl would have left him where I 
was sitting ..." The narrator is trying to figure out what may have happened to Christo. Unless 
sets up a space which is the unlikely alternative to the already established space within which Q 
is said to hold. "'Unless ...' I muttered, clicking my fingers ... Unless he'd been killed outright at 
sea, ..." Unless starts a new line of reasoning, at a different level of hypotheticality from the 
previous ifs. Then: "'Or...' Or he'd only been injured a little." Or here opens a third hypothetical 
space after rejection of the whole previous line of reasoning, an alternative which turns out later 
to be the correct one. Unless and in this case or, are used as tools for new departures in the 
narrative (DG 2005: 185-86). 
There are also contexts where the unless-clause precedes the main clause. In that 
position, it tends to function as a hedge on the following speech act, as in: "Dancing all night on 
top of a journey is a jolly poor joke. Unless you want me, I'll wait here for the papers" (DG 
2005: 186-87).
Unless is not interchangeable with if not. Also, it is thought that unless clashes with 
counterfactuals, as in ???"I wouldn't have finished unless you had helped me"; this sentence is 
unacceptable to some speakers. A corpus of data by Declerck and Reed (2000), however, has 
shown that unless is indeed used in counterfactuals (DG 2005: 189); but it has to be embedded, 
and those forms are rare. DG explain as follows. 
 The initial if-clause sets up a distanced space, and within that the speaker expects 
something which unless rules out: "and if miss Catherine had the misfortune to marry him, he 
would not be beyond her control, unless she were extremely and foolishly indulgent" (Emily 
Brontë, Wuthering Heights) (DG 2005: 189-90). The spaces here are not counterfactual; no 
space clashes with the base space: the marriage space (if-clause) has mere future reference, so 
except if can replace unless (DG 2005: 195-96). 
But consider: "'I have pulled my tail off,' replied the younger Mouse, 'but as I should 
still be on the sorcerer's table unless I had, I do not regret it'" (Andrew Lang, Red Fairy Book). 
The unless-clause here stands in opposition to the base space fact, so unless can be replaced by 
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if not and not by except if  (which is is non-factual, whereas unless is not necessarily non-
factual) (DG 2005: 194).
The following is DG's explanation of the lack of acceptability of except if as substitute 
for counterfactual unless (as in the mouse example). Except if embeds recursively, with local 
exceptive meaning: "... a year is a leap year if it is divisible by 4, except if it is divisible by 100, 
except if it is divisible by 400. Or in other words: All years divisible by 4 are leap years except 
for years divisible by 100 but not by 400."; counterfactual unless does not embed recursively, 
but sets up a new space, relatively separate from previous ones (DG 2005: 198-200). 
4. Counterfactuals in Literary Theories
4.1. Dannenberg 2008: Coincidence and Counterfactuality
According to Dannenberg (2008: 109), literary scholars have paid relatively little attention to 
counterfactuals in novels and films. 
Plot is “the dynamic interaction of competing possible worlds”; during the reading, "the 
authoritative version is one of many competing possibilities" (Dannenberg 45). In detective 
stories, “X murdered Z” is valuable because “Y murdered Z” is temporarily possible. 
Gwendolen Harleth in George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda (1876) speculates on future possible lives 
for herself, and after entering a marriage which turns out undesirable, imagines counterfactual 
versions of her life without that marriage (Dannenberg 45-46; 195-96). 
Gwendolen Harleth's counterfactualizing confirms what psychologists have observed in 
human thinking. Both people and characters or narrators contemplate how things could have 
been better ("upward" counterfactualizing) or worse ("downward"), with regret or satisfaction, 
respectively (Dannenberg 112-13; 242n5). When themselves the agent, people tend to regret 
things they did not do rather than the opposite (Gilovich & Medvec 1995: 271; Dannenberg 
113). Also, counterfactual thoughts are more often provoked by radical changes from the 
expected and by negative rather than by positive events (Olson, Roese & Deibert 1996: 300; 
Dannenberg 125). Fictional examples of the upward and downward cases are, respectively, 
Gwendolen Harleth's musings after her unhappy marriage, and Robinson Crusoe's gratefulness 
to God that his shipwreck was not far from the coast (Dannenberg 45; 195-96; 185). Some argue 
that popular fiction contains more downward counterfactuals, explained by the enhancing effect 
they have on actuality. But Dannenberg presents evidence that there is an even spread 
(Dannenberg 113). Ryan (2001) talks of "immersion" to describe the effect these narrative 
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strategies have on readers: realist fiction works because it draws the reader into the text, rather 
than because of its seemingly realistic details (Ryan 2001: 161; Dannenberg 5; 21-22). 
Some events, then, are in the text but do not happen. Prince (1992) calls these the 
"disnarrated", and Ryan (1991) refers to the complex systems of alternative possible worlds that 
are presented in narratives as the "principle of diversification" (Prince 1992: 30; Ryan 1991: 
156; Dannenberg 46). Out of all these worlds, one exists at closure in "realist" texts, since we 
apply real-world ontology to these narratives; but many worlds may exist by the end of 
"nonrealist" texts (Dannenberg 47). The human mind thinks in multiple worlds: Fauconnier and 
Turner (2002: 217) observed that “People pretend, imitate, lie, fantasize, deceive, delude, 
consider alternatives, simulate, make models, and propose hypotheses” (Dannenberg 2008: 47). 
About ontological spheres, Doležel (1998) says that by "setting boundaries, we avoid confusion 
whenever our aesthetic desire or cognitive project invite us to transworld travel". But 
Fauconnier and Turner (2002) have shown that the mind makes sense of complexity precisely 
by blending ontological boundaries (Doležel 1998: xi; Dannenberg 47-48). "We live in a 
counterfactual zoo of absent or negative things" (Fauconnier & Turner 2003: xv). There seems 
to be a mismatch, therefore, between expectations of one-world ontology, and thinking in 
multiple-worlds. Ryan (1991) argues that it is precisely the characters' attempts to turn virtual 
worlds into real ones that generate the plot. That idea is derived from Todorov's 1969 catalogue 
of modalities for narrative propositions: obligatory, optative, conditional and predictive modes 
(Todorov 1969: 46-49; Ryan 1991: 110; 119-20; Dannenberg 48). 
Either God or Providence often govern the degree of factuality of narratives. In the 
nineteenth century chance or destiny or confusion got to rule narratives, notably in Thomas 
Hardy (Dannenberg 102). With the demise of belief in Providence, counterfactual history also 
developed, as consideration that things could have been different became more plausible 
(Rodiek 1993: 266). That was reinforced by Darwin's demonstration (in The Origin of Species, 
1859) that mammals took alternate forms on different regions, suggesting a forking of paths 
(Dannenberg 200). But plurality of perspectives, and the resulting conflicts, are present "within 
any author, culture or period" (Dannenberg 103). Narrators sometimes comment on that obvious 
artificiality: "Had she given way and sobbed aloud, ... he would have melted at once ... But then 
where would have been my novel?" (Anthony Trollope, Barchester Towers, 1857; Dannenberg 
124). 
4.2. Ronen's Possible Worlds (1994): Counterfactuals and Different Degrees of 
Actualization
Ronen (1994) concentrates on the metaphor of possible worlds, which began with Leibniz. She 
indends to bring together philosophy and fiction, considered contradictory from Plato to Russell 
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(Ronen 1994: 5-7). Below is material not covered above.
There has been a move in literary studies from structuralism to philosophically-inspired 
semantics of possible worlds; from abstract studies of syntax to considerations of literary 
content and referents (Ronen 1994: 173). Emphasis has been placed on the way propositions are 
presented by speakers with varying degrees of authority, the resulting fictional world depending 
on the interaction between those variations of authority (Ronen 1994: 176). The fictional world 
is a self-sufficient construct which the cultural context decides is fictional, such as Anna 
Karenina in relation to Michelet’s A History of France (Ronen 1994: 10). It is considered 
modal, made of “facts, quasi-facts and nonfacts”: different degrees of actualization are 
attributed to each fictional fact, depending on whose point of view it is presented from and how; 
narrators' and characters’ beliefs, thoughts and predictions make up the text (Ronen 1994: 8; 
176-77; 220-27). 
Eco, Vaina, Margolin, Doležel, Pavel and Ryan, who continued the formalist tradition of 
literary analysis into the early 1990s, were some of the first to adopt the possible world 
framework. This involves “accessibility among worlds, necessity and possibility, nonexistence, 
counterfactuality, cross-world identity and epistemic worlds” (Ronen 1994: 19). The “basic 
intuition” was that there were many ways things could have been (Ronen 1994: 21). In 
postmodernist fiction, there are logical and epistemic impossibilities: Eco suggested that these 
“are simply mentioned, as it happens with the magic operators in fairy tales” (Eco 1989: 353; 
Ronen 1994: 55-56). Doležel asked whether we have to accept Leibniz’s restriction on possible 
worlds, that they have to be free of contradiction (Doležel 1989: 231; Ronen 1994: 56). 
“Authentication” was meant to distinguish between facts (authentic motifs) and nonfacts (non-
authentic motifs), depending on the authority attributed to the presenter of those motifs (Doležel 
1980; Ronen 1994: 56n4). 
Important for the study of fictional entities, and of non-actualized states of affairs such 
as counterfactuals, is Kripke’s question of whether proper names transfer across worlds. He and 
Donnellan have argued that a name will refer to a given individual although that individual does 
not satisfy the set of descriptions associated with it (Kripke 1972; Donnellan 1966). It is 
possible to imagine Nixon, for instance, not being elected president. That is because a concept 
attached to a name in one world may not be at another. “H2O” did not refer to water before the 
formula was discovered. “A name is tied to its referent not by identifying properties necessarily, 
but by the discursive practice in which such a tie is assumed” (Ronen 42). A name can be a 
“rigid designator” used “intensionally” in modalized contexts (such as “it is believed that p” or 
“it is possible that p”): this means that we can talk about objects we do not know much about. 
Loux observed that meaning can be “extensional”, but also modal (Loux 1979: 35; Ronen 42-
43; 133-36). 
But what about “baptising”? Since “Sherlock Holmes” has not been attributed to an 
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existent at any time, there cannot be rigid designation. Literary theorists, however, go beyond 
the “existential condition”: Pavel (1979) argues that what is considered real at one time is not at 
another, and this leads to blocks in the history of naming. “Zeus”, for instance, was real at one 
time, but not later. The god's name, therefore, was cut off from anything existent. Names do not 
carry properties with them (Ronen 45). 
An important concept relevant to counterfactuals is that of “incompleteness”. Ingarden 
argued that “Every literary work is in principle incomplete and always in need of further 
supplementation; … however, this supplementation can never be completed" (Ingarden 1973: 
251; Ronen 108). The absence of a referent means that properties cannot be verified. Ronen 
describes four main approaches to incompleteness.  
According to the actualist approach (Plantiga 1974), any object that could exist does, 
and fiction cannot be about incomplete nonexistents (Ronen 116-17). For the "quasi-actualist" 
Parsons (1980), fictional objects differ from real ones only by their ontological properties, the 
characterization of their modal status (possible or impossible), and technical properties such as 
incompleteness. Fine (1982) suggests a distinction between actuals and possibles (Ronen 
117n2). 
Another approach involves the hypothesis of various modes or degrees of being. Pavel 
says that to "be existent without existing is a sophisticated property equally shared by 
mathematical entities, unfinanced architectural monuments ..." (Pavel 1986: 31; Ronen 117-18). 
Wolsterstorff proposed a theory of kinds: Gogol's "Chichikov" is a certain kind of person, "the 
Chichikov in Dead Souls kind". The problems of both fictional existence and incompleteness 
are resolved, if we consider characters as "maximal components" of the fictional (possible) 
world (Wolstertorff 1980: 155; Ronen 119). Inwagen considers fictional beings to exist 
(Inwagen 1977: 302-03; Ronen 119). 
The incompleteness of fictional entities has also been interpreted in relation to their 
mode of construction. Howell (1979) found fictional entities to be only nonradically incomplete. 
Tolstoy selected a limited number of properties for Anna Karenina, and attached those to her. 
Castaneda (1979) considers that the "building blocks" of fictional entities are the same as those 
of real objects, but fewer of them are presented (Castaneda 1979: 53). According to Walton 
(1990) and Searle (1969), speakers who use names for fictional entities pretend to refer to 
something which exists (Ronen 119-120; 86).
Fictional incompleteness can be considered an object of aesthetic considerations. 
"Empty domains are constituents of the fictional world no less than 'filled' domains" according 
to Doležel (1988: 486). Pavel (1986) maintains that "authors and cultures have the choice of 
maximizing or minimizing" the "unavoidable incompleteness of fictional worlds" (Pavel 1986: 
108). Goffman proposed that what the text presents may be enough for the audience "to place 
themselves properly in regard to the unfolding events" (Goffman 1986: 149; Ronen 121). 
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4.3. Prince: The Disnarrated
"The disnarrated" is what does not happen in a narrative, but could have. This includes 
characters' beliefs, hopes and calculations, paths not followed and narrative strategies not used. 
It is not the non-narrated or unnarrated ("I will not recount what happened during that fateful 
week") or inferable from chronological lacunae; the unnarratable, which is not worth narrating 
because it is uninteresting or violates generic, authorial or social conventions; and denarration, 
which is the narrator's denial of a state of affairs stated earlier (Prince 2005: 118; 1992: 30). 
The disnarrated points to unrealised possibilities. It can delay the presentation of action 
or function as a device to add to characterisation; it can help elaborate a theme, such as the 
opposition between illusion and reality, or depict the relationship between narrator and narratee 
by showing that the narrator has the power to multiply potential lines of development. But its 
most important function is to say why the narrative is worth telling: it is because it could have 
been otherwise. "A less truthful man might have been tempted into ... a less sane man might 
have believed ... but Silas was both sane and honest" (George Eliot, Silas Marner, 2010: 11; 
Prince 1992: 35; 2005: 118).
The disnarrated has ancestors. These include Shklovsky's 1917 essay on the role of art 
to make the familiar look fresh: "Habitualization devours work, clothes, furniture ... The 
purpose of parallelism, like the general purpose of imagery, is to transfer the usual perception of 
an object into the sphere of new perception" (Shklovsky 1965); and Labov's "comparators", 
such as negatives and modals, as devices for comparing unrealised with realised events: "The 
use of negatives ... expresses the defeat of an expectation that something would happen. 
Negative sentences draw upon a cognitive background considerably richer than the set of events 
which were observed" (Labov 1972: 380-81). Mary Louise Pratt (1977) found the "narrative 
syntax" that Labov observed in real-life conversations in fiction and emphasized the role of 
speaker and addressee (Prince 1992: 31; Pratt 1977). 
4.4. Ryan 1991: Possible Worlds
Marie-Laure Ryan's 1991 Possible Worlds concentrates on "virtual embedded narratives": these 
are representations which are in characters' minds, and sometimes also outside, in the narrated 
world. Ryan says of counterfactuals: "The pragmatic purpose of counterfactuals is not to create 
alternate possible worlds for their own sake, but to make a point about the actual world" (Ryan 
1991: 48; Prince 1992: 31-32). Ryan (1991) largely agrees with Lewis' 1978 application of the 
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possible worlds approach to fiction, which we apply when we judge, for instance, "If Napoleon 
had not escaped from Elba he would not have died on St. Helena" on the basis of the causal 
chain which led to his dying on St. Helena; we conclude that a world in which he does not 
escape from Elba and does not die on St. Helena differs from reality less than one in which he 
does not escape from Elba but dies on St. Helena. It is by this principle, that of "minimal 
departure" from reality, that we form representations of the worlds created through discourse 
(Ryan 1991: 49-52). 
Todorov (1969) and Bremond (1973) were "the first  to point out that underlying the 
physical events presented as facts in the narrative universe is a complex network of events and 
states that never take place, such as possibilities contemplated by the characters and suppressed 
plot-lines contemplated by the reader" (Ryan 2006: 647; 1991: 110). Characters attempt to 
reduce "the distances between their model worlds and the actual world", a movement that ends 
when "the experiencer is no longer willing or able to take steps toward" a resolution. Conflict 
itself, a feature of the universe, remains (Ryan 2006: 649-50). We use the same skills to extract 
"a story out of a text" as to interpret human behaviour and make decisions (Ryan 2006: 647). 
Klauk (2011) argues against that parallelism. Counterfactual sentences (which can 
result from faulty knowledge) and counterfactual scenarios (like imagining another German 
chancellor than Angela Merkel) are different. Thought experiments involve steps which do not 
apply in literature: we imagine a scenario, judge it and make use of this judgment; the third step 
is missing in literature (Klauk 2011: 31-33).
4.5. Action Theory
This is a branch of analytical philosophy which explores ontological and epistemological 
aspects of human action, and which narrative analysts have applied to the study of stories 
(Herman 2005: 2). Davidson (1980) asked what events in a life reveal agency, as opposed to 
"mere happenings in history" (Davidson 1980: 43; Herman 2005: 2). Von Wright (1967), the 
pioneer of the theory, defined acting as intentionally bringing about or preventing a change. A 
description of an action involves initial and end states, and a middle acting situation, or 
opportunity of action. We need to be told what the initial and end states are, but also what the 
world would be like without the agency: "[e]very description of an action contains, in concealed 
form, a counterfactual ... When we say, e.g., that an agent opened a window, we imply that, had 
it not been for the agent's interference, the window would, on that occasion, have remained 
closed" (von Wright 1967: 124; 1983: 111; Herman 2005: 2).
Bremond (1973) and Labov (1972) talked of narratives unfolding against a background 
of what might have been, but was not; that may be described more or less explicitly. Negative 
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sentences underline the significance of paths chosen "within a network of paths not chosen" 
(Herman 2005: 2).
5. Counterfactual History
Dannenberg (2005) divides works of counterfactual history into three groups: those which 
function as analytical tools in political sciences (Tetlock & Belkin 1996); counterfactual 
historical essays (Squire 1972); and fictional works of alternate history (Alkon 1994). Historical 
theorists regard only plausible scenarios as valid (Dannenberg 2005: 86); this matches the 
behaviour of lay people, who do not imagine miracle-world counterfactuals, such as "If the 
Romans had had machine-guns, ..." (Byrne 2005: 10). Historical counterfactuals focus on 
turning points in history, the failed invasion of the Spanish Armada in 1588 or the Allied victory 
in 1945 (Dannenberg 2005: 86). Demandt (2011) considers a Persian victory at Marathon (490 
BC), as contemplated by Herodotus (from 6.109), Pontius Pilatus pardoning Jesus, and Hitler 
dying in 1938. These are typical subjects of counterfactual history. Historical figures 
themselves, of course, also use counterfactuals. Byrne (2005) quotes Martin Luther King' 
speech made ten years after he was nearly stabbed to death in 1958: "... if I had sneezed, I 
wouldn't have been around here in 1960 when students all over the South started sitting in at 
lunch counters ... I wouldn't have been here in 1963 when the black people of Birmingham, 
Alabama aroused the conscience of this nation and brought into being the Civil Right bill ... " 
(King 1968; Byrne 2005: 1). A relatively minor event, not sneezing, is presented by King as 
crucial to the growth of the civil rights movement in the US. Byrne reminds us that King was 
assassinated the next day. 
5.1. Tetlock & Belkin 1996: sixteen essays on Counterfactuals as Tools for Political 
Analysis
Social scientists use counterfactual thinking in a variety of topics, such as the spread of religious 
and philosophical ideas (Weber 1949; Fogel 1964). Not all, however, agree on its usefulness. 
For some, determinism, fate and free-will are best left alone (Fisher 1970: 18; Taylor 1954); E.P. 
Thompson, not quoted in TB, thought counterfactual history "unhistorical sh*t" (Thompson 
1978: 300). Yet, non-causal narratives would make it hard to learn "lessons from history", and 
would be incoherent. Historical counterfactualizing may be open or concealed, but is always 
present (Fogel 1964; TB 1996: 4). 
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All contributors agree that potential causes in world politics are complex. Causal 
reasoning must invoke counterfactual arguments about what would have happened in "some 
hypothetical world in which the postulated cause took on a different value from the one it 
assumed in the actual world" (TB 1996: 6; Fogel 1964; Fearon 1991). Some counterfactuals 
concentrate on points of indeterminacy at historical junctures ("idiographic"; Khong 1996 
examines what Prime Ministers might have opposed Hitler; TB 1996: 6, 7); some apply 
theoretical or empirical generalizations to well-defined antecedents ("nomothetic"; Russett 1996 
argues for a democracy-peace hypothesis; TB 1996: 6; 9); others combine the two approaches 
(conceivable cause, deductive theory and empirical observation; to examine the impact of an 
asteroid to explain the extinction of dinosaurs; game theory: "no-one stands to gain from 
unilateral defection"; TB 1996: 6; 10-11; Bueno de Mesquita 1996; Weingast 1996); in 
computer simulations, counterfactuals may reveal theoretical contradictions by capturing key 
properties of actual history (Cederman 1996: hegemons emerge in computer-simulated anarchy; 
TB 1996: 6; 13); or counterfactuals may reveal psychological contradictions in belief systems, 
by pointing out unexpected causal chains in possible worlds (Kahneman 1995; Turner 1996; TB 
1996: 6-7; 13). Overlapping with these categories are six widely supported normative criteria 
for judging counterfactuals: clarity (well-specified antecedents and consequents); consistency 
(logical: cotenability; historical: minimal re-write; theoretical; statistical); projectability (TB 
1996: 16-18).
We will look at one of the sixteen essays in some details. Lebow and Stein (1996: 119-
48) test twelve existing counterfactuals (ten explanatory and two predictive) about the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. They first ask why people scoff at this counterfactual: had students not 
committed electoral fraud in 1960, there might have been a nuclear war (as Nixon rather than 
Kennedy would have become president of the US) (LS 1996: 119). Studies of chaos have shown 
that distant, small events can have large consequences. They then discard TB's fourth and fifth 
criteria as irrelevant, claiming there are no law-like and few statistical generalizations in 
international relations (LS 1996: 127). Two instances of applications of the discarded criteria 
are: theoretical consistency (fourth criterion), greatly advocated by the economic historian 
Fogel, and invoked by Kiser and Levi to argue that revolutions are inevitable under certain 
structural preconditions (international and demographic pressures, fiscal crisis, divisions in the 
dominant class, mass mobilization of the discontented) (Fogel 1964: 224; Kiser and Levi 1996: 
187-207; TB 1996: 27); and statistical consistency (fifth criterion), applied by the opponents of 
the argument that if all states in the twentieth century had been democratic, there would have 
been fewer wars: there are not enough democracies, wars and uninterrupted periods of time for 
evaluators to judge (Russett argues that there are, and includes Greek city-states and tribal 
societies as data sources. TB 1996: 29; 31; Russett 1996: 182-84).    
Nine of the twelve counterfactuals about the Cuban Missile Crisis meet "a reasonable 
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approximation" of TB's first  criterion, "clearly specified antecedents and consequents and 
'plausible worlds'" (LS 1996: 127-28). One that fails is the "early warning" counterfactual 
(Krushchev might not have sent missiles if Kennedy had sent an early warning). The compound 
counterfactuals which are necessary for its evaluation are implausible: early on (April), 
Kennedy had no reason to expect missiles. Similarly, the argument that if there had been public 
health measures, mortality from the Black Death would have been reduced, fails because 
additional conditions, such as people realizing they could affect the spread, were not in place 
(Hawthorn 1991: 31-60; LS 1996: 128-29). 
Some of the Missile Crisis counterfactuals specify no connections between antecedent 
and consequent. "Revisionists", for instance, do not explain why they think that Krushchev 
would have responded positively if Kennedy had made a secret overture to him before the 
blockade. It is as plausible that Kruschchev would have increased the pace of construction of 
missile sites in Cuba (LS 1996: 130). "Consistency with well-established facts" is also infringed 
by some of the counterfactuals, those which require too much re-writing of history. Evidence 
shows that Kruschchev was impressed by Kennedy's performance in Vienna. The counterfactual 
about a greater American resolve preventing Soviet missiles therefore fails. Another instance of 
excessive re-writing of history involves Churchill replacing Chamberlain as British Prime 
Minister in 1938: since his personality prevented that, there is no viable antecedent in a 
counterfactual which asks whether a 1938 Prime Minister Churchill would have stopped Hitler 
(Khong 1996: 112). 
Finally, the criterion of projectability requires that counterfactuals generate theories that 
can be used to make predictions. Most of the Cuban Missile Crisis fail to specify antecedents 
that can be projected to new cases, or fail to make explicit the connecting principles between 
antecedents and consequents. Therefore most of the counterfactuals do not pass the test of 
projectability. Kruschchev, for instance, formulated his counterfactual according to the (later) 
Marxist-Leninist principle that capitalists would not risk nuclear war, and would not react to a 
deployment of missiles in Cuba. That theoretical framework did not fit reality (LS 1996: 132-
33).
LS conclude that evidence of policy before, during and after the Missile Crisis shows 
that five of the counterfactuals are most likely invalid, and seven untestable. Both American and 
Soviet counterfactuals, explanatory or predictive, were a function of political belief systems 
rather than deriving from compelling evidence; and adequately specified counterfactuals which 
are based on false assumptions are likely to be wrong (LS 1996: 142-44). On the other hand, 
time is short: "[p]olicy makers can wait even less than scholars for the verdict of history; both 
need to evaluate competing counterfactuals with incomplete evidence (LS 1996: 145). LS then 
add three criteria of their own: tighten the link between antecedent and consequent and amongst 
other events, and allow for additional consequents. History does not allow "cut-and-paste 
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reassembly of elements" with counterparts and situations unchanged (LS 1996: 146; Turner 
1996: 292). All criteria put together should at least help reject a bad counterfactual, a more 
important matter in the authors' view than spotting a good one (LS 1996: 147).
5.2. Psychological Biases in Counterfactual Thought and Politics
Olson, Roese and Deibert show that the same biases that occur in counterfactual thinking can 
affect theorists' counterfactual reconstructions of political events (ORD 1996: 296-97; opposite 
view: Kahneman 1995). 
People construct counterfactuals which are consistent with their own beliefs. High self-
esteem people focus on their own actions ("If not for me, we would have failed") when 
successful, and on others' actions ("If not for him, we would have succeeded") when 
unsuccessful (Roese & Olson 1993; ORD 1996: 297). Political scholars behave likewise: "had 
the West succumbed to the pacifists, the Cold War would still be ongoing" (Perle 1992) exists 
alongside the opposite view, that in spite of armaments, there was international cooperation 
(Levy 1994; ORD 1996: 298). 
Widely cited is the perceivers' bias toward unusual antecedents. Subjects judge that a 
man who leaves work early, takes the normal route home and has an accident, would have been 
safe if he had left work at the normal time (Kahneman & Tverski 1982; ORD 1996: 298). That 
conclusion is illogical. In world politics, crop failures, market crashes and sudden technological 
innovations are converted "to reestablish the trajectory of historical trends that were interrupted 
by the unusual event". Political assassinations, for instance, are only considered when they 
actually occur, and scholars wonder what would have happened if routine had continued 
(Breslauer 1996; Kiser & Levi 1996). Historians speculate on how European religious affairs 
would have developed, had Henry of Navarre not been assassinated, and the Edict of Nantes not 
been repealed (Toulmin 1990; ORD 1996: 299). 
Negative outcomes are more likely to trigger counterfactual thinking. This is considered 
to have evolutionary significance, as states of crisis require a fast response ("fight or flight"; 
Taylor 1991). More counterfactual thoughts were generated in relation to an academic failure 
scenario than to a success one in experiments (ORD 1996: 299). In world politics, theorists tend 
to want to explain negative outcomes, and especially war (Gilpin 1981; Waltz 1959; Holsti 
1985). The undefended border between Canada and the US, for instance, receives less attention 
than the First World War (Christensen & Snyder 1990; Sagan 1986; ORD 1996: 300).
Awareness of cognitive constraints may offer new perspectives on historical events and 
present ways of examining issues which are ruled out by unrecognized biases. 
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5.3. Alkon 1994: Alternate and Parallel Histories
Alkon (1994) defines alternate history "as essays or narratives exploring the consequences of an 
imagined divergence from specific historical events"; this is in opposition to parallel histories, 
which just offer some different past or present from the ones we know (Alkon 1994: 68). 
Nabokov's Ada, for instance, is a fantasy about a similar planet to the earth without twentieth-
century wars, but no study of causation (Alkon 1994: 68). Alternate history, on the other hand, 
requires more historical knowledge on the part of the reader, and is therefore relatively little 
known. Alkon (1994), identifies the first instance of the genre in Louis Geoffroy's 1836 
Napoléon et la conquête du monde - 1812 à 1832 - Histoire de la monarchie universelle. He 
then discusses three twentieth-century "classics", before describing more recent alternate 
histories (Alkon 1994: 69)
The first "classic" is Winston Churchill's essay "If Lee Had Not Won the Battle of 
Gettysburg" (1931). Events that happened, such as the First World War, are presented in the 
essay as the conterfactual world about which someone speculates from a reality which involves 
the Confederate General Lee's victory, the South offering to abolish slavery, the formation of the 
Union of the English Speaking Peoples, and that of a United States of Europe led by Kaiser 
Wilhelm II. Churchill was to use that technique again when he invited his audience to imagine a 
dreadful future as "an alternate past wrenched out of time", to prevent which something could 
still be done. That was in his speech to Parliament on 18/6/1940 to persuade Britain not to 
capitulate to Hitler (Alkon 1994: 69-70). Counterfactuals and futures, two closely-related non-
facts, are similar.
Another work on the popular theme of "[v]ictorious Confederacies", instances of 
"downward" counterfactualizing since they make people feel better about their own times 
(McMullen, Markman & Gavanski 1995: 134) is Ward Moore's Bring the Jubilee (1953). The 
narrator, "Hodge", born in 1921, recounts his experiences living in an impoverished United 
States which never recovered from a Confederate victory. Alkon speculates that the 
technological backwardness of that world must have symbolized "the moral retrogression" of a 
slaveholding universe for American readers of the 1950s. Hodge is in love in an alternate 
twentieth-century New York. He also travels back and corrects the Confederate victory, so 
invalidating his initial presence in the alternate world. There are, however, realistic studies of 
the relevant battles, and emphasis on the advantages of living in the readers' own time (Alkon 
1994: 71-72). 
Robert Harris' 1992 Fatherland is set in 1964. Joseph (not John) Kennedy is American 
President and 75-year old Hitler rules Europe. The novel portrays a convincing Nazi Berlin, and 
features the hard-boiled, divorced detective in conflict with his superiors, who has a female 
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lover. These clichés are applied in the strange Nazi setting, but the world from which the 
protagonist is alienated in Alkon's view suggests actuality. The detective ends up vainly 
preparing to face his Gestapo pursuers after he has discovered material that will incriminate the 
regime. An "Author's Note" gives details of how real and imaginary history mix in the text 
(Alkon 1994: 75-77). 
The next alternate histories discussed by Alkon are of a postmodernist type. These 
include William Gibson and Bruse Sterling's The Difference Engine (1991). Here, Charles 
Babbage's analytical engine is being used by the nineneteenth-century English and French 
governments to keep track of people. Other twentieth-century machines are also present (Alkon 
1994: 80). Particularly dislikable according to Alkon is the mock-Victorian language and 
melodramatic plot. The alternative is not to history, but to fiction, and there is no appendix of 
historical material, nor explanations of how the engine came to be supported by governments. 
Alkon objects to the gratuitousness of many aspects of the novel, such as John Keats working 
with prototypes of the cinema (Alkon 1994: 81). 
Alkon concludes that late twentieth-century alternate history may enhance awareness of 
the past as well as of the present, but also blunt awareness of historicity. There are, therefore, 
two strands of alternate history: one, represented by Fatherland, which continues the "classical 
mode" (Louis Geoffroy, Churchill), and another, exemplified by The Difference Engine, that 
verges on parallel history. There has to be a forking time, when courses of events diverge from 
actuality, for alternate history to be meaningful (Alkon 1994: 83-84). 
5.4. Cowley 1999: Thirty-five What-Ifs by Military Historians
Cowley's anthology (2000) contains thirty-three essays on thirty-five "what might have been" 
chosen and written by military historians. "History is properly the literature of what did 
happen", he comments, but "what ifs" can lead us to reconsider assumptions and to define 
turning points (Cowley 2000: xi-xii). The subjects treated are: World War Two (seven), World 
War One (four), American Civil War (three), American War of Independence (three), Napoleon 
(two); and one each of: Spanish Armada, Spanish not in America, Christians in the Balkans, 
Turks / Mongols / Arabs  in Europe, Roman Empire surviving, Romans keeping Germany, 
Alexander dying younger, Persians / Cimmerians in Greece, Assyrians keeping Jerusalem, Cold 
War, Chinese Revolution, Vietnam War and USSR-US 1983 nuclear war. 
Josiah Ober's on Alexander's early death  is the counterpart to Arnold Toynbee's on 
Alexander's late death. Alexander has been a popular subject for counterfactual speculation, 
starting from Livy's (9.16.9-19), as we will see shortly, and including current websites. 
Toynbee's older Alexander becomes a peaceful world-ruler. With Alexander dying younger, in 
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334 BC when he nearly did die, the Persian Empire survives and there is no Hellenistic period. 
But the older Alexander, we are told, may have damaged Hellenism anyway, because of his 
cruel disposition. The counterfactual narrative branches off from the point of Alexander's near-
death. After a sequence on what a non-Western world would have been like ("no Renaissance, 
no Enlightenment, ...", Ober 1999: 54), the essay ends with reference to what Ober considers 
another counterfactual: the future of the empire, which Alexander envisaged as absorbing 
Persian customs and army, and his bodyguard as remaining Macedonian. Alexander killed the 
bodyguard, and the world confirmed neither prospect: the empire crumbled (Ober 1999: 39-56).
5.5. Francis Beckett ed., The Prime Ministers Who Never Were 2011 
This anthology of biographies includes, amongst others, Oswald Mosley and Normal Tebbitt. 
Under the heading of Francis' Beckett's "Prime Minister Smith looks to Brussels, not 
Washington", comes the Labour leader John Smith. He appoints Ken Livingstone as Transport 
Secretary: the railways are renationalized, and tolls are introduced on motorways. 
6. Counterfactuals and the Ancient Historians
6.1. Zhang 2008
Counterfactual argumentation in the ancient historians is the subject of a 2008 PhD by Yongle 
Zhang. These works are rare.
Conjectural reasoning took a variety of forms in the Greco-Roman world, and its role in 
divination, legal practice and medical writing has often been observed. In book 7 of Herodotus, 
Themistocles reasons that if the oracle had meant that Athens would be defeated, it would not 
have said "blessed Salamis", but would have said "cursed Salamis" (7.141-2). In book 1, 
Croesus learns from the delegation sent to Delphi that he had drawn the wrong inference from 
the oracle's response: the"great empire" that would fall was clearly not that of the enemy, but his 
own (1.91) (Zhang 20-22). Long before Herodotus, the Homeric stvr had to adjudicate 
between stories, those  presented by litigants (Il. 18.501; 23.486; Nagy 1990; Ginzburg 1999). 
Herodotus uses modus tollens: if A, then B; but B is false or ridiculous, so A is also false. 
This is the method of political and legal debates and Hippocratic argument. Reasoners start from 
their adversaries' account (B) and argue counterfactually: the Aeginetans and the Athenians so 
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discredit each others' version of events at Hdt. 5.86 (Zhang 31-32; 25; Lloyd 1996). Herodotus' 
narrator examines which version of the causes of the war between Greeks and barbarians is 
correct (1.1), and at 8.118-19 considers two versions of how Xerxes retreated to Persia, and 
makes a decision: Xerxes would not kill off the political Persian elite so easily (Zhang 27). At 
7.139 he asks: what if Athens had not resisted the Persians by sea? The two possibilities are that 
Sparta resists or that it collaborates with the Persians. Either way, Greece would fall to Xerxes. 
Athens, therefore, saved Greece. 
Counterfactual argumentation is also used by Herodotus to challenge Homer's authority, 
and in the words of wise political advisors (Solon, Croesus, Artabanus); their job is to 
"emphasize the role of contingent and uncontrollable elements in the course of events" (Zhang 
35; 38).
Thucydides, Zhang estimates, has as many counterfactual situations, namely 50. In the 
archeology, Thucydides says he will use conjectures to reconstruct the remote past from clues 
(1.9.5); he then applies the same method to the future: "if Athens should suffer the same fate, its 
power would, I think, from what appeared of the city's ruins, be conjectured double what it is." 
(1.10.2. Zhang 53). Likelihood rather than necessity underpins these inferences, so difficult are 
clues to interpret.
Another form of counterfactual argument in Thucydides happens through speeches. In 
paired speeches, one becomes policy and one is aborted and becomes the alternate possibility. 
At 1.81, Archidamus says Sparta is not prepared for war and leaves it to future generations, but 
that does not materialize; Pericles' first and third speeches (1.140-4, 2.60-4) outline a strategy 
later forsaken by successors (Zhang 82). 
An antithetical structure that invites to counterfactual thinking runs through the whole of 
Thucydides: the war is between two powers, and we find the oppositions democracy / oligarchy 
(embodied in Corcyra), active  / conservative (Athens / Sparta), intelligence / chance, and paired 
speeches throughout the work (Zhang 86). This also marks a difference from Herodotus, as 
polarized thinking and writing became more common during the fifth century because of the 
expansion of law courts and political assemblies (Zhang 90). A tacit counterfactual underpins 
the whole of Thucydides: Athens would have won the war if Pericles had led it to the end 
(Zhang 91).
Hornblower's work on if-not situations in Thucydides (1987; 1994; 2004; 2008; 2011) 
must be mentioned here. The author's 1994 study was intended to apply some of the insights of 
narratology to the analysis of ancient history (Hornblower 2011: 59; also Grethlein 2010). With 
so many if-nots, Thucydides' world is one of contingency and counterfactuality, which many 
modern historians, such as Niall Ferguson in his seventy-page introduction to the 1997 
anthology Virtual History, tend to ignore (Hornblower 2011: 7-8). In Thucydides, hinge-
moments in history are underlined by the Homeric if-not device, the topic of "important work" 
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by Irene de Jong (1987) and Nesselrath (1992. Hornblower 2011: 8-9; 59). 
The if-not structure can be less than "full-dress", as in "and they [Spartans] would have 
done [invaded Attica], but they were prevented by an earthquake" (1.101.2), or full-dress, as in 
the pair paraphrased as "Mytilene / Syracuse would have fallen, had it not been for the arrival of 
the second trireme / Gylippos" (3.49.4, 7.2.4 respectively), both ending in an explicit remark 
about the near miss (Hornblower 2011: 9; 89-90). A wider notion of counterfactuality than the 
strict if-not is envisaged here. Flory (1988) counts only nineteen narratorial counterfactuals in 
Thucydides, and judges Xenophon's continuation of Thucydides up to 404 BC to be 
counterfactual-free (Flory 1988: 44-45; 48); Hornblower would probably spot at least Hell. 
1.3.17-8 (408 BC): "Clearchus ... arranged everything ... But ... those who wanted to betray the 
city of Byzantium set about their work ...".
The most developed counterfactual in Thucydides appears towards the end of book 8, the 
third of a cluster: "and if the Peloponnesians had been more enterprising, they could easily have 
executed such a plan. Either they might have cruised near, ... or ..."; this culminates in the fall of 
the Athenian empire to the Peloponnesians (8.96.4; previous two 8.86.4, 8.87.4; Hornblower 
2011: 9; 89; 2008, on 8.96.4). The "true parent" of such narrative devices is Homer, although 
Herodotus produced his own if-nots and counterfactuals (nine according to Flory 1988: 47), 
such as 7.139.3: "Had the Athenians, in terror at the approaching danger, left their country, ..." 
and surrendered to Xerxes, ... (Hornblower 2008, on Thuc. 8.96.4; 2011: 9-11; 279). The 
Pisistratid tyrants fall as the result of sexual jealousy, also the result of "contingency causation" 
(6.54.1. Hornblower 2004: 301n46). Kleinknecht (1940) had attributed Herodotus 7.139 to the 
model of argumentation used in Ionian science and medicine, which involves testing a thesis by 
comparing its denial with empirical facts. Demand (1987) found Herodotus' claim that if the 
Athenians had not stayed, Greece would have fallen to the Persians, quite different from 
Kleinknecht's reconstruction of the Hippocratic argument: it is rather, "if A had not occurred, B 
would not have occurred" (Demand 1987: 748). Flory (1988: 47-48n11) agrees. Historians may 
also have different reasons for counterfactualizing. Thucydides may have had a political point, 
or quoted an actual debate which included the abandoned course (Hornblower 2011: 98); and in 
Flory's view Herodotus 7.139.3 seems to reflect a post-war topic of conversation current at 
Athens (Flory 1988: 43n11).
With Polybius, counterfactual reasoning becomes an integral part of writing useful 
history. Zhang counts over 150 explicit counterfactuals, many in clusters; not many given the 
size of his (extant) work. According to Polybius, the historian should ask "Why, how, and 
wherefore each thing was done, and whether the result was what we should have reasonably 
accepted" (3.31). But reasonable expectations clash with Fortune, which rules world affairs 
(1.4.1) (Zhang 93-94). In book 2, Polybius narrates the downfall of Cleomenes, king of Sparta: 
"Thus ever is it the way of Fortune to decide the weightiest issues against reason. For on this 
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occasion Cleomenes, had he deferred giving battle for merely a few days, or had he, on 
returning to Sparta after battle, waited ever so short a time to avail himself of the turn of events, 
would have saved his crown" (2.70). Cleomenes could have made the correct prediction, but he 
did not; the materialized path of history departed from expectation (Zhang 95).
It has been commented that Polybius often invokes Fortune () when there are 
perfectly rational explanations for the way events turned out (Walbank 1957: 17). In the case of 
Cleomenes' and Perseus' downfall, the explanation is their own cowardice or folly (Zhang 103). 
But Polybius' "one-sidedness" is rooted in Aristotle, who tells the story in Physics 2.4-6 of a 
man who happens to collect money owed him, because he accidentally finds himself in the right 
place. Polybius' Fortune, therefore, contains a "core" which is the disparity between rational 
expectation and the materialized, unplanned result. In counterfactual arguments, the author or 
historical actors reconstruct a picture in accordance with the regular pattern in human affairs, 
and compare it with the real path of history. That comparison shows how, by a narrow margin, 
things happened differently (Zhang 105-06). Also,  is no bad thing, because it provides the 
opportunity to show one's "excellence" () (Zhang 108). Hannibal, for instance, the enemy 
general on whose defeat the Romans built their strength, faces his  admirably, and this is 
conveyed by the narratorial comparison between reality and a likely, counterfactual scenario: 
"Had the Carthaginians been obliged to meet all this host in a pitched battle, they would 
assuredly have suffered defeat; but, as it was, Hannibal very wisely and skilfully faced about 
and retreated so as to place the river Tagus in his front ..." (3.14; Zhang 109-10). The if-not 
variant is sometimes used: the army would have been destroyed, had he not ... (3.53; Zhang 
111).
Providing exemplars for "men of affairs" was another of Polybius' purposes (9.9; Zhang 
113). That involves showing also wrong decisions: "... had he [Hannibal] begun with the other 
parts of the world and finished with the Romans none of his plans would have failed to succeed" 
(11.19). Philip V could have avoided a miserable death, had he followed the example of his 
predecessors Philip II, who had shown clemency to the Athenians, and Alexander, who had 
spared the temples of both Thebans and Persians (5.8-11; 23.10; Zhang 115). 
Comparing an estimation of reasonable expectations against reality is also necessary for a 
study of causation. Highlighting the significance of antecedents is necessary for the past to be a 
guide to the future, because human affairs behave with regularity; political regimes, for 
instance, go in cycles (6.9; 12.25b; Zhang 121-22).
Counterfactual argumentation can also be understated. Zhang compares the three different 
approaches by Thucydides, Polybius and Plutarch to Nicias' decision to delay in Sicily due to 
the moon eclipse. Where Thucydides refrains from commenting counterfactually on the case 
(6.23.2), Polybius states that "had he [Nicias] only inquired from men acquainted with 
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astronomy ... he could have utilized the ignorance of the enemy" (9.19). Plutarch merely 
comments that the habitual soothsayer, Stilbides, has recently died (Nic. 23.5; Zhang 125-26).
Polybius' counterfactuals, such as the one about Hannibal doing better if he had tackled 
the Romans last, are not as closely related to context as those of Thucydides and Herodotus. 
Bent on arguing for the usefulness of history, Polybius makes frequent authorial interventions in 
counterfactual form (Zhang 128-30). 
6.2. Livy's Alexander Digression
An important counterfactual in relation to those of the Aeneid is Livy's passage on Alexander 
(9.16-19). It was probably composed in 25-23 BC (Luce 1965: 228; Ligeti 2008: 250), the same 
decade Virgil was writing his own counterfactuals. Livy, like Sallust, Cato the Elder and Tacitus, 
was concerned with promoting traditional Roman virtue against the perceived decadence which 
followed contact with the Greek world (Liv., Praef.; Zhang 2008: 132); his Alexander 
counterfactual was part of that project.
Morello (2002) analyzes it thoroughly. During narration of the 321 BC Roman defeat by 
the Samnites at the Caudine Forks and subsequent retaliation led by Papirius, Livy states that 
the general was considered a match for Alexander, if the latter had attacked Europe (Quin eum 
parem destinant animis magno Alexandro ducem, si arma Asia perdomita in Europam vertisset. 
9.16.19). He then apologizes for breaking the chronological sequence, and adds that he had 
himself wondered (quinam eventus Romanis rebus, si cum Alexandro foret bellatum, futurus  
fuerit. 9.17.1-2). An Alexander (of Epirus, uncle of the other) landing in Italy had already been 
introduced in book 8, and could have attacked Rome (quod bellum, si prima satis prospera  
fuissent, haud dubie ad Romanos pervenisset. 8.3.6; expanded at 8.17 and 8.24). So, when we 
come to Alexander the Great in book 9, an Alexander threatening Rome has already been 
mentioned. Rome would have won, the narrator estimates, and on four grounds: the soldiers' 
numbers and manliness, the leaders' abilities, and fortune (9.17.3). Macedonian and Roman 
military leaders (9.17.5-18.19) and their armies (9.19) are compared, to the Romans' advantage, 
fortified as they are by military discipline (9.17.10-11); if peace continues, Livy says, that will 
guarantee safety (9.19.17). Alexander is outperformed "in virtually every sentence" (Morello 
63).
Scholars have not liked the digression. But Morello considers it part of the Roman 
counterfactual tradition. It alludes to the rest of Livy and links "in theme and language to 
Sallustian debates about Roman virtue and the dangers of magnitudo", and to Catonian 
historiography; it provides exempla, and also examines "the place of unus homo both in res 
publica and in res gestae" (Morello 65).
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Evidence for the first point Morello finds in Appius Claudius Caecus' speech of 280 BC 
to the senate reported by Plutarch, against a treaty with Pyrrhus: "Where is your usual boldness 
of speech in the face of all men (  πρ ς παντας νθρ πους θρυλο μενος ε  λ γοςὁ ὸ ἅ ἀ ώ ύ ἀ ὶ ό ) to the 
effect that if the great Alexander himself had come to Italy and attacked us ... he would not now 
be celebrated as undefeated ..." (Plut., Pyrrh. 19; Morello 66). The thought "we could have 
defeated Alexander, and Pyrrhus is less than he" may have been a rhetorical commonplace 
(Kennedy 1972: 28-29), and only Plutarch mentions the habitual boasting, but repeated 
discussions are clearly indicated (Morello 66). Livy talks as if working within an existing 
Alexander tradition of counterfactuals as well as synkrisis (comparison of subjects): dictitare 
solent (9.18.6) "suggests the repetitiveness of Parthia-loving Greek intellectuals on Alexander's 
chances against Rome" (periculum erat, quod levissimi ex Graecis, qui Parthorum quoque  
contra nomen Romanum gloriae favent, dictitare solent, ne maiestatem nominis Alexandri,  
quem ne fama quidem illis notum arbitror fuisse, sustinere non potuerit populus Romanus;  
9.18.6-7); extollunt ..., intellegunt again refers to Livy's sources (quam [magnitudo hominis] qui  
... extollunt ... non intellegunt ... 9.18.9). Livy was fond of counterfactuals: Seneca refers to him 
asking whether it would be better if Caesar had not been born (Sen. QNat. 3.18.4), and 
Suerbaum (1997: 42)  identifies counterfactual speculation in Livy 2.1.36 (the effects of Brutus' 
actions if carried out earlier. Morello 66n24).  
There is textual consistence, too. Livy's apologetic tone in 9.16.1 for leaving the 
annalistic ordering (ab ordine declinarem, deverticula amoena, 9.17.1) matches the preference 
for the pleasure of digressions announced in the Preface (1-3; Morello 67n26). 
The digression also continues the debate with Sallust, documented in studies of Livy's 
preface (Morello 68n28). The importance of ingenium in war (Sall. Cat. 2.2), fortune (Sall. Cat. 
8.1) and need for peace (Sall. Cat. 9.1) are marked as Sallustian by pollere in Livy 9.17.3 
(Morello 68n29; Lebek 1970: 300). 9.16.19 goes with Cat. 7.1-7 (most fruitful period in 
virtuous men); 9.19.15-16 is reminiscent of Cat. 7.5 (Romans at their virtuous best); and 
Papirius embodies Sallust's both bright and strong soldier-general (9.16.12; 9.17.13; Sall. Cat.  
1.7; 60.4). Moreover, Sallust's own synkritic digression (Sall. Cat. 53-54) shares the 
introduction with Livy's: the author's thought will not be concealed from the reader, and is 
connected to the narrative (Sall. Cat. 53.2; 53.4; 53.6; Liv. 9.17.2). Finally, the opposition 
between virtuous past (Papirius' time) and degenerate present is expressed by a metaphor of 
fertility in Livy (feracior, 9.17.1); in Sallust the present has lost its fertility (sicuti effeta parente; 
Sall. Cat. 53.5), until Cato and Caesar are produced (Morello 68).
A parallel with Cato's reluctance to name individual generals in the Origines, Morello 
finds in Livy's increasingly "corporate" qualities of the characters, culminating in the 
achievements of a single, anonymous soldier. Livy's unus homo motif (individual conqueror - 
Alexander - versus many commanders / populus - Rome) is reminiscent of Cato's opposition 
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between the "constitutional design by accretion through generations (Rome) and by single 
lawgiver (Greece)" (Morello 69; Cic. Rep. 2.2.1). Tension is created between these strategies of 
Livy's and both epic Roman heroism and the elogia of one commander, such as Ennius' eulogy 
of Fabius Maximus (Morello 69n38). In the digression, Morello identifies a movement from 
eulogy of one man, to that of a pageant of heroes and back to eulogy of a single, collective 
miles (9.19.17; Morello 70; 79).      
Livy's 9.17-19 digression also connects with three earlier sections. One is 7.29.1-2, an 
authorial intervention which surveys Rome's increasing contact with foreigners culminating in 
the Carthaginian wars and returning to the present and to the preface: ut in hanc magnitudinem 
quae vix sustinetur erigi imperium posset ; the digression alludes to all major wars listed at 7.29 
(Samnite wars, Pyrrhus and Carthage). 
Another section is in book 8 (Morello 70). The digression's position in book 9, rather than 
at Alexander's first appearance in 8.3.7, or second, 8.24.1, allows the reader to become 
acquainted with Papirius, whose anger, similar to Alexander's, and fear for military discipline 
are illustrated from 8.30. Also, we saw that the invasion and death of an Alexander who came to 
Italy feature already in book 8, and references to his nephew in book 8 are linked to that (8.3.6-
7. Moreover, the two Alexanders' stories show parallels in relation to both fortune and 
counterfactuals: the uncle "would undoubtedly" (haud dubie) have attacked Rome if he had 
been successful in Lucania; and fortune killed off his nephew (8.3.6-7; Morello 71). In the 
digression of book 9, the first Alexander also voices the opposition between manly Italians and 
effeminate Asians (9.19.10-11). 
The third connection is the metaphor of the road. The Preface (9) already represents 
progress through history as a journey, combined with the image of a falling building. Reading is 
represented as forward movement (9.18.12). A choice of roads was offered to the legions on 
their way to Luceria at 9.2: duae ad Luceriam ferebant viae, altera praeter oram ... longior,  
altera per furculas Caudinas, brevior ... (9.2.6); this is followed by more roads and journeys, 
until Livy's departure from the annalistic organization and an offer of diversions (deverticula 
amoena 9.17.1) is announced in the road metaphor (declinarem, 9.17.1). 
Other relevant motifs include earlier counterfactuals of book 9, spoken by Postumius 
(9.9.5-6), Herennius (9.3.6-13) - a "warner", the figure Suerbaum (1997: 45) considers the 
personification of alternative history back to Homer - and Lentulus (9.4.8-10. Morello: 72-73); 
and the sense that by going the longer way, which the Romans do the second time (9.13.6), they 
could have won (Morello 73-74). 
The unus homo theme begins by a synkrisis between Papirius and Alexander. Both are the 
man on whom the nation relies (9.16.19; 9.18.18) and both drink, run fast and get into rages 
(9.16.13; 8.30.10; 8.35.10; 8.35.12; Plut. Alex. 3.5 and more). The comparison moves on to 
Alexander and eleven Roman leaders (9.17.7-8; Morello 74-75). Roman military training is 
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handed down through the generations (9.17.10-11). The unus homo motif versus Roman history 
is repeated at 9.17.12-17. "The true synkrisis, of course, is between Alexander and Rome", with 
the nomen Romanum transcending all others (9.18.6), and Roman history outweighing 
Alexander's magnitudo (9.18.8-10). The digression, therefore, does not praise unus homo 
(Morello 76-77). The survival of the state across time depends on numbers and tradition, rather 
than on one irreplaceable individual. 
Breitenbach (1969) made a parallel with Isocrates' praise of monarchy. But Livy does not 
share Isocrates' favouring of a single leader in war (Isoc. Paneg. 3.24; Liv. 9.18.18-19), rather 
retaining just one disadvantage of democracy: the danger of civil strife (9.19.17). Also, Isocrates 
presents rotating leaders as inefficient, whereas Livy's compensate for one another's weaknesses 
(Isoc. Paneg. 3.17-21; Liv. 9.18.13-16). Kings are less commendable because they do not face 
power-sharing difficulties (Morello 80). 
In the synkrisis, then, Alexander is a "potentially negative" exemplum for Rome (Morello 
80). Both were damaged by oriental luxury (Praef. 11; 39.6.7; Rome's mismanagement of 
wealth: Sall. Iug. 41.3), inability to sustain magnitudo (Praef. 4), loss of discipline (9.17.10; 
Praef. 9), change in character (Alexander: 9.18.2; both generals and soldiers lose their 
Romanness: 5.38.5) and anger (in the Roman army as well as Papirius: 9.1.7; 9.13.4; 9.14.13). 
The passage about kings (domini rerum, 9.18.16) suggests reference to Aen. 1.282 (Romanos,  
rerum dominos), thus 25-24 BC for composition of the digression; there was awareness of the 
Aeneid before 25 BC, as demonstrated by Propertius' allusion to Virgil's treatment of Actium 
and the opening of the Aeneid (Prop. 2.34.61-64; Aen. 8.675-713). But Livy's transference of the 
expression to non-Romans, Morello takes to underline the restrictions on those kings' powers. 
The Virgilian allusion is the more perplexing, in view of Augustus' reported approval of Virgil's 
line (Suet. Aug. 40.5). The contrast between Jupiter's celebration of the house of Caesar in the 
Aeneid (1.286-88) and Livy's celebration of the Roman people further emphasizes the 
"admonitory" role of Livy's Virgilian reference (Morello 81). 
Did Livy oppose Augustus? That "old chestnut", Morello will not touch (Morello 81-82. 
Warrior (2006) argues he did). Moles (1993: 153) and Woodman (1988: 134-35) have 
supported, respectively, pre- and post-Actium composition of Praef. 9 (haec tempora quibus 
nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus); the later the dating, the more unflattering for 
Augustus (Luce 1965: 231). But the digression is definitely from the 20s (modo sit perpetuus 
huius qua vivimus pacis amor et civilis cura concordiae. 9.19.17), and does not endorse 
permanent one-man rule. The Roman miles, rather, has averted and will again avert many 
armies (avertit avertetque, 9.19.17; Morello 82). The digression, then, is "at least a 
manifestation of the qualities that made Livy a Pompeianus"; unus homo figures can only 
benefit the state intermittently (Morello: 83). 
By contemplating a probable past, Alexander's invasion, on the pattern of his uncle's and 
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many others, Livy's digression moves away from accuracy and provides an example for the 
present and the future. Alexander's status as unus homo is factual, and relevant to the 
digression's 20s BC state of affairs (Morello 84).
Oakley's commentary (2005) adds some useful points. Like most ancient historians, Livy 
broke the annalistic pattern and made use of digressions (list: Oakley 2005: 184-85). These were 
normally accompanied by explanations (Oakley 2005: 185). The rhetorical form of the 
digression, synkrisis or comparatio, often judged one of the two compared subjects superior 
(Oakley 2005: 188-89).4 Livy's synkrisis does not follow the recommended structure, as it 
compares Alexander to Rome as a whole; Alexander's uniqueness cannot compete (Oakley 
2005: 189-92). 
Concerning the speech attributed to Appius Claudius Caecus (280 BC), Oakley comments 
that Plutarch may have read Livy (Oakley 2005: 195). Possible allusions in the digression to 
Livy's Preface and to Sallust may suggest judgments on contemporary events. But these are hard 
to pin down: Augustus was a very different character from Alexander (Oakley 2005: 197-99). 
Whether the levissimi Greeks who opposed Rome and supported the Parthians were Timagenes 
and Metrodorus, Oakley is not certain (9.18.6-7; Oakley 2005: 202-03). 
Livy's Alexander digression provides the longest extant discussion of Alexander in Latin 
literature of the Republic and early Principate apart from Curtius', and the most famous 
counterfactual: Livy clearly liked such conjectures (2.1.3-6; 6.40.3-41.12; 7.30.1-23), including 
the use of warners  (3.1-13), who present alternative futures to those recorded by the narrative, 
and "the inverted ni- and cum-clauses" are among his favourite constructions (6.24.4-5; 7.15.1; 
Oakley 2005: 205-06); there are also elliptical quid si questions (9.18.5; 9.3.11; 36.19.12; 
45.36.8; slightly different: 8.21.4; 38.59.7; 44.39.6; Oakley 2005: 228-29). As to Morello's 
suggestion that Livy (9.18.16) may have emulated Virgil's Romanos rerum dominos (Aen. 
1.282), Oakley thinks it "would be easier to argue that Virgil recalls Livy" (Oakley 2005: 241n1; 
Morello: 81). 
Zhang (2008: 133-35) also discusses Plutarch's report of Appius Claudius' 280 BC 
Alexander counterfactual (Pyrrh. 19; Zhang 135). Alexander was not universally admired. In a 
letter to Atticus, Cicero mentions "king" Alexander as superbum, crudelem, immoderatum, and 
says that Caesar, whom he compares to Alexander, would not appreciate a letter from him, 
Cicero (Cic. Att. 13.28.3; Zhang 141). Livy's counterfactual was clearly relevant to its time: it 
treated current conflicts such as relations between Greece and Rome, and which of two paths 
Rome should take: a return to the republic, or government by a single man (Zhang 142-43). 
Zhang also finds resonances between the Alexander counterfactual and the rest of Livy's 
work. Having witnessed leaders' ambition and the unruliness of the plebs in the civil war, Livy 
4 Isocr. Paneg. 3.17-26: monarchy / tyranny and oligarchy; Cic. Mur. 22-30: jurist / soldier; Ov. Am. 
1.9: war / love; Fast. 2.131-44: Augustus / Romulus; Sen. Dial. 2.12.2: children / the childish; 3.5.2: 
angry / non-angry; end of most of Plutarch's parallel lives; Sall. Cat. 53.6-54.6: Caesar / Cato.
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presents the dangers inherent in an immature plebeian class when Brutus expelled Superbus, in 
two counterfactuals (2.1.4-6; Zhang 143-44). 2.23.10 states that mob violence would have 
ensued, had not the consuls (P. Servilius and Ap. Claudius) intervened. At 2.39.6-7, the if-not  
that saved the situation is the common enemy, and at 2.56.15 Quinctius; his speech to the plebs 
armed against the Senate contains a counterfactual (3.67.2). 6.20.14 expresses sympathy for the 
patrician Manlius, who had protected the Capitol and the plebs, but was sentenced to death for 
agitating them: hunc exitum habuit vir, nisi in libera civitate natus esset, memorabilis. Like the 
single ruler Alexander, Manlius has personal ambitions which are a hindrance to the republic. 
(Zhang 144-45).
Hannibal's personal ambition and corruption can also be assimilated to those of 
Alexander, in opposition to Scipio Africanus' republican virtus. While Scipio, who swears 
loyalty to the republic as a youth (21.53.5-13), succumbs to easy living in Syracuse (29.19.12; 
also in Cic. Verr. 4.117), but impresses the Roman legati with his efficiency (29.22.1; 29.22.4) 
and they bid him sail for Africa (29.22.6), Hannibal, who swore to his family to be an enemy of 
Rome in youth (21.1.4), behaves as if Italy were his own province (21.5.1-2; Zhang 147), and 
after luxuriating in Capua prepares a speech in self-defence rather than acting (29.22.1; Zhang 
149). In Scipio's hortatory speech virtus is more heavily emphasized than fortuna, which 
appears only twice and belongs to the city (21.41.17), but the opposite is the case in Hannibal's 
(fortuna vestra) (21.40-44; Zhang 150). The synkrisis between Romans and non-Roman 
Hannibal and Alexander in Livy's third decade as well as in the Alexander counterfactual, 
highlights the superior virtus and lower vulnerability to fortuna of the Romans (Zhang 151-52). 
The counterfactual Alexander digression (9.16-19), therefore, constitutes an integral part 
of Livy's synkrisis between Rome, which has shared responsibilities, and those constitutions 
which allow one man to decide. Setting up a counterfactual environment for comparison makes 
that job easier. Plutarch later continues the comparison of individuals in terms of virtue and 
fortune (Zhang 152-53).
6.3. Counterfactuals, Historiography and Cicero
This section, from Zhang 2008, gives a brief outline of the use of counterfactuals in rhetoric, 
and considers Sallust, not covered by Zhang. Rhetoric was closely connected to historiography 
in the Graeco-Roman world. Both disciplines were supposed to inspire the audience to take 
moral action (Cic. De or. 2.35-36; Zhang 174). 
In Lysias' "On the Killing of Eratosthenes", the defendant argues that he killed his love 
rival out of anger rather than intentionally: "... if I had known beforehand, don't you think I 
would have had servants ready and sent word to my friends ...?" The speaker here constructs a 
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possibility and compares it with reality, and concludes that reality does not conform to 
deliberate intention (Lys. 1, 177; Carey 1997: 34; 37; Zhang 177-79).                       
Aristotle later wrote about the forensic and epideictic branches of rhetoric, which, as 
opposed to the deliberative, deal with the past and therefore resemble history (Zhang 179). 
Historians' conjectures about the past often take the shape reductio ad impossibile. This involves 
negating a possibility, so as to confirm the claimed fact that is the antecedent to it (modus 
tollens). Aristotle argues that in the Medea of Carcinus, the protagonist "pleads that she would 
have slain, not her children, but her husband Jason; for it would have been a mistake on her part 
not to have done this, if she had done the other" (Rh. 1400b28). This is the enthymeme form of 
a modus tollens syllogism (i.e. one in which a premiss is missing), and an argument from 
probability (Rh. 1357a15). 
Relevant to counterfactuals are Cicero's coniectura, definitiva and qualitas. The purpose 
of coniectura is to reconstruct something unknown from clues. These may be necessary signs, 
such as a fever indicating illness, or probable signs (Arist. Rh. 1357b16-18; Quint. 7.2; 5.9.8). 
Cicero divides coniectura into author, intention and action, all three potentially requiring 
counterfactual thinking about the past. Could a given act have been performed? Could it have 
been performed by anyone else? (Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.42). Modus tollens argumentation is needed to 
answer such questions. Concerning action, it has to be assessed whether a deed was planned, 
and whether fortuna was a contributory factor (Inv. rhet. 2.44).
Evidence of counterfactual thinking also features in Cicero's comparatio and concessio, 
parts of the so-called (unprovable) "assumptive" issues. Comparatio is the case where for lack 
of better options, some act is defended by reference to the end for which it was done. A 
commander who made an agreement with the enemy and saved his soldiers but lost arms and 
baggage, argues: "I did this because otherwise all the soldiers would have perished." The 
plaintiff then asks: "Would they have perished?" (Inv. rhet., 2.73). A comparison is here carried 
out between the reality and an alternate possibility in the past, in order to establish intention. 
But support from signs is also necessary, in this case a description of the landscape that will 
convince the audience that the whole army had been endangered (Zhang 174). 
Concessio (confession and avoidance) is the plea in which the defendant asks for pardon, 
and takes two forms, purgatio and deprecatio. Purgatio appeals to imprudentia (ignorance), 
casus (accident) or necessitudo (necessity): the question is asked whether the person would have 
done the same act except under those circumstances (Inv. rhet. 2.94-100). This involves 
comparing two stories, reality and hypothetical events uninfluenced by ignorance, accident or 
necessity, and drawing a conclusion. The prosecutor should provide a definition (definitiva) of 
these excuses, try to show that the defendant could have avoided the crime, and argue that he 
did it rather out of inertia, negligentia, or fatuitas. The judge has to decide, for instance, 
whether ignorance of local customs can disculpate sailors who have sacrificed a bull (Inv. rhet.  
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2.95-96). 
Concerning the interpretation of written documents, Cicero uses the following imaginary 
case of ambiguity: a son says he is only obliged to give his mother what amount of silver plate 
he desires when she asks for it, because his father's will specified heres meus uxori meae  
vasorum argenteorum pondo centu, quae volet, dato (Inv. rhet.2.116). Cicero suggests ways of 
proving the father's intention: for instance, considering that the father would not have used 
certain words (Inv. rhet. 2.120-21). That argument relies on the construction of a possibility in 
the past (Zhang 186-87).
Intention needs to be inferred from action, and Quintilian quotes Cicero's pro Milone on 
the subject: the audience is asked to consider "whether it is probable that the accused hoped that 
he would be able to carry such a crime into effect, or that it would escape detection when 
committed, ... whether he could have done the deed at some other time and in some other way ... 
" (Quint. 7.2.43; Zhang 186-87). Cicero claims that Milo acted in self-defense, and to that effect 
mentions the possible consequences of the victim's survival: "and finally, had the immortal gods 
not launched him [Clodius] upon the impulse of attempting ... to slay a very gallant gentleman 
[Milo], your free constitution would be to-day a thing of the past" (Cic. Mil. 33). The fall of the 
republic is envisaged in that counterfactual. Another "untaken option in the past" is Milo's 
killing of Clodius: "had anyone slain him [Clodius] then, there would be no deliberation about 
acquittal, but about reward" (Mil. 15). This counterfactual presents a possibility advantageous to 
Milo, which he passed over; the implication is that he did not intend to kill Clodius (Zhang 
191). 
Against Verres again involves counterfactual reasoning. The real Verres is compared with 
a hypothetical, ordinary tyrannical governor: "They [Sicilians] would, in fact, have endured 
even Verres in silence, if only his offences had been those of an ordinary man, ..." (Cic. Verr. 
2.2.3; Zhang 192-93).
Sallust's use of rhetoric is extensive. It includes antithesis, brevity (ellipsis, asyndeton, 
lists), abrupt syntax and parataxis. This was done in imitation of Thucydides and of the Elder 
Cato, whose austere outlook Sallust shared, and in opposition to Cicero (Batstone 2010: xxxiii; 
Ramsey 2007: 10-11). Referring to what he found at his entrance into public life, Sallust says: 
pro pudore, pro abstinentia, pro virtute audacia, largitio, avaritia vigebant (Sall. Cat. 3.3; 
Batstone 1988: 5). But typical of Sallust are "false antitheses" (Scanlon 1980: 75). The 
attribution of pudor and abstinentia to Cato, for instance (Sall. Cat. 54.6), given the earlier 
pairing they received with audacia and largitia, implies that the negative characteristics apply to 
his competitor Caesar (McGushin 1977: 272; Batstone 1988: 5). Similarly, the description of 
Cato at 54.3 (nihil largiundo gloriam adeptus est) refers to a largitio which implicitly belongs to 
Caesar (Batstone 1988: 6); but of Caesar, Sallust says Caesar dando sublevando ignoscundo 
[gloria adeptus est] (Batstone 1988: 6). As Batstone (1988) comments, "Sallust offers no 
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mutually exclusive antitheses". While narrative context, a debate, emphasizes competition, the 
only explicit statement about the relationship between Caesar and Cato is that they are different: 
ingenti virtute, divorsis moribus (53.6; Batstone 1988: 4). 
False antitheses are one expression of the agonistic device synkrisis: "contrary but 
responsive" spheres of activity were declared, an exemplar set, and another character compared 
to it (Polybius 10.2-8-13: Scipio meets Lykurgus' standards; Cic. Brut. 41-43: Coriolanus meets 
Themistocles'; Batstone 1988: 3n9). Scholars disagree on the outcome of Sallust's Caesar/Cato 
juxtaposition, Syme (1964) probably representing the "cautious pro-Cato" interpretation; 
although he also argues for the fragmentation of virtues between the two (Sall. Cat. 53.6-54.6; 
Syme 1964: 120; 116; Batstone 1988: 1n1, 2). The virtues attributed to each rather "inhabit and 
reveal" each other: in (Caesar's) beneficia ac munificentia and (Cato's) integritas vitae, 
integritas is needed for beneficia to be such (Sall. Cat. 54.2). This makes readers suspicious: 
"[i]f Cato's integritas suggests something hiding behind Caesar's beneficia, it is natural to ask 
what hides behind Caesar's mansuetudo or Cato's severitas" (Batstone 1988: 7-8).
A rhetorical technique, then, was used by Sallust around 43-35 BC, which consisted in 
juxtaposing related worlds that challenge each other in complex ways (Scanlon 1980: 50). 
According to Cicero, Thucydides was popular in Rome around 50 BC, though unsuitable for 
orators (Ramsey 2007: 10; Cic. Brut. 287; Orat. 30: Ecce autem aliqui se Thucydidios esse  
profitentur, novum quoddam imperitorum et inauditum genus). Sallust found his predecessors 
wanting: the "brilliant minds" who recorded Greek events were just not available (Sall. Cat. 8. 
Cicero agrees: De or. 2.51; Leg. 1.5; Brut. 228). Therefore he left the annalistic format for the 
monograph, which dealt with a single topic (Ramsey 2007: 8). Scanlon (1980), still considered 
the definitive work on Thucydides' influence on Sallust by Pagán (2009: xxxvii), analyzes types 
of antithesis common to the two. These include antitheses between word and deed, "with an 
especial delight in orations designed to demolish the speaker" (Syme 1964: 255, said of Sallust), 
such as Thucydides 3.70.1 (Corcyrans claiming to be prisoners released by the Corinthians, but 
trying to give them Corcyra) and Sallust's Cat. 38.2-3 ("under pretence of the public welfare 
each [nobleman] in reality was working for his own advancement." Scanlon 1980: 80-82). Two 
elements are juxtaposed, one truer than the other (Scanlon 1980: 83). Oppositions could also 
feature between words, ideas, clauses, sentences, speeches and entire sections of the narrative. 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus calls this a "showy feature", derived from Gorgias (DH de Thuc. 
24.363). False antithesis, also from Gorgias, was a type favoured by Thucydides, and disliked 
by Cicero (De or. 3.53.203): "Nicias, ... thinking ... that everything that had been done on their 
side was still incomplete, and what had been said by the generals was not yet adequate ..." 
(Thuc. 7.69.2; Scanlon 1980: 75-76); an instance from Bellum Jugurthinum is 51.5: dignitas and 
libertas are not necessarily in conflict (Batstone 2008: 7n29). 
Sallust shows another similarity to Thucydides (and Herodotus) pertinent to Virgil's 
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counterfactuals: parataxis. Syme (1964: 257) comments: "[Sallust] can be charaterized as anti-
Ciceronian both in sentence structure and in vast tracts of his vocabulary." Sallust's paratactic 
style, all agree, was a reaction to Cicero's oratorical period, itself a reaction to "Asianism", "a 
showy and recherché style" (Pernot 2005: 81; Scanlon 1980: 77).
Sallust is also attributed early use of the ni "de rupture" (Iug. 53.7), much exploited by 
Livy (Chausserie-Laprée 1969: 602; discussed later, pages 95-96). This will resurface in the 
Aeneid, along with parataxis.
7. Greek conditionals. Wakker 1994
7.1. Propositional, Illocutionary, Predicational Conditionals
Wakker (1994) examines the syntactic, semantic and especially pragmatic aspects of Greek 
conditionals within the theoretical framework of Functional Grammar as formulated and 
developed by Dik (1978; 1989; 1990). In 1993, Wakker argues, van der Auwera's (1983: 243) 
view was still valid: "on the logical side, conditionals constitute a major research theme [...] . 
On the linguistic side, conditionals have not been in the forefront of investigation at all" (van 
der Auwera 1983: 244). These deficiencies continued into the 1990s in spite of 1980s works 
such as Traugott et al. (1986), and the Journal of Pragmatics 7 (1983), dedicated to conditionals 
(Wakker 1-2). Most grammars of Ancient Greek have no theoretical substructure;  "at best", they 
mention other ways of expressing conditional relations and other semantic values expressed by 
/n (Wakker 35).
Functional Logic distinguishes between semantic, pragmatic and syntactic functions 
(involving, respectively: Agent, Goal, Recipient, ...; Theme, Topic, Focus, ...; Subject, Object) 
and acknowledges three truth values for conditional sentences: True, False and Uncertain, the 
latter subdivided according to degrees of probability. Conditionals (antecedents) "are considered 
a means through which a speaker can create a hypothetical picture ... which differs ... from his 
current picture"; the addressee's and the "general" picture are also involved. Wakker describes 
different conditional types "in terms of different picture constellations" (Wakker 15; 32-33). She 
identifies three principal types: the propositional: "if I am not mistaken, Peter is at home"; the 
illocutionary: "if you are thirsty, there is some beer in the fridge", both relating to the higher 
levels of the main clause and constituting a comment on it by the speaker; and the predicational 
("if it rains, I'll take the umbrella"), which defines a domain for the main clause (Wakker 34; 49; 
59).5 Other groupings are by time reference and type of discourse (interactive speech vs. 
5 See notes 2 and 3.
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narrative, description and comment, with partial overlap with the three main types).
Cross-linguistically, conditionals tend to be marked according to higher or lower degrees 
of probability of realization, especially of the protasis, by (respectively) the indicative or the 
subjunctive (Wakker 111). Greek is unusual in marking four degrees of probability by mood in 
the protasis:
neutral
 + indicative - the speaker does not express an opinion on the degree of likelihood of the 
fulfilment of the condition.  () tn plin arsomen, bon to yeo ysomen 
("if (really) we take the city, we will offer a cow to the gods"); Homeric:  + indicative
very well possible
n + subjunctive - the speaker thinks the future fulfilment of the condition is very well 
possible.  tn plin men bon to yeo ysomen ("if - and I consider this very well 
possible - we have taken the city, we will offer a cow to the gods"); Homeric:  ke + 
subjunctive (also , n, a ke; or ke /  absent)  
potential
 + optative - the speaker thinks the future fulfilment of the condition is possible and no more 
than that.  tn plin oimen, bon to yeo yoimen  ("if we were to take the city, we 
would offer a cow to the gods"); Homeric:  (ke) + optative (, Il. 2.597)
counterfactual (present / past)
 + ind. II (imperfect for present, aorist for past) (the main clause containing ind. II + ) - the 
speaker thinks the fulfilment of the condition is no longer possible.  tn plin omen, 
bon to yeo ysamen  ("if we had taken the city, we would have offered a cow to the 
gods"); Homeric: present  + optative; past:  + ind. II (Wakker 6-7; 112; 205).
Iterative States of Affairs are marked by the subjunctive with  when referring to the non-
past (  plin meglhn ,  to yeo yei,  d plin 
mikrn , bon mnon. "[They have this custom]: if someone has taken a big city, he offers 
a hecatomb to the gods; if one has taken a small one, only a cow") and by the optative when 
referring to the past (  plin meglhn oi,  to yeo yue,  
d plin mikrn oi, bon mnon. "[They had this custom]: if someone had taken a big 
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city, he offered a hecatomb to the gods; if one had taken a small one, only a cow". Wakker 8).  
also introduces purpose clauses ("in the hope that"), indirect questions and wishes (more often, 
 and  ) (Wakker 7-10).
Most recent studies adopt this description of Greek conditionals, reflecting the speaker's 
choice of  mood based on his judgment of the fulfilment of the condition (Brunel 1980; 
Greenberg 1986; Rijksbaron 1980; 1986).
7.2. Position and Function of Conditionals
Wakker does not entirely agree with the general view that if-clauses are "naturally" placed 
before their main clauses, as stated in Greenberg's "Universal of Word Order" 14 (Greenberg 
1966: 84). There is some cross-linguistic evidence in favour of that view (Comrie 1986: 83-86): 
the if-clause temporally and logically precedes the main clause (iconicity); interlocutors must 
agree on common ground (the if-clause) before proceeding with argumentation (Lehmann 
1974); given information (if-clauses) precedes new information (Haiman 1980: 528); except in 
Greek counterfactuals, which have an apodosis marked as non-factual (by secondary indicative 
with ), it is the if-clause that is marked as non-factual, and its initial position prevents the 
main clause from being interpreted as factual (Comrie 1986: 84-85; Wakker 51n13); in 
paratactic conditionals, such as "Do that and I'll punish you", the condition comes first (Hodot 
1981: 46; Wakker 50-52). Pragmatically speaking, if-clauses have a Theme function or a Topic 
function, which is similar. This function would explain why a subordinate clause occupies an 
initial position, thus infringing the "Language-Independent Preferred Order of Constituents", or 
"Principle of Increasing Complexity", according to which more complex constituents appear on 
the right.6 Themes precede the main clause, and are not sensitive to the clause-internal 
grammatical rules; thus, the subsequent clause can have any illocutionary values (declarative, 
directive, interrogative), on a pattern parallel to "My brother, I haven't seen him for years". 
Wakker, however, finds some Greek if-clauses to be extra-clausal constituents which may 
precede, follow or interrupt their main clause, on a pattern parallel to "Ladies and gentlemen, 
shall we start the game?" (Dik 1989: 264-65; Wakker 53-54; 54n16, 17); as in Xenophon's: n 
, p; ("If you start now, when will you reach home?", Cyr. 5.3.27). 
Here the illocutionary value of the interrogative main clause (as of directive ones, the types to 
which this applies in particular) is not shared by the if-clause; p does not dominate the 
protasis (Wakker 55-56). 
Predicational if-clauses in Greek are initial in 50% of cases (the highest in Herodotus, 
6  Dik 1978: 192; 1983: 273; 1989: 345; 351-52.
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60.5%), and final in 33% (with the highest in Homer, 45.5%, partly accounted for by -
clauses, discussed shortly, but 46.5% are initial). Propositional and illocutionary protases, are 
final in 44% of cases (particularly in tragedy, 64%), interrupt in 34% and initial in 22% of cases. 
Universal 14 therefore does not apply to Ancient Greek (Wakker 58-60; 58n29). Also, some 
initial predicational if-clauses are whole sentences with Focus function, though some are replies 
and complete a sentence interrupted by the questioner: - ο μαί ποτε Λυσιμάχας μ ς ...ἶ ἡ ᾶ  
καλε σθαι. - τί ποιησάσας; - ν παύσωμεν ... ξ ν πλοισιν γοράζοντας κα  μαινομένους. (Ar.,ῖ ἢ ὺ ὅ ἀ ὶ  
Lys. 554-56. "One day, I think, we shall be called 'Women who end the battle' - By which 
means? - If we stop soldiers in arms marketing and raging") (Wakker 68-69). Some final 
protases are extra-clausal and have Tail function (afterthought): τ  δ  πισθεν ρεσσόμεθ , α  κέὰ ᾽ ὄ ἀ ᾽ ἴ  
ποθι Ζε ς δώ  ... κρητ ρα στήσασθαι λεύθερον ν μεγάροισιν (ὺ ῃ ῆ ἐ ἐ Il. 6.526-28. "These things we 
will make good hereafter, if ever Zeus grants us to set up a bowl of freedom" (Wakker 74-75). 
Some predicational conditionals are restrictive, which means they are bound up with the main 
clause, and can occupy a number of positions: ρ  ο ν ν με ο εσθε τοσάδε τη διαγενέσθαι εἆ ᾽ ὖ ἄ ἴ ἔ ἰ 
πραττον τ  δημόσια; "Do you believe that I could have lived so many years if I had beenἔ ὰ  in 
public life?" (Pl. Ap. 32e2-3; Wakker 95). 
7.3. Conditionals Come from Wishes
Ludwig Lange (1872-73) is credited the idea that conditionals developed out of wishes and 
suppositions; Tabachovitz (1951: 16-18) discussed the influence on it of Darwin's theory of 
evolution. The chronological precedence of parataxis over hypotaxis, i.e. simpler over more 
difficult syntax, Wakker rejects along with the absence of subordinators in Indo-European, 
which is assumed in the absence of evidence. All known human languages have subordination 
(Wakker 386). However, Wakker presents the reconstruction of the passage from wishes to 
conditionals as follows. E originally introduced wishes (Il. 10.111; 10.536-38), being either an 
interjection or a demonstrative adverb derived from the locative of the Indo-European 
demonstrative stem*e-/o- "then, so" (cf. ), thus referring to the previous sentence; a 
sentence later followed, explaining the consequences of the fulfilment of the wish (Il. 17.561-
64). The two sentences then formed a new sentence (Il. 17.156-59), and at some later stage the 
contents of the protasis changed to possible non-wishes, and became expressible by means other 
than the optative (Il. 7.129-30; with optative). Wakker adds that the protasis may follow the 
apodosis (Wakker 387). She also questions the haziness of the alleged move toward the 
coalescence of protasis with apodosis, illustrated by the array of scholarly interpretations of: 
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α  γ ρ Ζε  τε πάτερ κα  θηναίη κα  πολλονἲ ὰ ῦ ὶ Ἀ ὶ Ἄ
τοιο τοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες ε εν χαι ν:ῦ ἶ Ἀ ῶ
τώ κε τάχ  μύσειε πόλις Πριάμοιο νακτος ᾽ ἠ ἄ
"Father Zeus, Athena and Apollo, may you give (or: if you were to give) me ten such 
counsellors among the Achaeans; (or: comma) then the city of king Priam would quickly fall" 
 (Il. 2.371-73; Wakker 389-90). 
The passage may be used as evidence for the view that wishes derive from conditionals. 
Similarly, the reading of the fixed expression , followed by an imperative or first 
person subjunctive or future indicative, as not an elided conditional such as  
, seems arbitrary (Wakker 390-91); Od. 15.180-1 and Il. 22.286-8 
(wishes followed by consequence-sentences) also fail to prove that  plus optative plus 
consequence-sentence occurred only as independent sentence and expressed only a wish (as 
argued in Kühner-Gerth 1904: 1,228; Chantraine 1963: 275), and  /  followed by an 
infinitive to express an unrealizable wish (Od. 7.311; 24.376) may have started as part of a 
conditional, rather than as an interjectional particle combination (as argued in Kühner-Gerth 
1904: 2,21 f.; Wakker 391). As for Schwyzer and Debrunner's (1950: 682) assertion that 
conditionals only came into use with trade and justice, Wakker thinks it "can hardly be taken 
seriously" (Wakker 392). Wishes and conditional constructions in Homer exist side by side, 
some paratactic sequences having a more effective rhetorical effect than equivalent conditional 
sentences (Il. 3.52-53); also, Homeric texts are too artificial to be taken as proof of linguistic 
change. The role that intonation and word order may have had in establishing subordination 
before the existence of explicit means, Wakker considers dubious (Wakker 392-93; 393n58). 
7.4. Wishes Come from Conditionals
Aristarchus had already commented, in relation to Iliad 16.559 (atn ... eikisameya "if 
only we may dishonour him"), that the implied apodosis kal  xoi ("it would be well") 
must be inferred (Ludwich 1884). Monro (1891: 285), Goodwin (1889: 378-79) and 
Tabachovitz (1951: 49-91, 113-38) supported that idea, maintaining that wishes introduced by 
/or  / a gr are conditions without an apodosis, and rejected the possibility of an 
early phase of Greek without conditionals. Their arguments include: in modern languages, 
conditional subordinators occur in wishes (if only); the expression gr gneto toto, for 
an unrealizable wish, can only be explained as an elliptic conditional, since wishes never occur 
as gneto only: this Wakker attributes to the confusion with non-wishes that the secondary 
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indicative would generate; conditional protases often have the overtone of a wish (Wakker 394-
95). The alternative theory has weak foundations, and the evolutionary hypothesis (parataxis 
preceded hypotaxis) cannot be proven (Wakker 394-96). Kühner-Stegmann on Latin (1914: 
2,388, Anm. 2) also thought that conditional sentences derived from wishes (Wakker 394n60; 
Kühner-Stegmann 1955 retains that view).
7.5. Greek Counterfactuals with Present Reference
In present counterfactuals, the imperfect is normally used. The counterfactual conditional 
indicates that the speaker considers the state of affairs in question no longer realizable; but he 
still creates a hypothetical picture, in which the realization of p entails the realization of q 
(Wakker 132-33). These are typical examples, which include the factual situation presented 
afterwards and announced by  in (a) (sometimes ) and  in (b):
ν ν ε  φοβερόν τι νωρ μεν, π ν ν σο  προεφράζομεν. ν νῦ ἰ ἐ ῶ ᾶ ἂ ὶ ῦ  δ  ... α τοί τε θαρσέομεν κα  σοὲ ὐ ὶ ὶ 
τερα τοια τα παρακελευόμεθα. ("if we saw any danger in the present situation we would tellἕ ῦ  
you without reserve. But now we are confident ourselves and advise you to adopt a similar 
attitude". Hdt. 1.120.6)
πολλ ν δ  όντων μοτρόφων το σι νθρώποισι θηρίων πολλ  ν τι πλέω γίνετο, ε  μῶ ὲ ἐ ὁ ῖ ἀ ῷ ἂ ἔ ἐ ἰ ὴ 
κατελάμβανε το ς α ελούρους τοιάδε ὺ ἰ ("whereas there are many domestic animals, there would 
be many more, if this didn't happen to cats". Hdt. 2.66.1).
Herodotus then explains that male cats kill kittens in order to gain access to the mother-cats, and 
the action therefore can be considered reiterative. (Wakker 133-34). Potential conditionals, 
taking the optative, can also be contrasted with the factual situation, often marked by  or 
:
πόλλ  ν λέγειν χοιμι πρ ς τ  το δ  πη,᾽ ἂ ἔ ὸ ὰ ῦ ᾽ ἔ
ε  μοι παρείκοι: ν ν δ  ν ς κρατ  λόγου. ἴ ῦ ᾽ ἑ ὸ ῶ
("I could say much in reply to his words, if it were possible for me; but now I have the power to 
say one word only". Soph. Phil. 1047-48).
There is an area of overlap between present and future reference, and also between 
counterfactual and potential conditionals as both involve non-actuality and explicitly contrast 
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with reality (Wakker 133-35). Some contexts dictate counterfactuality, such as this inscription 
on a tomb: 
‘ε  μ  πληστός τε ας χρημάτων κα  α σχροκερδής, ο κ ν νεκρ ν θήκας νέ γες.’ ("if youἰ ὴ ἄ ἔ ὶ ἰ ὐ ἂ ῶ ἀ ῳ  
were not insatiate of wealth and basely desirous of gain, you wouldn't open the coffin of the 
dead". Hdt. 1.187.5).
This can only be read once the door has been opened (Wakker 136). Some contexts are made 
more dramatic by the use of counterfactuals:
ε  γ ρ π  μέας μούνους στρατηλάτεε  Πέρσης ..., χρ ν α τ ν πάντων τ ν λλωνἰ ὰ ἐ ᾽ ἡ ἐ ὁ ῆ ὐ ὸ ῶ ἄ  
πεχόμενον έναι ο τω π  τ ν μετέρην ... ν ν δ  ... το ς α ε  μποδ ν γινομένους μερο ταιἀ ἰ ὕ ἐ ὶ ὴ ἡ ῦ ὲ ὺ ἰ ὶ ἐ ὼ ἡ ῦ  
πάντας ("For if the Persian were marching against us alone, he would have to leave all others 
alone and make straight for us. But now he is taming all those that come in his way". Hdt. 
4.118.4-5; Wakker 137).
Wakker concludes that "the use of counterfactual and potential conditionals is often determined 
by semantic-pragmatic factors" (Wakker 139). "Imperfective" counterfactuals usually refer to 
the present, and potential conditionals to the future, with some overlap in cases of general 
reference, and when an optative refers to the immediate future. The two constructions are not 
freely interchangeable (Wakker 141).
There are Greek counterfactuals with present reference but the aorist, Wakker identifies 
two possible explanations for this case: the supposition that the state of affairs in the apodosis 
would at once be completed if the condition were realized, or that the aorist expresses the pre-
utterance completeness of the state of affairs:
σπερ ν ε  τύγχανεν ν ποδημάτων δημιουργός, πεκρίνατο ν δήπου σοι τι σκυτοτόμος  ὥ ἂ ἰ ἐ ὢ ὑ ἀ ἂ ὅ
("as, if he were to be a maker of shoes, he would answer you [before you ended speaking], I 
think, that he was a cobbler" Pl. Grg. 447d3-4).
Here, Socrates tells Gorgias what a shoemaker would say if asked who he is. The aorist conveys 
the immediacy of the shoemaker's reply (Wakker 149). The nature of the implications of 
counterfactuals is mainly pragmatic and contextual (Wakker 154). 
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7.6. Greek counterfactuals with past reference
A past counterfactual outlines an alternative course of events to reality in the past and it is 
characterized by an aorist indicative, but also imperfect, with  in the apodosis, and is 
sometimes contrasted to actuality by ν ν δῦ . The counterfactual alternative can be used to 
support or contradict an opinion (here with imperfect, mention of Agamemnon clearly 
indicating reference to the past):
ο κ ν ο ν νήσων ... κράτει, ε  μή τι κα  ναυτικ ν ε χεν ὐ ἂ ὖ ἐ ἰ ὶ ὸ ἶ
("he would not have ruled over the islands [as Homer says he does], if he had not had something 
of a fleet". Thuc. 1.9.4)
(here with aorist):
ε  γ ρ δ  τα τα ο τω ε ρέθη κ το  κυβερνήτεω πρ ς Ξέρξην, ν μυρί σι γνώμ σι μίαν ο κἰ ὰ ὴ ῦ ὕ ἰ ἐ ῦ ὸ ἐ ῃ ῃ ὐ  
χω ντίξοον μ  ο κ ν ποι σαι βασιλέα τοιόνδε ... λλ   μέν ... δ  χρεώμενος ...ἔ ἀ ὴ ὐ ἂ ῆ ἀ ᾽ ὃ ὁ ῷ  
πενόστησε ς τ ν σίην. ἀ ἐ ὴ Ἀ
([It is said that ...] "for if indeed the pilot has so spoken to Xerxes, I think that there is not one in 
thousand that will deny that the king would have done thus". Hdt. 8.119; Wakker 144-45; 148, 
153).
Some past counterfactuals take the imperfect either in the protasis or the apodosis or both, 
because the state of affairs represented is not completed (rather than constituting an exception as 
all scholars think,  except for Goodwin (1889: 147-48; 151). Wakker 146). The imperfect 
normally describes simultaneous or repeated states of affairs, and the aorist a state completed 
before the time of speaking or before another mentioned in the surrounding context (Wakker 
146-47). The use of the imperfect in a counterfactual, therefore,  indicates a state of affairs 
which continues at the time of speaking but the decision about whose non-realization was made 
in the past; the decision about the non-realization of a state of affairs in the past (past 
counterfactual with aorist) was made at some earlier time (Wakker 147; different explanation in 
Weinrich 1971; against: Fayen 1971). 
Wakker explains the use of tense stems for counterfactuals by the semantic character of 
the present and aorist stems. Those semantic qualities also justify apparent exceptions, when the 
state of affairs involved takes place at a different time from that of speaking; that time is 
indicated by an aorist or some other means in the context:
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ε  γ ρ δ  μ  παρέπρηξε μηδέν, π   δ  στάλη ποίεε, ε λε ν τ ν ρυκίνην χώρην  ἰ ὰ ὴ ὴ ἐ ᾽ ὁ ὲ ἐ ἐ ἷ ἂ ὴ Ἐ
("for if he had not done anything beyond, but had kept on doing that for which he set out, he 
would have taken the region" Hdt. 5.45.1).
The imperfect ποίεε has continuative value, and context (Doreius' death) shows that theἐ  
conditional refers to the past (Wakker 147-48). 
7.7. Homeric counterfactuals: Present
Non-actual states of affairs both present (no longer realizable) and future (realizable) in Homer 
are marked by the old optative. The possibility of immortality, an impossible condition in the 
real world, in Homer takes the optative:
 ... ε  μ ν γ ρ ...ἰ ὲ ὰ
α ε  δ  μέλλοιμεν γήρω τ  θανάτω τεἰ ὶ ὴ ἀ ᾽ ἀ
σσεσθ , ο τέ κεν α τ ς ... μαχοίμηνἔ ᾽ ὔ ὐ ὸ
ο τέ κε σ  στέλλοιμι μάχην ς ...ὔ ὲ ἐ
ν ν δ  μπης γ ρ κ ρες φεστ σιν θανάτοιοῦ ᾽ ἔ ὰ ῆ ἐ ᾶ
μυρίαι ... / ομεν ἴ
if we had the perspective to be for ever ageless and immortal, neither should I myself fight amid 
the foremost, nor should I send thee into battle. But now - for in any case thousands of fates of 
death beset us - let us go forward (Il. 12.322-27).
As the opposition between potential conditional and present counterfactual does not exist in 
Homeric Greek, Wakker rejects the assumption that this is definitely a counterfactual. Some 
have argued that such constructions replace counterfactuals. Wakker notes the same lack of 
differentiation in Plautus (Wakker 211; 212n171; Harris 1986: 268).
7.8. Homeric Counterfactuals: Past
In Homer, the past counterfactual construction + indicative II (aorist), indicative II +  is 
used, as in Attic. There are seventy instances of "fully developed" past counterfactuals in 
Homer, such as (without  in the apodosis):
ε  γάρ τίς μ  λλη γε γυναικ ν ...ἰ ᾽ ἄ ῶ
... γγειλε κα  ξ πνου νέγειρεν,ἤ ὶ ἐ ὕ ἀ
τ  κε τάχα στυγερ ς μιν γ ν πέπεμψα νέεσθαιῷ ῶ ἐ ὼ ἀ
... σ  δ  το τό γε γ ρας νήσει. ὲ ὲ ῦ ῆ ὀ
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for if any other of the women had told me this, I would straightaway have sent her back in sorry 
wise to return; but to you old age will bring profit (Od. 23.21-24).
Out of seventy, however, forty-seven counterfactuals are "if-not situations", which involve a 
narrator interrupting the story and presenting an alternative to the actual course of events. The 
main clause in these cases describes the expected event which does not materialize, and the 
subordinate clause the unexpected but actual state of affairs:
καί νύ κεν νθ  πόλοιτο ... Α νείας,ἔ ᾽ ἀ ἰ
ε  μ  ρ  ξ  νόησε ... φροδίτηἰ ὴ ἄ ᾽ ὀ ὺ Ἀ
And now Aeneas would have lost his life there, if Aphrodite had not watched sharply (Il. 5.311-
12)
νθά κεν α τε Τρ ες ... π  χαι νἔ ὖ ῶ ὑ ᾽ Ἀ ῶ
λιον ε σανέβησαν ...Ἴ ἰ
ε  μ  ρ  Α νεί  τε κα  κτορι ε πε ...ἰ ὴ ἄ ᾽ ἰ ᾳ ὶ Ἕ ἶ
... λενοςἝ  
Then the Trojans would have been driven again by the Achaeans up to Ilium, if Helenus had not 
said to Aeneas and Hector ..  (Il. 6.73-76)
καί νύ κεν ια πάντα κατέφθιτο κα  μένε  νδρ ν,ἤ ὶ ᾽ ἀ ῶ
ε  μή τίς με θε ν λοφύρατο καί μ  λέησεἰ ῶ ὀ ᾽ ἐ  [or: σάωσε]ἐ  
and now all my stores would have been spent and the strength of my men, if not one of the gods 
had taken pity on me and saved me (Od. 4.363-64; Wakker 212-13).
The ε -clause, in second position, introduces the surprising course of events, whereas the mainἰ  
clause refers to what preceding events led to expect. On some occasions, the ε  μή constructionἰ  
is replaced by an ll  coordinated clause (Il. 5.22-24, 17.319-25; Od. 9.79-80; de Jong 2004: 
69 lists Il. 15.459-64, a regular counterfactual followed by a clause coordinated by ll): 
according to Ruijgh (1992: 82-83), the e m + indicative II did arise precisely from the 
construction with ll + indicative II, which relates a fact (Wakker 210n168). A non-negative 
e m counterfactual is Od. 11.317-20, followed by an explanation of what prevented the 
realization of the if-clause (de Jong spots Il. 15.459-64). There are also instances of both main 
clause and if-clause in the negative (Il. 11.504-05, 12.290-93; Od. 24.41-42). The particle  
often follows e m (Il. 3.374, 5.312, 5.680, 8.91, 8.132, 20.291, 23.541, 24.715; Od. 23.242) or 
appears in a surrounding relative clause (Il. 15.461, 17.72, 17.532, 23.384; Od. 4.366). Near 
death or near defeat are described in this way, a god or a human in most cases intervening to 
rescue the situation. This narrative technique provides information relevant to the addressee, by 
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emphasizing the critical nature of the events, and creates a clash between what happens and 
what does not, so making the actual events stand out (Wakker 214).
8. More on Homeric if-nots
If-not counterfactuals have also been analyzed as instances of "presentation through negation". 
A common narrative pattern in Homer is the statement of an event by its opposite. In “He 
(Agamemnon) did not stop fighting” (Il. 11.255), the implication is that stopping would be 
expected (de Jong 2004: 61). The negative formulation points to likely but unrealized 
possibilities. Achilles’ spear is said not to be picked up during the arming of Patroclus. This 
subverts audiences' expectations of arming scenes (Il. 16.140-42); that spear is also used later by 
Achilles to avenge Patroclos and kill Hector (de Jong 2004: 62). 
If-not sentences express the factual in the negative. De Jong examines each if-not in the 
Iliad as a form of interaction between narrator and narratee. Earlier scholars had just 
commented on samples: Bassett (1938: 100-02) had remarked that the function of if-nots is to 
emphasize critical points for the audience; Kullman (1956: 42-48) and Reinhardt (1961: 107-10) 
saw them as ways to turn the course of events; Fenik called them "extreme situations" (Fenik 
1968: 175; de Jong 2004: 69; 262n59). Philologists had written on the use of negatives before. 
In “L’expression négative”, Marouzeau (1949: 185) commented “Dire ‘non’ n’est pas le simple 
pendant de dire ‘oui’”; there is no need to specify that it is not  raining, unless someone thinks it 
is.
Narrow escapes in the Iliad, such as last-minute rescues of heroes by a god or a human, 
or of one side in the war, plus some non-dramatic situations, are related in this way. The unreal 
but likely alternative is mentioned first, followed by the real event cast in an if-not clause 
(thirty-three cases in narrator-text, eleven per type, and five in character-text; de Jong 2004: 68-
78). The moods are: thirty-five indicative apodoses with ν/κεν (thirtyone aorists, fourἄ  
imperfects), and three optatives with ν/κεν; all protases are in the aorist (de Jong 2004: 69).ἄ  
Normal counterfactuals, as we saw in Wakker, exist in Homer:
ε  δέ κ  τι προτέρω γένετο δρόμος μφοτέροισι,ἰ ᾽ ἔ ἀ
τώ κέν μιν παρέλασσ  ο δ  μφήριστον θηκεν᾽ ὐ ᾽ ἀ ἔ
And if the course had been still longer for the two of them,
then he would have passed him by, nor have made the outcome in doubt  (Il. 23.526-27)
But these have the main clause second, so reflecting the order of events. If-nots reverse both 
chronological order and clause position. One important and much-discussed instance of this is 
Poseidon’s rescue of Aeneas from Achilles:
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νθά κεν Α νείας μ ν πεσσύμενον βάλε πέτρἔ ἰ ὲ ἐ ῳ
 κόρυθ   σάκος, τό ο  ρκεσε λυγρ ν λεθρον,ἢ ᾽ ἠὲ ἱ ἤ ὸ ὄ
τ ν δέ κε Πηλεΐδης σχεδ ν ορι θυμ ν πηύρα,ὸ ὸ ἄ ὸ ἀ
ε  μ  ρ  ξ  νόησε Ποσειδάων νοσίχθωνἰ ὴ ἄ ᾽ ὀ ὺ ἐ
Then would Aeneas have struck him with the stone as he rushed on him,
either on the helmet or on the shield that had [or: would have] warded from him woeful 
destruction, and the son of Peleus from close at hand would with his sword have taken Aeneas' 
life, if Poseidon, the shaker of the earth, had not been quick to notice (Il. 20.288-91).
Leaf (1902, on 20.289) found the double apodosis, “with its long chain of unrealised 
possibilities, by no means in the Homeric manner” (de Jong 2004:  262); this is although there 
are at least six of them in the Iliad (Il. 3.373-75, 8.130-32, 11.310-12, 17.319-22, 18.165-68, 
20.288-91). Bakker (2005: 90) talks of the "poetics of the Iliad", including if-nots, as the 
frequent "verbalization of what could have happened, but did not". On this occasion, Poseidon 
stops "the course of events from becoming anti-action ... The death of Aeneas would have been 
in conflict with known poetic tradition; it would have been π ρ μο ραν". Poseidon himselfὑ ὲ ῖ  
warns Aeneas not to act π ρ μο ραν (ὑ ὲ ῖ Il. 20.336. Bakker 1997: 178; 179n69). By the "reversal 
passage", the saviour rescues not only a hero, but also the whole epic tradition (Bakker 1997: 
179). Other if-nots are less threatening, such as Il. 17.530-31; the two Aiantes stop a fight 
between Hektor and Automedon, but that does not challenge fate (also Il. 23.491, 24.713). As 
mini-battle scenes (de Jong 2004: 70), if-nots constitute the basic ingredients of epic.
9. "Beinahe-Episoden" in the Aeneid and before
Nesselrath (1992) examines narrative twists of the if-not type in Greek and Latin epic and 
ancient drama.7
The Odyssey, first systematically studied by Lang (1989), has fewer and shorter if-nots  
(twenty-seven) than the Iliad (fourty-six), since it contains fewer battles. Like the Iliad and all 
epics, however, it includes large-scale, imminent but curtailed developments, such as Odysseus' 
early homecoming. Nesselrath disagrees with Lang's view (1989: 19) that "maintenance of 
suspense" in the Odyssey replaces premature contemplation of disasters in the Iliad; there is 
plenty of suspense in the Iliad (Nesselrath 28-29). The Iliad itself is a large if-not, Nesselrath 
argues, stating that Achilles' anger would have enabled the Trojans to win, if he had not timely 
returned to battle (Nesselrath 27); with its forty-six, nine-type if-nots of various lengths, the 
Iliad proved a "mine" for future epics (Nesselrath 10-27). 
7  Predecessors listed: von Nägelbasch (1861; Iliad), Arend (1933), Bassett (1938), Schadewaldt 
(1938; Iliad), Kullman (1956; Iliad); Reinhardt (1961; Iliad); Fenik (1968; Iliad); de Jong (1987; 
Iliad); Lang (1989).
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Post-Homer, the Greeks' near-flight on ships in the Cypria parallels the same scene in 
Iliad 2 (Nesselrath 39). Hesiod's Theogony 836-9 has a double apodosis duel between Zeus and 
Typhoeus, Zeus at his most endangered (Nesselrath 41-42); we will see how this relates to Aen.  
1.58-59 and 2.54-56. The Hymn to Demeter contains three if-nots; the Hymn to Apollo states 
that the foundation of Delphi as the temple to Apollo would not have happened, if the Boeotian 
spring Telphusa had behaved more hospitably to Apollo (Nesselrath 43). There are thirteen if-
nots in Apollonius Rhodius' Argonautica, evenly split between human and divine interventions, 
with one involving nature. They occur outside of battles, although these exist. Different 
formulas are used, the longest episode relying on 4.1305-08, an adversative ( λλ ) scheme thatἀ ά  
introduces the Argo's stranding in the Libyan desert (Nesselrath 44-46).  
Latin offers no true equivalents for the Greek κα  ν  κε(ν) / νθάί ύ ἔ  κε(ν) ... ε  μ  / ἰ ὴ λλἀ ά. 
Aen. 5.232-34 has et fors + pluperfect subjunctive, ni + pluperfect subjunctive; elsewhere, ni 
with subjunctive, following a main clause with subjunctive and sometimes indicative. 
Nesselrath comments on the pluperfect indicative of Aen. 2.55 (impulerat) that it shows how 
close the action was to its full realization, si non here replacing ni; but he overlooks the initial 
position of the si-clause, however, which annuls the effect of surprise (Nesselrath 74-75; 136, 
notes; 137). Counter-movement is also provided by the cum-inversum construction. The total 
number of if-nots in the Aeneid, twenty, is much lower than the forty-six of the Iliad, which is 
once and a half the length (Quintus Smyrnaeus' Posthomerica, roughly as long as the Aeneid, 
has thirty-eight); but they are longer and more elaborate. Writers influenced by Virgil produced 
similar numbers and types. The role of fate, positive and negative, Nesselrath finds stronger in 
Virgil and later Roman than in Greek epics. Concerning choice of events, although there are 
more battles in Roman epics, if-nots are scarcer there (as in the Argonautica. Nesselrath 75). A 
hero escapes death (and one side of the war defeat. 9.757-61) by the device only once in the 
Aeneid (10.324-28). Sporting competitions traditionally show if-not thinking in all epics. In the 
Aeneid, this happens in the games for Anchises (Nesselrath 76). One important if-not occurrence 
is Aeneas' near-saving of Turnus at the end (Aen. 12.930-52); this is interrupted by the sight of 
Pallas' belt in a cum-clause (12.941), which reminds him of his friend's slaughter and provokes 
him to revenge (Nesselrath 78). A  mirror scene of this is perhaps Juno's triple rescuing of 
Turnus in Aen. 10.685-86 (Nesselrath 78). 
The way Nesselrath understands "undone events" is clearly on a large scale. The repeated 
frustrations of the Trojans' project to find Italy in the first half, he considers if-nots: Anchises 
refuses to go (2.635-49) and Aeneas is tempted to find death in Troy (2.655-72), but, in a cum-
clause, divine signs release the impasse (from 2.680); Dido provides another retarding 
mechanism, broken by Mercury's reminder to Aeneas to move on (4.265-76. Nesselrath 80); the 
women's burning of the ships threatens the narrative again (from 5.630), until Jupiter stops it 
(5.685-99). Soon Aeneas ponders whether to remain in Sicily (5.700-03); that is remedied by the 
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seer Nantes (5.704-18) and Anchises' apparition (5.722-39). 
In the second half of the Aeneid, there is the threat of premature land-grab and association 
with the Latins (7.284: the Trojans return bringing peace), in contradiction with the 
announcement in the second proemium, of horrida bella (7.37-45; Nesselrath 81). A "but" 
sequence follows: Juno notices and takes action to bring about war (7.286-87; Nesselrath 
82n148). The rest of the book derives from that counter-development. In book 12, the threat of 
an early end reoccurs, when Aeneas and Latinus agree to a duel between Aeneas and Turnus as 
resolution to the conflict. Another "but" counter-movement starts, with the Rutulians' objection; 
the war continues (12.216-76; Nesselrath 82-83). Book 11 reports that Turnus' plan would have 
been successful, if his allies had not been defeated elsewhere; the coming battle is postponed by 
a ni-clause announcing the sunset (11.912-94). In book 6, Anchises concludes his pageant of 
Roman heroes to Aeneas with the young Marcellus, who died in Virgil's time before he could 
ascend to power as expected. This is perhaps Virgil's "boldest" counterfactual; also 
grammatically, as we will see, and as Nesselrath outlines (Nesselrath 84; 84n152).
If-not mechanisms are clearly perceived by Nesselrath, as by Hornblower, as narrative 
techniques which are parallel to larger twists in storylines.
10. Latin Conditionals
10.1. Martín Puente 2009: Conditionals of the Predication, Proposition, Enunciation
Martín Puente, contributor to the 2009 anthology Sintaxis del latín clásico, which takes a 
functionalist approach, thus emphasizing communication and pragmatics, identifies three broad 
categories of Latin conditionals which use si: conditionals of the predication, proposition and 
enunciation; these match Wakker's (1994) predicational ("If it rains, I'll take the umbrella"), 
propositional ("If I'm not mistaken, Peter is at home") and illocutionary ("If you are thirsty, 
there is some been in the fridge". Austin's biscuit conditionals).8 The protases of the last two 
relate to the higher levels of the sentence rather than to their apparent apodoses, and to some 
aspect of the current communication, behaving like profecto, quidem, ut vero tibi dicam (MP 
659). Some sentences have a conditional sense without si, such as epistulae offendunt non loco 
redditae (Cic. Fam. 11.16.1. "... if they come at the wrong time") and dummodo sit dives,  
barbarus ipse placet (Ov. Ars Am. 2.276. "Provided that ...". MP 658-59). Others, completives, 
behave like arguments of verbs, and show modal discordance between main and subordinate 
clause: hoc vero tam inopinatum malum et paene inauditum non miror si sine metu fuit, cum  
8 See notes 2, 3 and 5.
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esset sine exemplo (Sen. Ep. 91.1. "I do not wonder, however, that he was free from 
apprehension ...". MP 662; Bodelot 2000).
Enunciation / illocutionary conditionals, which relate to the relevance of the main 
clause, are not biconditionals. MP identifies: polite use (sis = si vis, si licet, si placet, si fas est), 
for instance si licet, inquit, consules, de re publica dicere, errare ego populum in hac causa non  
patiar (Liv. 3.71.3. "If, consuls, I'm allowed to speak ..."); metalinguistic use: nec Quirites vos  
sed milites videor appellaturus, si nomen hoc saltem ruborem incutere ... possit (Liv. 45.37.14 
"... if that title can at least call up a blush ..."); and "usos procesurales": siquidem pol me queris,  
adsum praesens praesenti tibi (Plaut. Mostell. 1075; MP 669-70). 
Propositional conditionals have protases which often mean "if it is true that p": si, quo 
die ista caedes Romae facta est, ego Athenis eo die fui, in caede interesse non potui (Cic. Inv.  
rhet. 1.63. "If ... on that day I was in Athens, I could not ...") or "according to": scorpiones 
maiores minoresque ad sexaginta captos scripserim si auctorem Graecum sequar Silenum, si  
Valerium Antiatem, maiorum scorpionum sex milia, minorum tredecim milia (Liv. 26.49.3; MP 
667-68).
Predicational conditionals split between prototypical conditionals and conditionals 
with other values. MP considers prototypical conditionals as biconditionals, the thinking behind 
adsequar omnia si propero: si cunctor, amitto (Cic. Att. 10.8.5). Of these there are three types, 
depending on whether the condition is presented as possible, indifferent or false (Nuñez 1996; 
MP 2009: 663). In the first case, Latin uses the indicative in both protasis and apodosis: si di  
sunt, est diuinatio (Cic. Div. 2.41). In a potential conditional, the higher degree of unreality is 
marked by the present subjunctive in both protasis and apodosis for the present: possim illud 
probare, si velim, omnem te hanc pecuniam domum tuam avertisse (Cic. Verr. 2.3.164. "I could 
prove, if I chose, that ..."); and by the perfect subjunctive in the apodosis for the past, generally 
with the present subjunctive in the protasis: facturusne operae pretium sim, si a primordio urbis  
res populi Romani perscripserim, nec satis scio nec, si sciam, dicere ausim (Liv., Praef. 1. 
"Whether I am likely to ... , ... I neither know for certain, nor if I knew would I dare to avouch 
it"). A counterfactual, considered false by the speaker, takes the imperfect subjunctive in both 
components for the present: is iam pridem est mortuus; si viveret, verba eius audiretis (Cic. Q. 
Rosc. 42. "He has long since died; if he was alive, you would ..."); and the pluperfect 
subjunctive for the past: si id scissem, numquam huc tetulissem pedem (Ter. An. 808. "If I had 
known, I would not have set foot". MP 666). 
Predicational conditionals can also acquire different senses from the context. The 
relevant protases can be concessive: non possum disposite istum accusare, si cupiam (Cic. Verr. 
2.4.87. "... even if I wanted to"); and causal: epistulam Caesaris misi, si minus legisses (Cic. Att.  
13.22.5. "... in case you did not read it"); or final: omnibus deinceps diebus Caesar exercitum in  
aciem aequum in locum produxit, si Pompeius proelio decertare vellet (Caes. BCiv. 3.55.1. "... 
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in case Pompey wanted to decide matters by a fight"). These main sentences are true 
independently of protases (MP 2009: 666). There are "iterative conditionals": si quis collegam 
appellasset, ab eo, ad quem venerat, ita discedebat, ut paeniteret non prioris decreto stetisse  
(Liv. 3.36.8. "If anybody sought redress from another decemvir, he came away regretting 
that ..."). The moods and tenses in the apodoses and protases of these cases are asymmetrical 
(MP 666-67).
Other conjunctions than si are used in Latin conditionals. Sive / seu feature in 
disjunctive coordinated protases or apodoses; facilem esse rem, seu maneant, seu proficiscantur 
(Caes. BGall. 5.31.1). Si modo tends to be postponed and is restrictive: in hac arte, si modo est  
haec ars, nullum est praeceptum, quo modo verum inveniatur (Cic. De or. 2.157. "In this art, if 
indeed it be an art, ..."). Sin introduces a second protasis, opposed to the first: si domi sum, foris  
est animus: sin foris sum, animus domist (Plaut. Merc. 589) (MP 659-60). 
Ni, originally not conditional, acquired the sense of nisi and was itself replaced by si  
non, initially to emphasize an opposition. The resulting conditional always has a restrictive 
value: nemo enim fere saltat sobrius, nisi forte insanit (Cic. Mur. 13. "... , unless of course out of 
his mind"). MP does not mention the indicative apodoses in the next two examples, listed to 
illustrate the distinction between line-initial and line-final protases using ni and nisi: (protasis 
first) ac ni caedem eius Narcissus properavisset, verterat pernicies in accusatorem (Tac. Ann. 
11.37.1. "If Narcissus had not hastened her death, ruin would have ..."); (protasis second, 
expressing a condition to a related but "non-explicit" event) trudebanturque in paludem ... ni  
Caesar productas legiones instruxisset (Tac. Ann. 1.63.2. "They would have been pushed ..., if 
Caesar had not ...") (MP 660). Earlier scholars had commented on the discrepancy; Torrego 
(1999; mentioned in MP 660) treats the subject extensively, as discussed below. 
Hypothetical comparisons are introduced by quasi, tamquam, tamquam si, velut si, ut, 
with the subjunctive: tamquam si claudus sim, cum fustist ambulandum (Plaut. Asin. 427. "As if 
I were lame, I have to ...". MP 2009: 660-61).
10.2. Origins of Latin Conditionals: Parataxis?
There is some agreement that the Latin conditional originated paratactically, rather than as a 
main clause (apodosis) to which another is subordinate (protasis). The etymology of si would 
seem to justify that view. Coming from the locative *sei like sic, si has been read as "so" in 
early Latin texts: meam rem non cures, si recte facias (Plaut. Capt. 632) is translated "Do not 
worry about my affairs, so you will do well" (MP 659; Ernout-Thomas 1959: 374; Kühner-
Stegmann 1955: 2,388). Palmer (1968: 331) translates Si sapias, eas ac decumbas domi (Plaut. 
Merc. 373) as "Thus you would be wise: go home and lie down". As evidence for that theory, 
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Kühner-Stegmann (1955: 2,388) quote the survival into classical Latin of the expression si dis  
placet as "so it pleases the gods": in omnibus circulis atque etiam, si dis placet, in conviviis  
sunt, qui exercitus in Macedoniam ducant (Liv. 44.22.8). A non-conditional reading is clear also 
in Alfred Cary Schlesinger's translation: "In all clubs and even - God save us! - at dinner-tables 
there are experts who ...".   
Pinkster (1972: 168), however, while conceding that some subordinators may have been 
coordinators or adverbs first (like dum, "a while"), agrees with Lakoff that the hypothesized 
proto-language without subordination would be unique amongst known languages (Lakoff 
1968: 4-6). Kühner-Stegmann's reference to elementary language Pinkster considers misguided 
(Kühner-Stegmann 1955: 2,1; Pinkster 1972: 168). Concerning the apparent lack of 
subordinators in Indo-European, Pinkster points to Meillet's 1915 warning (1948: 162-63) 
against arguments from silence: we would not know of sed, nam, ut and cum in Latin, just from 
looking at Romance languages (Pinkster 1972: 168-89; 1990: 139; 276n76). Subordination as 
deficiency of meaning (Szantyr 1965: 526; 85*; Kühner-Stegmann 1955: 2,2) is particularly 
displeasing: how do we deal with cum-inversum sentences, for instance, which deliberately 
confuse main and secondary clauses? Szantyr considers them later constructions to be ignored, 
but provides no evidence for that view (Szantyr 1965: 85*; Pinkster 1972: 169-170).
Pinkster rejects Scherer's (1975) speculations on how two independent Latin sentences 
may have merged: ubi sim nescio may come from ubi sim? nescio (Scherer 1975: 238). But a 
deliberative ubi sim is unlikely in Latin, and nescio needs a second argument; if that is ubi sim, 
then it is subordinated to nescio (Pinkster 1990: 139-40). Blatt’s “reanalysis” as explanation for 
the evolution of the Accusativus cum Infinitivo again divides complex sentences into unlikely 
segments: arguo: pecunias cepisse would have the odd phrase pecunias cepisse by itself, and 
arguo without the arguments it requires (Blatt 1952: 252-53; Pinkster 1990: 140).  
Also opposed to a "parataxe primitive" was Haudry (1973). Noticing the skepticism of 
Meillet (1948/1915) and Lakoff (1968), he proposed that subordination results from the 
correlative structure "normal diptych". Scholars most often think of the juxtaposition of 
independent sentences as the origin of hypotaxis. Regarding conditionals, to most a paratactic 
origin would seem evident: it is not only si that is a locative (*sey), but the Greek and Baltic 
conditional particles are too (Haudry 1973: 151). However, Haudry points to the existence of 
other conditional particles in Baltic languages derived from *kwod; in Latin, there is quod sī. 
The conditional meaning probably resided in quod, while sī was an anaphoric pronoun meaning 
"so, then" (Haudry 1973: 152n8: There is no parallel in Greek, though). A process of renovation 
led to sī conditionals without quod (Haudry 1973: 152).
Correlation comes between parataxis and hypotaxis: in tel père, tel fils, for instance, 
there is total parallelism between the two components (Haudry 1973: 153; 186). Haudry 
identifies three chronological levels of correlation in Latin: the most ancient, based on *kwod ... 
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*to (cum ... tum, ...); possibly more recent, ut ... ita, ...; and qui ... is. Minard (1936) calls the 
basic form of correlation "normal diptych": the relative clause precedes the clause introduced by 
a correlative or anaphoric, though a reversal of positions is most common (Haudry 1973: 154). 
Diptychs in Latin include: quos ferro trucidari oportebat, eos nondum voce vulnero (Cic. 1st 
oration Cat. 9. "men who ..., as yet I am not even wounding [them]") (Haudry 1973: 156). The 
passage from correlative to hypotactic status occured in clauses such as: Germani qui trans  
Rhenum incolunt (Caes. BGall. 1.28.3), later Germani, qui .... 
Lehmann (1973: 15n17), however, expressed doubts on grounds of rarity of examples 
and uncertain interchangeability between si and sic. Bodelot (2000) supports a paratactic origin 
of conditionals with the si-clause, containing a cataphoric si meaning "in the following 
situation" followed by the situation: Si venias, laetus sim. The debate concerns Virgil, in view of 
his own dislocation of apodoses from protases.
10.3. The Rise and Fall of the Latin Subjunctive
Latin optative forms, linguists largely agree, became subjunctive, and subjunctive forms became 
future indicative; and the subjunctive expanded in classical Latin, then shrank. Both optative 
and subjunctive were former past tenses or connected with the perfect aspect. Close links 
between past and non-indicative moods have been observed in many languages. Repeated past, 
for instance, is expressed in the optative in Homeric Greek subordinate clauses (Il. 12.268: 
"whenever they saw, δοιενἴ , a man hang back from the fighting". Benveniste 1951: 17-18).
Calboli (2005) uses Hittite juridical language to support his thesis on how IE past 
indicative became past eventual. The passage accompanied that from a specific to a general 
case, with unreality marked by the particle man, or mān (comparable to ν, κε(ν), and κα inἄ  
Greek). This is intended to show that moods started as modifications of indicative tenses. As 
moods expanded and specialized, they eventually contracted. The Greek optative was gradually 
replaced by the subjunctive after classical times and finally disappeared. The old Latin 
subjunctive specialized to express the future, and the optative which replaced it as subjunctive 
then expanded, only to give way to the indicative in vulgar and late Latin in consecutive, 
hypothetical and interrogative clauses (Calboli 2005: 516-17). 
Regarding conditionals, other changes took place. The present subjunctive was used for 
both potential and unreal (counterfactual) present conditionals, until the imperfect subjunctive 
became the tense used to differentiate present counterfactuals in classical times; early Latin past 
counterfactuals were marked by the imperfect subjunctive: deos credo voluisse; nam ni vellent,  
non fieret, scio (Plaut. Aul. 742; Ernout-Thomas 1953: 377; Harris 1986: 268; 281n2). Calboli 
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(2005: 512) gives this example of present subjunctive expressing the present counterfactual of 
early Latin, Vahlen's reconstruction of three lines from Ennius’ tragedy Telamon 316-18: Ego 
deum genus semper dixi et dicam caelitum / sed eos non curare opinor, quid agat humanum  
genus: / nam si curent, bene bonis sit, male malis; quod nunc abest; “... for if they did care, it 
would go well with well-doers; but ...”. Woodcock (1959: 153), reporting the same passage, 
comments that "It is left to the context to make clear whether future possibility is contemplated, 
or whether the thought is confined totally to the present". Homeric Greek, as we saw, was in a 
similar position, as both potential (realizable) and present counterfactual (unrealizable) 
conditionals took the optative (Il. 12.322-27; Wakker 1994: 211-12; 212n171: "The same 
vagueness between counterfactual and 'optative' is seen in Plautus").
Why did the distinction arise? In Latin, the expression of the unreal as a whole 
expanded in classical times. Examples are: -urum fuisse, an infinitive used in subordinate 
clauses with an unreal meaning (Cic. Lig. 23, Africam ... tibi patrem suum traditurum fuisse, 
"that his father would have given up to you that province"); the cum-historicum construction 
with the subjunctive, exemplified in Cicero’s “correction” of Plautus’ temporal quom exibam 
dono (Aul. 178) to cum exirem domo (Cic. Div. 1.65); and the expression dixerit quispiam also 
in Cicero (Nat. D. 2.133; Leg. agr. 2.32; Phil. 14.13; Rep. 1.71; 2.48), which did not exist in 
early Latin, although it does in the Iliad (καί ποτέ τις ε π σιν,ἴ ῃ  Il. 6.459. Calboli 2005: 512-14). 
Through these non-deictic forms, speakers express the unreal. They also "avoid responsibility in 
the verbal process" (Calboli 2005: 511).
10.4. Orlandini 2005: Mitigators
Orlandini (2005) elaborates on the mechanisms Latin used to modify the factuality of sentences 
and to reduce speakers' commitment to utterances (Hare 1970; Lakoff 1973; Caffi 1999). 
"Bushes", "hedges" and "shields" achieve such mitigations. In Latin, "bushes" are quasi, 
tamquam, velut, quidam; "hedges" are types of conditionals, described below (Orlandini 621-
22); "shields" resemble "bushes", distancing the speaker from deixis (ego-hic-nunc) and 
attributing the assertion to a different speaker: Haec precatus, veluti si sensisset auditas  
preces ... Restitere Romani tamquam caelesti voce iussi (Liv. 1.12.7. "After such prayers, as if 
feeling they had been granted ... they stopped as if commanded by a voice from heaven". Are 
tamquam and velut not bushes?). Exempla ficta, non-actualized possible worlds often cast as 
conditional sentences, fit into this category: Si unus quisque ad se rapiat commoda aliorum 
detrahatque quod cuique possit emolumenti sui gratia, societas hominum et communitas  
evertatur necesse est (Cic. Off. 3.22; "If each one of us took the goods of others for himself and 
removed what he could from each, for his own advantage, human society and community would 
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